

THE  
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*A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL  
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# THE ANDOVER REVIEW.

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## PRESS NOTICES.

This *Review* completes its first volume with the June number now at hand. It is to be said that its half dozen issues thus far have fully met expectations as to the ability and spirit displayed, and this is saying much. It has not proved quite the new and novel explosive that was predicted in some quarters. The steeples remain fairly plumb all about the ancient Seminary. Yet it is certain that something has been gained in the way of frank and full discussion of questions heretofore avoided or slurred over. — *New York Evangelist*.

The *Andover Review* is the latest, and it is not too much to say it is the best, of the reviews now published in this country. It is the best, not because it ranks highest in scholarship (though it is below none), nor because it gives the most correct representation of the living thought of the times (others do that), but because it combines the most other good qualities along with these chief excellencies. The average preacher is not able to read more than one leading review, and this is the best, because it best meets his wants. Two reasons: (1) It is catholic; several denominations are represented in its list of contributors; many are Congregationalists, like its editors, but Professor Brown and Principal Grant are Presbyterians; Dr. Buckley is a Methodist; Dr. Mulford is an Episcopalian, and Dr. Stuckenbergh is a Lutheran. This insures that quality of catholicity which will commend this *Review* to a wide circle of readers in all denominations. (2.) It gives great prominence to book reviews. These are full, capable, and intelligent. By reference to them the reader will be able to keep abreast with the products of the press, and will be greatly aided in selecting volumes for his personal use. The name of the reviewer is always attached — this is of itself a recommendation. Another "best" feature of this *Review* might be added: that it comes to hand more frequently than any other (monthly) and at no additional expense. — *Missionary Record* (St. Louis).

Whatever fears may have been entertained in regard to the "Progressive Orthodoxy" of New England, it will be conceded that it finds expression in a "live" journal. The *Andover Review* is conspicuous for the ability with which it is conducted. It is bold, yet conservative, and we believe that truth will be subserved by its discussion of subjects which are engrossing the attention of the theological world. — *The Messenger*.

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The *Andover Review* for June shows plainly the invigorating, strengthening effects that the consciousness of success and abundant moral backing gives. It was from the beginning fearless in the expression of opinion; but never yet as plainly, frankly outspoken as in this number. We refer especially to its editorials. The two on "Indisposition to face Religious Problems," and "Accountability of the Ultra-Conservatives," are undoubtedly the most striking articles of the number. They say boldly just what one feels the editors would have liked to say a good while ago already — and what certainly ought to be said. — *The Moravian*.

*The Andover Review* for June sustains the high reputation this latest of the religious monthlies has already acquired. For the scholarly discussion of the most recent phases of religious thought, we know of nothing superior to it. — *Pittsburgh Christian Advocate*.

The editorials in *The Andover Review* are an important feature. Written mostly by the professors at Andover, they touch the nerve of the religious consciousness of our time and do much to define and affirm present convictions.

The *Review* may be congratulated on gaining with its sixth issue the confidence of the religious public. It is conducted with remarkable ability, and if its editors did nothing more than what they put into its pages, they would make themselves felt strongly in the movement of present intellectual life. The *Review* has become indispensable to thoughtful persons. — *Boston Herald*.

In every number we find something to be especially preserved. — *The Churchman* (New York).

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VOL. II.—JULY, 1884.—No. I.

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THE OFFICE OF PROOF IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF  
GOD.

RELIGIOUS conviction is not the result of any formal proof. It waits for no such plodding process. It leaps to its tremendous influence. It issues from the experience of daily life and the world of common observation. It is not an achievement of philosophy; it is an interpretation of life. Precisely as, in the physical life, the question abruptly presses: What is this world which thus environs and besets me? and the answer will not be denied: It is a real, external, objective world; so the spiritual life, even in the interpreting of its own experience, finds itself face to face with an external objective factor of that experience, which has been involved throughout the whole process of self-interpretation, just as the breathing of the atmosphere is involved in any inquiry concerning the external world. The reality of this external, physical world has been a favorite theme of speculative skepticism. Idealism has sought to expel from the mind this fiction of a reality beyond our own impressions. Yet, difficult as idealism is to disprove, it is still more difficult to enforce. The mind insists upon an adequate hypothesis for its experience and finds this adequate explanation in nothing less than a real world. If this reality cannot be proved it must be because it is too close for proof, involved and assumed in the very process of analysis. Thus it happens that all natural science begins with this tremendous assumption, and finds the very possibility of its progress in a prodigious and yet an unhesitating act of faith. In precisely the same way the spiritual life, waked to reflections concerning its emotions and desires, finds itself abruptly brought face to face with another factor of its experience. Over against its struggles and its peace it discovers a Reality which interprets them. The universal sense of depend-

ence, which seems the degradation, but becomes the glory of humanity, — the striving for freedom, which knows no limitations of time or of completeness, — what do these mean, how did they begin their conflicts in the depths of human experience, and where shall they find their final peace, except in Him whose service is perfect Freedom? Thus the spiritual life, like the physical life, begins with an act of faith. It assumes the reality of that which makes its own reality possible. It believes in the atmosphere which it breathes. It disregards proof because its object is too near for proof. It finds God — as Jacobi said — “because only in finding God does one find himself.” It is with the religious life as with the Prodigal Son ; — no sooner does one “come to himself” than he says, “I will arise and go to my Father.”<sup>1</sup>

Such, we must confess, is the practical and historical method of the religious life. It simply becomes aware that throughout its own development the life of God has been implicated and involved. Then life becomes plain, justified, durable. Then the events of life find meaning. A working basis for its experience has been laid ; and the outward and the inward factors of experience are accepted as equally fixed and sure. The events which seem, on the one hand, like human processes and experiences, reveal themselves on the other hand, as divine leadings. That which we call religion from the one side, is, from the other side, revelation. That which we trace as a human evolution in the history of the race appears to the awakened heart as a “drawing” of the Father.

But, if this represents the practical experience of the devout life, an interesting question at once meets us. What shall we say of the time-honored, historic, labored proofs of God, so familiar to students of the history of philosophy and at times so persuasive through their method and effect? A curious destiny has controlled these arguments. They have been the comfort of one age and the scorn of another. At one time they have been forced to support

<sup>1</sup> “It is not experience and its manifold content which have developed this consciousness of the Infinite ; this consciousness lies in the very nature of our being and waits only for favoring conditions of experience to unfold it.” Lotze, *Mikrokosmus*, ii. 340.

“Man is conscious of the being of the external world and lives and acts in that consciousness, and the being of the external world so comes to be apprehended by him. And, further, man is conscious of the being of God and lives and acts in this consciousness, and the reality of the being of God so comes to him.” Mulford, *Republic of God*, p. 1.

“The recognition of absolute dependence as a universal element of life completely supplants the need of any so-called proofs of the existence of God.” Schleiermacher, *Christliche Glaube*, i. § 33.

more weight than they could carry ; at another they have not been trusted in the structure of thought at all. Just now we have swung to the extreme of disbelief in any efficacy from such demonstrations. It is said, on the one hand, that they are superfluous, and, on the other hand, that they are impossible ; superfluous, because they convey conviction only to the mind already predisposed to religion ; impossible, because they transcend the limits of that verifiable experience which provides our only valid test of truth.

As to the latter of these criticisms, it is sufficient to say<sup>1</sup> that if the limits of experience were made the limits of thought, not merely theological discussions but even those generalizations upon which natural science is built would become illegitimate. Every general conception — the conception of a scientific Law, for example — is an inference which leads far beyond actual experience ; every proof of the limitations of human knowledge holds in itself the correlative conception of thought beyond experience ; every process of thought, in its moulding and translating of the elements of experience is vastly more than the real product of the impressions which it uses as its material. Thus, when we speak with strictness of a "philosophy of experience" we are in reality so limiting knowledge that any philosophy — even a philosophy of experience — becomes impossible. One of the most curious facts of history is the repeated attempt to limit the themes of profitable inquiry and the no less inevitably repeated return of the human mind — as by a law of its own nature — to the regions which it has been forbidden to enter.

As to the superfluity of these proofs of God the objection is certainly valid that they do not and cannot commend themselves to the mind unaffected by religious interest. It is only to the mind already turned that way, only to those that have ears to hear, that any proof can come with convincing force. Thus, as was lately said by a German professor at the outset of his lectures on Apologetics, "A science of apologetics in any strict sense is impossible." Yet this objection does not in reality make proof superfluous ; it only assigns it to its true position and office. It is true that until the religious life is awakened the proofs of God are like a demonstration of the theory of music to him who has no ear for harmony ; yet it is no less true that when the emotions and desires of religion are once stirred into activity they forthwith demand satisfaction from the mind. It would be more reasonable at this point to call the proofs of God inevitable than to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Pfeiderer, *Religionsphilosophie*, s. 383 ff.

call them superfluous. They mark the steps which the plodding reason takes over the course which the heart has traversed at a single flight. They are suggested, and even compelled, by the doubts and questionings which force themselves at once into the region of the religious life. They are the philosophical reconciliation which the faith of the heart demands with the scientific aspect of the world. Thus they play a part which is strictly subordinate, yet strictly essential. They are verifications of the religious sentiment, indicating the limits of its reasonable inferences. They are to the consciousness of God precisely what the whole philosophy of religion is to the religious life — not its origin or its fundamental stimulus, but its scientific analysis, its healthy corrective, its inevitable accompaniment.

I wish to call attention to certain characteristics of these proofs of God. Proofs in any absolute sense they are not. They no more demonstrate the beauty of the life of God to the unquickened mind of man than the analysis of a symphony demonstrates its beauty to the unmusical ear. Yet, when the mind is quickened by the suggestions of the divine life, they fulfill a most important office. If we may very briefly follow the course of each of them we shall, I think, observe two results. In the first place, we shall find that no one of the arguments stands alone. Their method is cumulative. The force of each lies in its relation to the rest. We are led, as it were, up a flight of successive steps, each of which transfers us to the next, so that in the connection of all lies the meaning of each. In the second place, we shall observe that this progress is not only cumulative but is, so to speak, circular or, more accurately, spiral. Our successive steps bring us round to the same position from which we set out, only higher up. The end of the series of the proofs of God restores us to that same attitude of direct religious experience from which we start, but with an intellectual conviction added to our original act of faith. These are the two propositions which I wish to consider.

We must, to this end, examine four kinds of proof. Two proceed from the observation of the outward world, two from the study of the inward life. Each offers something and withholds something. Each opens the way for its successor. Each has its legitimate part to play in the verification of the knowledge of God, while the complete verification lies in the unity of all.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare Kant, *Kritik der Rein. Vern.* Ww. (ed. Hartenstein), iii. 417 ff.; Hegel, *Philosophie der Religion*, Ww. xi., xii.; Biedermann, *Christliche Dogmatik*, § 635 ff.; Flint, *Theism*, ch. v. ff.; Lotze, *Religionsphilosophie*, Dictate,

I. The cosmological proof observes the facts of the outward world and seeks a sufficient cause for their origin and persistence. These facts, it argues, are not self-sufficient. Their apparent accidents must be taken up into a general law; their sequence of results into an adequate cause. Thus it infers from the reign of Law in nature the reign of a Law-maker beyond nature. Against this course of argument the most serious criticism has been offered by Kant. The Law of Causality, he remarks, is a Law of the physical world. The inferences which it suggests must be, therefore, nothing more than physical. It never can lead one out of the region of physical sequences into the region of theology. The cosmological conception of the universe has therefore only "regulative" truth. It may represent a necessity of our thought, but it does not represent a necessity of things. It is simply a transfer of our thought into a world where it does not belong.

This classic criticism, with which our century began, has appeared to many to be the end of the cosmological argument; yet it may be doubted whether it is not rather — as in a certain sense it was to Kant — a new beginning of the legitimate use of this form of proof. Up to this time the argument had sought too much. Observing physical effects in their varied and disconnected forms, it inferred a coördinating force acting from without. The criticism of Kant only turns us to the view of nature as in itself a self-coördinating and organic unity. The very possibility of orderliness, the very conception of Law in nature, implies this organic and coördinated relation of its parts. At this point there can be no difference of view between naturalists and theologians. Concerning the super-added revelation of a Law-maker beyond nature thoughtful opinions may frankly differ; concerning the inward unity of nature itself thoughtful opinions must coincide. The universe is a Cosmos and not a Chaos. In its unswerving order is found the impulse of our researches and the peace of our lives. Nothing but confidence in the universality of its laws invites us to scientific observation of its effects. "It is," says Lotze, "only when we conceive of single phenomena, not as isolated existences, but as parts of one all-embracing, infinite and inner Unity, that we can conceive of their relation with each other at all." Thus the cosmological argument takes a new form. That which seemed a fatal criticism of it opens the only way in which it reaches us with any force. Not to a Power without, but to a

self-revealing Unity within, do we refer the effects of nature. Not in the apparent accidents alone, or in the exceptional intrusions of change in nature, do we trace the special working of a higher cause. Through its whole sweep and in its universal method there is revealed a central organizing force. Under no other conception can the world without respond to the method of science, instead of exhibiting itself as a meaningless muddle of fragmentary events. Thus the cosmological argument fulfills a certain function, both positively and negatively. Positively, it affirms, under any limitation which criticism may demand, the inward unity of the outward universe. Negatively, it forbids the transition from the assumption of this organic unity to the assumption of a personal Law-maker over against a created universe. It brings us, that is to say, a certain distance on our way to the justification of the religious life, though it may seem to bring us only a short distance. It brings us to a view of nature which is, to say the least, not inconsistent with the verifications of religion which are contributed from other sources. It lays a certain foundation upon which other "proofs" may be laid. It even invites to further inquiry concerning this organic unity. It does not bring us without delay into the presence of the God of the religious life, the God who is a Spirit, who can be described as personal, or who is accessible through prayer.

II. At this point enters into the course of argument a second inference from the observation of nature,—the so-called teleological view. This is the most obvious and immediately impressive argument for Theism. From the dawn of speculation the phenomena of nature have seemed to exhibit the characteristics of design and have led plain minds to the inference of a Designer. This has been the classic method of would-be common sense theologians. Kant himself was tempted to speak of the argument from design with a respect which he bestowed upon no other proof of God. Yet this teleological proof has been to many a sanguine student the most disappointing and illusive of arguments. Its first promise is soon replaced by the sense of its limitations. What it at the beginning suggests, it at the end distinctly withdraws. No less than three forms of objection have repeatedly recurred to honest inquirers as they have examined the argument from design. They have reported, first, that it gave them no more than a carpenter of the universe, designing each thing for its own occasion, working—so to speak—by the piece; second, that much in nature, if it be called design, seems not well designed,

and forces them to count even this Carpenter of the Universe as an imperfect workman ; and third, that the very conception of design as manifested in isolated details contradicts the conception of law as manifested in the whole. This last is the really serious criticism, and the one urged by Kant against teleology. It comprehends both the earlier objections. The difficulty with the Carpenter theory is, at bottom, the fragmentary, isolated, impulsive method which it assigns to the divine order, the contrast it at once suggests with the cosmological view of an orderly and organic whole ; and, again, the judgment we pass upon events as well designed or ill designed is, in the same way, our own fragmentary, momentary judgment estimating the wisdom and beneficence of nature by its immediate effects, and not by its contribution to the final and all comprehending purpose. Thus we sum up the whole objection to design when we set it in contrast with the reign of Law. If the cosmological proof is valid, does it not make an end of the teleological proof ? If the universe is a perfect mechanism, where is the room for the interruptions of design ?

At this apparently critical point it is encouraging to notice that the view of philosophers, elsewhere of the most various tendencies, is substantially one. Whether it is the school of Kant, or the revolt of Schopenhauer, or the equipoise of Lotze, to which we turn, in each there is the clear recognition that the very hope of any unity in our conception of the universe lies in reconciliation at this point, and all unite, with more or less distinctness, in the only method which affords any promise. Once more, as in the cosmological argument, we must turn from the view from without to the view from within, from the accidental and external features of nature to its essential and inward character. Mechanism, uniformity, law — these are the characteristics in nature which make the scientific observation of it possible, and a design which counteracts this mechanism must be, in the view of science, an ill-judged, or, rather, an impossible intrusion. But what if, in and through this universal mechanism, there worked an underlying purpose ; what if, the more one recognized the uniformity of nature, the more he stood in awe before the scope and range of purpose which that uniformity fulfilled ; what if the events which seem to us the apparent intrusions of design should come — like the sound of a clock built to strike once in a century — first startling us with the sense of a new design, but in a moment recalling us to the far grander conception of a design which could comprehend both the surprises of an instant and the silence of a century ? That would

be to justify both proofs of the Divine method ; it would be to escape from this strange conflict between the thought of an orderly universe and the thought of a divinely governed universe ; it would be to supplement the cosmological argument by the acknowledgment of a purpose fulfilling itself through Law. Nature, under such a view, is not only a unity ; it is a unity with a tendency of its own. It is a "*Hinstreben*." Mechanism, in the words upon which the whole philosophy of Lotze is built, fulfills a mission which is *absolutely universal* yet *absolutely subordinate*. That which proved itself at first a central and organic force in nature now takes on the added aspect of a universal and spiritual purpose. Teleology does not conflict with mechanical sequence. It presupposes it ; and the more perfect is this mechanical sequence, the more completely does it serve the immanent design.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the teleological argument is superimposed upon the cosmological argument. It brings us another step on our way to Theism. It adds to the aspect which the universe presents in its own wholeness the character which it reveals in relation to ourselves. The universe has a meaning ; its laws interest us for this meaning which they hold. The cumulative method of our argument already appears. We have added something to our sense of unity. Yet we are still left far from the end which the "proofs" attempt to reach. We find illustrated that fact to which experience repeatedly testifies—that the phenomena of the outward world always fail at a certain point in their reflection and interpretation of the inward life of men. The environing cosmos may stimulate the religious life, but it is the microcosm of each human soul which must prompt the final justification of faith. Not through the study of nature, but through the study of human life, comes the clear interpretation of the mysteries of God. Not through the suggestions of outward events, but through the course of inward experience, must lie the way to the higher and final proofs of God.

Thus the spiritual life, with all its varied phenomena, invites us to its interpretation. We are to consider not whether its experiences are possible, but what it is which makes these experiences—

<sup>1</sup> See the remarkable essay by Professor W. James (*Princeton Review*, July, 1882), "Rationality, Activity, and Faith." "A thorough-going interpretation of the world in terms of mechanical sequence is compatible with its being interpreted teleologically. Teleology presupposes, in fact, mechanical sequence." P. 59.

inevitable as they are — possible and justified. Here again, as in the study of the outward world, two conspicuous forms of proof appear. The first is from certain isolated facts which have always seemed to compel attention; the second is from a certain total effect which the whole of the spiritual life conveys. The first is the so-called moral proof; the second is the ontological proof.

III. The argument from the fact of conscience is singled out by Kant as the only argument with which he can reconstruct a falling faith. It is carefully separated by him from his whole list of speculative proofs, and on it is rebuilt the edifice of positive results which his own criticism has just overthrown.<sup>1</sup> We need not here consider the meaning of this mighty transition and magnificent inconsistency. What we have now to see is, that in spite of the hollow sound with which much of Kant's reasoning on morals falls upon the ears of our generation, in spite of the distrust with which we hear these tremendous inferences from the one fact of conscience to the whole series of religious ideals, God, Freedom, and Immortality, we must still confess ourselves brought out into a new point of view. The "Moral Proof" is no longer a "speculative" research. We are simply invited to take a fact of universal experience just as it is, and to consider what it implies. Here is the very method which we have already tried to apply to the physical order, and the method which we may now apply quite as naturally to the moral order.

The difficulty with the earlier forms of proofs from nature has been, as we have observed, their externality, — the setting of God over against the processes of nature as the framer of its laws and the designer of its events, and we have turned from this inference of a Deity apart from his creation to the revelation which is made by the workings of nature itself, and have found the results less pretentious but more stable. We have simply taken the facts which we were able to observe, and considered what makes them possible. The same change of method has been the result of the Kantian Theory of Ethics. We no longer look outside of the range of morals for the supporter of morality. We look simply at the facts of morals, register their deliverances, and translate their statements. This is precisely what makes the special attrac-

"Three proofs of God are open to speculation; the first is the physico-theological; the second, the cosmological; the third, the ontological. More than these three there are not and cannot be." *Krit. d. r. Vernunft*, ed. Hartenstein, s. 404.

Cf. Katzer, *Der Moraleische Gottesbeweis nach Kant und Herbart*. *Jahrbücher für Prot. Theol.* IV. 1878.

tion of ethical study. It appears to be the only kind of philosophy where the facts are plain. No rational student denies the sense of obligation which creates the moral life. He simply sets himself to consider its origin, its meaning, or its motive power. He is therefore in need of no theological assumptions or religious sanctions. He seems to be setting out from a different region of life. He is not trying to prove God; he is simply taking things as they are and as they must be. He is engaged in a strictly scientific research. He observes the ethical process as it follows out its own inevitable course, and inquires for the law which makes its phenomena possible, and for the inner meaning of its events.

Now the course of the moral life, thus independently regarded, presents one perfectly obvious and peculiar characteristic. Such conduct is always consciously directed toward a fixed and stable end, which compels the loyalty of the moral actor and creates in him the sense of obligation. He is *bound* to that line of conduct. If he is not conscious of this obligatory quality, but finds that other lines of conduct invite him with the same force, then he is simply not involved in a moral conflict, and no clear issue of the right and the wrong is presented to his will. Many things concerning the moral life are very obscure; questions of its origin and of its standard may still divide the learned as they have done through the whole history of speculation; but of this characteristic of moral conduct there is so little question that it has almost escaped the observation of the great majority of philosophers. Moral conduct is conduct directed toward an ideal end. The moral hero is the man who sees an ideal of conduct and commits himself to its service. He may not fulfill his ideal, but he is like a man who in leaping a chasm looks not into the chasm but beyond it. He may not reach the point to which he looks, but the onward look helps him to clear the chasm. These ideals of conduct, we have said, appear as fixed ends. They are not to be balanced over against other ends. They are ends for which all other ends are to be sacrificed. Adjustment and conciliation are the last words on the lips of the moral hero. He has not come to bring peace into the world but a sword. His mission is not to adjust things but to make things right. Thus the consciousness of designed and permanent end is taken over from the observation of nature into the consciousness of man. All ethics, as has been strongly said of late, is teleological.<sup>1</sup> It involves the conception of a moral end. Man is, as defined in one of the few worthy ethical text-books, an

<sup>1</sup> Schurman, *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*, p. 68.

"ideal-making animal,"<sup>1</sup> and his moral ideal is forever the dynamic element in his moral life.

Whence then do these moral ideals which are so inseparable from all moral conduct enter into human minds? They are not the result of experience. On the contrary, they are precisely what experience does not give. They represent not what man has attained, but the unattained and the unattainable. One never expects to discover perfect truth or to paint perfect beauty, and yet it is forever the vision of these ideals which beckons and persuades him. He is moved not by what he has achieved, but by what he lacks. "He seeks the better, because he conceives a best." In other words, the moral ideal is not contributed by the outward standard to which conduct is adjusted. It is an inward and spiritual impulse. It represents the evolution of personality. The difference between a large, strong life and a small and torpid one lies in this grasp upon ideal ends. A small life adjusts itself to prevailing standards, and finds its moral satisfaction in keeping things as they are. "Complete life," says Mr. Spencer, as if speaking for such minds, "is but another name for complete equilibrium." A large life, on the contrary, is invited by the vision of a perfect end, and is led, not indeed to its perfect fulfillment, but at least far out into its best results.

What then, we ask once more, is this moral life which discovers within itself this tendency to a permanent and perfect end? It is in reality but another name for the religious life. We may turn ourselves to the human aspect of conduct; we may believe with Mr. Spencer, that "in a time when religion has so little hold on men, morality must be enforced for its own sake," and that "the secularization of ethics is demanded." But, frankly attempting this, what do we find? We find that moral conduct itself, if it is to be adequately explained, must take account of the kingdom of ends which it discloses. It assumes the permanent. It believes in one far-off divine event. We discover with a certain surprise that the *teleology* which interprets the rest of the universe is demanded to interpret the facts of the moral life, and that it is no more in conflict here than elsewhere with the reign of universal law.

Thus the moral proof contributes something to our advancing thought. It is not superimposed upon morality, nor is its religious sanction demanded to uphold morality. It simply discovers within the moral life the fact of an ideal and infinite aim.

<sup>1</sup> Grote, *On the Moral Ideals*, p. 392.

It is an argument derived from a part of life, and therefore not fulfilling the needs of the whole of life. Yet it takes a large step. The universe, it now appears, is not only a universe of order, and of order which fulfills one mighty end, but it is also a universe in which, so far as man is concerned, this supreme order is a moral order,—a moral order without which human conduct would be but a disconnected series of fragmentary incidents, and his inward life a scene of chaos without a hope of peace.

IV. We pass, finally, from the evidence of a single function of the inward life to the impression which is forced upon us by human nature in its wholeness and its complete effect. What do the nature of the human mind and the method of its working testify as to the character of the universe in which it is placed? This is the sphere of the so-called ontological argument. It seeks to inquire the law involved in the necessities of being and the fact of thought. The history of this argument is most depressing. Under the hands of Anselm, it appears as the most illusory and barren of syllogisms, and hardly worthy of the polemic which is directed against it by Kant.<sup>1</sup>

But suppose that instead of these discouraging inquiries concerning the nature of the most perfect Being and his attribute of existence, we turn this ontological question upon human beings and their existence. Suppose we take the problem, not as one of theology, but as one of psychology. Here we are, with these human faculties of ours, set in the midst of an environing universe, with one dominating faculty regulating our relation with this outward world. That which makes human life what it is is the power to think. "*Geist ist Wissen.*" The principles of rational thought are the source of all confidence, sanity, and peace in human life. But now, what makes this process of thought possible to us? If it is not sheer self-illusion, which it is folly for us to trust or exercise, then it must be that there is some real correspondence between the order of our thought and the order of the world, so that the world is an intelligible world and its phenomena may be correctly translated into terms of thought. In every inquiry of science, in every reflection upon conduct, we regulate life upon this presupposition of a harmony between the

<sup>1</sup> *Krit. d. r. Vern.* s. 409 ff. "Existence is obviously no real element in the conception of a thing. . . . One gains as little by summing up these barren ideas as a merchant gains in actual property by appending a row of ciphers to his bank account." (Cf. Runze, *Der Ontologische Gottesbeweis. Krit. Darstellung seiner Geschichte seit Anselm*, 1881).

nature of thought and the nature of things. Of this harmony in its turn, there are but three conceivable interpretations. Either the laws of our thought are the product of things, or the existence of things is the product of our thought, or else beneath the diverse phenomena of thought and life there lies a common coördinating unity, of which thought and being are the expressions. In other words, those to whom an absolute materialism, on the one hand, or an absolute idealism, on the other, are alike unreasonable, find themselves forced to postulate a common ground, a common law, which shall hold the incidents of the world within and of the world without in its single interpretation. This, it must be observed, is no metaphysical assumption. It is the presupposition upon which the practical affairs of daily life are inevitably conducted. We assume that in dealing with the outward world we are dealing with a real world, which shows itself honestly to us, and which, so far as we understand it at all, we understand as it really is. We explore nature on the presupposition that it is intelligible, just as we explore the working of our minds on the presupposition that its laws are natural. Thus the whole of our confidence in life rests on this tremendous act of faith, that our fragmentary existences are held in the unity of a larger order. Confidence in our thought involves the faith in an absolute truth, which it is our function not to create, but haply to discover. Heroism in our conduct is not the make-shift of temporary expediency, but loyalty to permanent ideals, which disclose suggestions of themselves both in the world without and the life within. Adjustment of life to its environment becomes the most hopeless of problems unless it is true that both environment and life are meant for each other as parts of a single whole. Thus, our thought, so far as it is true, thinks in the line of universal truth, and our conduct, so far as it is right, fulfills the universal purpose. The universe of life is an incarnation of thought; the universe of thought is ever unfolding itself in forms-of life; and underneath both these factors of existence lies the single source of being, which makes each of them possible, and unites them both in a single order.

Such is ontology when it is directed towards human life. We must have a working hypothesis for the interpretation of inevitable experience. We cannot believe that the whole process of observation and reflection which makes life rational goes on without any real relation to permanent truth; and we cannot surrender either factor of this process, and deny the veracity either of the

macrocosm without or of the microcosm within. We are therefore turned both from the hypothesis of materialism and from that of idealism, and invited to presuppose a common ground in which the *λόγος* of rational method and the *ὅν* of outward phenomena are held in a higher unity.

This common ground of the *λόγος* and the *ὅν* is the final discovery of what may be fairly called *onto-logia*. It is the argument which has always hovered before the minds of philosophical idealists, but which was reserved for Hegel to reproduce in its fullness of meaning. Yet it can hardly be called an argument. It is rather the discovery of that upon which the daily experiences of our life and work depend. It does not invite one to argue; it invites one simply to consider what it is which makes his thought rational and trustworthy. It is a working hypothesis, without which our life becomes the fragment of a chaos, and with which our life takes its place as a part of a universal order.

But when it thus appears that our experience and reflection are explicable only as they refer themselves to a central unity of life and thought, what does this really mean? It means that we have, unawares, completed an entire circle of speculative inquiry, and that we find ourselves, at the end of this examination of proofs, precisely at the point from which we at first set out. For this which we have called the ontological view is in reality nothing else than the religious view, and the last step of "proof" is but a return to the immediate experience of the devout life.

What is the religious aspect of human experience? It is when life is seen to be lifted and translated into terms of the divine nature, and when human thought and conduct, with their incompleteness and insufficiency, are taken up into a wisdom which holds them and a universe besides. Precisely this is the view which we have now reached by the plodding steps of philosophical method. It is not alone the outward universe which now presents itself to us as fulfilling the sweep of its own inward law, and it is not alone that this central law discloses in itself a moral end. It is our whole inward life which now demands for its own interpretation the assumption of a spiritual unity at the heart of things. The ontological proof only repeats in scientific phrase the spontaneous expressions of the devout life. Underneath us, it reiterates, are the everlasting arms. God is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all life, be it the life of the world without or of the soul within, is lived unto Him, and to be without Him is to die. The final outcome of philosophical research is a return to the in-

tutions of religion. The last word of mental freedom is the confession of spiritual dependence.

And have we here, at last, it may still be asked, what can be called a personal God? The question, strangely enough, is in reality a question of the use of words. If personality takes its name from the limitations of human life, then it certainly cannot be applied to that larger life of moral and spiritual unity which this series of proofs disclose, and the dictum of Strauss is justified: "As persons, we feel and think in distinction from other persons. A Being, therefore, who has no like being from which he is distinguished is not a person. Personality is separated existence. . . . The Absolute is the all-embracing. . . . Absolute personality is thus a contradiction in terms."<sup>1</sup> But suppose we say that the limitations of human nature, instead of defining personality, are precisely what hinder its full and free development? What is the impression which is constantly forcing itself on human life? It is the impression of the failure to realize that which we would be; it is the sense of an incompletely developed personality. This is an impression which makes itself all the more keenly felt as apparent personality becomes more developed. The more complete a human character grows, the more it seems to itself to lack. To this frame of mind the attribute of personality, far from being impossible to the Absolute, is possible nowhere else than in that absolutely free existence, and all that we call personality is but the partial reflection of that perfect life. Here it is that the natural expressions of religion and the final statement of modern philosophy find themselves once more in accord. The cry of the human heart for a personal God, and the sense in the human soul that this personal relation is found only through self-dedication to holy ends;—what are these but devout expressions of that sublime conception with which the philosophy of Lotze sums up its last result? "Personality," says this great teacher in the final words of his masterpiece, "can be complete only in an infinite Being, whose purposes and methods are self-developed and self-sustained. Of the personality of finite beings we have little reason to speak. It is an

<sup>1</sup> *Glaubenslehre*, § 33. An interesting and discouraging reversal of opinion in this respect is to be observed in Pfleiderer, whose course of argument in other respects I have found of extreme value. In his earlier work (*Die Religion, Ihr Wesen und Ihre Geschichte*, 1869, p. 187 ff.), he maintained, at much length, that the elements of personality were given in the results he reached. In his more elaborate treatise (*Religionsphilosophie auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage*, 1878, s. 417 ff.) he reviews this judgment, and, with Biedermann (*Christliche Dogmatik*, § 639), refuses to use the word "personality" of the God whom his "proofs" disclose.

ideal. Like every ideal, it is in its fullness his only who is Infinite, and, like every perfect good, it is ours only conditionally and imperfectly to share.”

Thus it is that the proofs of God fulfill their part in establishing the conviction of God. They do not create it, but they mightily reinforce it. Their function is subordinate, but it is strictly essential. It is in vain to withhold the mind from going over, in its own way, the ground which the needs of life have covered in their flight. The proofs of God represent this painstaking and corrective process. They inquire into the validity of this religious experience, and are led from it to consider the validity of all experience; and as they trace the assumptions which make all experience possible, they confirm the special experience of religion in the two ways which we at first described. In the first place, their effect, as we then remarked, is cumulative. Each proof brings us over a certain arc in the sweep of the circle of inquiry, and then yields its office to the next. The cosmological argument finds at the heart of things a single force; the teleological argument observes in this central force a permanent purpose; the moral argument discovers in this permanent purpose a moral end; finally, the ontological argument identifies this moral end with spiritual being. From Force to Purpose, from Purpose to Moral End, from Moral End to that Spiritual Unity which is true personality,—thus the mind is led on. Each single aspect of the universe, in other words, needs the addition of a different point of view. Not through the observation of nature alone, nor through reflection on moral experience alone, does the completed conception of the divine order arrive. “The various arguments are, in a word, but parts of one comprehensive argument.”<sup>1</sup>

In the second place,—and this is the more striking truth,—this series of inquiries restores us to the conviction from which it set out. It forms, as we have seen, a completed circle; or rather, it ascends by a spiral stair. It performs that office which is forever the reproach of philosophy, but which in reality gives its true worth to philosophy. For the function of philosophy is not to discover new truths, and those who measure progress by accretions of information can never find profit in philosophy. Its mission is to justify and verify the natural conceptions of plain minds. It renews the natural point of view at a point higher up. Its highest results are when it presents once more in classified and

<sup>1</sup> Flint, *Theism*, p. 74, and Appendix IX.

1884.] *The Office of Proof in the Knowledge of God.* 17

corrected form these vague and naive conceptions with which it began. "I shall not dwell," says Kant himself,<sup>1</sup> "on the benefits which philosophy has conferred on human reason. . . . But, I ask, do you really require that knowledge which concerns all men should be revealed to you by philosophers only? The very thing which you find fault with is the best confirmation of our previous assertions, . . . that with regard to the essential interests of human nature, the highest philosophy can achieve no more than that guidance which nature has vouchsafed even to the meanest understanding."

Thus, we have said, the proofs of God fulfill their office. Yet we spoke wrongly. This may be indeed their issue for the reflecting mind, but this is not their sole impression to the religious heart. To it they have a larger meaning. We saw at the outset how the convictions of religion were not created by such arguments, but only verified by them. Let us now watch a mind controlled by religious conviction, looking back over this chain of arguments and considering their meaning. What does it see? It sees, let us suppose, a logical process and an impressive argument for faith. But it sees much more. For it does not believe that a living God can have left the human mind to grope in its own blind way toward the light of the divine presence. It does not believe that God waits thus to be discovered by man, but is sure that in man's searchings and strivings,—yes, and even as Lessing held, in his mistakes,—the divine guidance is working and discovering itself. Thus what we call our proofs of God are to the believing heart God's varied evidence of himself. They are the revelations which He bestows through nature and through life,—partial, inadequate, but real. It is as though God said to us: "No serious mind shall escape some witness of my presence. The naturalist shall be invited to one glimpse of it, and the moralist to another, and the perfect vision shall be for the perfect man." Thus the religious man surveys the proofs he reaches, and finds in them not alone his search for God, but God's varied voices speaking to him. Our proofs of God are in reality his proving of us. We find him because He first finds us. We end as we began. A real religion implies a real revelation. It is not man alone who makes for himself a faith; it is a self-revealing God who inspires it. We work up along the lines of proof to Him because He has worked down through them to us. Our proofs are the answer to his call. The knowledge of God is itself a gift from Him.

*Francis Greenwood Peabody.*

<sup>1</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. M. Müller, I. xxvii.

## THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE AND THE DOCTRINE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE.

THE traditional Protestant view, in a more or less unreflecting way, regards the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the prime and only source of truth and of authority in matters of Christian doctrine. To the Bible the Protestant Christian dutifully resorts in order that he may find out what it is right for him to think respecting Christian dogma, and what it is right for him to do in ordering his Christian conduct. Upon certain subjects of faith and practice, then, the chief and most comprehensive inquiry which he is wont to ask himself becomes the following : What does the Bible say ? In this manner, many apparently difficult and complex questions seem to resolve themselves into one question, the answer to which is simple and easy. In this manner, what is most lofty in speculation and most perplexing in practice seems to be at once brought down upon a level with the comprehension of the man of plain and common sense. For a multiplicity of intellectual interests, a single such interest can be substituted ; instead of abstruse investigations, an appeal can be taken to the uniform and uncomplicated task of interpretation. There can be no doubt that it is a great relief to many minds thus to escape the task of earnest and faithful but critical inquiry.

I have called the above-mentioned view of the office of interpretation, and of the relief which may be expected from a direct appeal to the Bible, the "traditional Protestant view ;" I have also implied that this view is wont to be held in a more or less unreflecting way. The addition of a certain small amount of reflection to this view, however, quite inevitably, at least for a time, brings into it elements of disturbance. For it does not need a profound scholarship or a philosophical training to see that the question, What does the Bible say ? is by no means always a very simple and easy question. In truth, there are few questions which raise more issues subordinate to the main issue than this one ; there are few questions which are, in certain applications, more difficult of solution than this. Nor is it impossible to make clear to any one, who will consider the subject seriously, one reason, at least, why the answer to this question is so complicated and so difficult. In a word, the answer to the question, *What does the Bible say ?* is always made by the inquirer more or less dependent upon his answer

to the other question, *What is the Bible?* And surely the answer to this latter question is considered by no enlightened person in these days to be particularly simple or easy of solution. All of biblical criticism, and much of theological dogma, is obviously concerned in the right settlement of any inquiry into the origin and nature of the Bible. Moreover, in the effort completely to answer the question, *What is the Bible?* we are obliged chiefly to resort to the Bible itself. But in this resort to the Bible itself, we have, of course, to ask again the other question, namely, *What does the Bible say?*

It appears, then, that the unreflecting advocate of that view which I have called "the traditional Protestant view" makes his answer to these two questions mutually dependent. Inasmuch as he appeals to the Scriptures as his supreme and only authority,—at least in matters of religious faith and conduct,—he assumes that he has already answered in part the question as to what these Scriptures really are. To him these Scriptures are the only and the final authority in a certain realm of thought. Such an one is, then, both theoretically and practically correct in always asking what the Bible says, with the unwavering conviction that what it says will be self-consistent, and consistent as well with his own view of what the Bible is. Now all this is certainly a plain circle in argument (*circulus in arguendo*). Is it, or is it not, a vicious circle in argument?

Much has been said of late concerning the impropriety of making our opinions in respect to Christian truth depend upon their conformity to more than *one* source of such opinions. To coördinate so-called Christian consciousness with the Bible, as in any sense an authority on matters of Christian truth, has been pronounced un-Protestant and even heretical. Such a course is compared to making the Christian system a circle without a centre, or a circle with more than one centre. So far as the argument is a figure of speech, it is a sufficient reply to say that for some purposes an ellipse is as good as a circle; and that neither the Bible nor Christian consciousness, but Christ, is the centre of the Christian system. But surely the traditional Protestant view contains apparently another case of a circle without a centre, or another case of a circle with more than one centre. Practically, the result of this view is often made to justify such a process as the following: an uncritical opinion of what the Bible says is derived from an unverified assumption as to what the Bible is; and then, the unverified assumption as to what the Bible is gets confirmation from other uncritical

opinion as to what the Bible says. Thus are doubtful interpretation and doubtful dogma made to answer the purpose of two firm supports for the Bible; but, alas! it does not so much seem to stand firmly upon two supports as to shift its position between them, whenever the pressure on either one becomes too painful to endure.

Shall we, however, strive to break entirely the connection which now maintains itself, so firmly and yet so inconsiderately, between the above-mentioned two questions? For an answer to our inquiry the thoughtful student of the entire subject can scarcely hesitate even for a moment. The connection which is involved in the traditional Protestant view is, in principle, historical and rational; it never can be broken. What the Bible says to us must always depend upon what the Bible is in our opinion; and, conversely, what the Bible is in our opinion must always depend upon what the Bible says to us. In other words, the relation which exists between the interpretation of sacred Scripture and the doctrine of sacred Scripture is an intimate and necessary relation; it grows out of the very nature of the case. And, furthermore, the principle which is involved in this relation, so far as the case of the Bible is concerned, is really a fundamental principle of all right hermeneutics. What any book says to us depends upon our opinion as to what that book is; and what any book is in our opinion depends upon what that book says to us. It is not the principle upon which the relation is established that is in itself wrong. The fault of the ordinary unreflecting view consists rather in this, that it makes so many and so grievous misapplications of the principle.

As to the real relation which exists between the interpretation of the Bible and the doctrine of sacred Scripture, history has a word to say. The history to which I refer is a kind of complex, made up of growth in interpretation and of growth in dogma. The great fact of interest to us in the present consideration is this: the growth of interpretation and the growth in dogma have always been mutually dependent. Hermeneutics and dogmatics have not, indeed, always gone lovingly hand in hand. At times the new hermeneutics has, with considerable of a mind of her own, declared herself unwilling to walk in the same path with the old dogmatics; she would not serve, but would be her own master. The old dogmatics has, perhaps, responded to the new hermeneutics that she need not stand upon the order of her going; for the old dogmatics the old hermeneutics has been thought to be quite good

enough. But as the old hermeneutics has grown weaker under an unbearable load of allegory, of Aristotelianisms, of Hebraisms, of false syntax, and of falser ethics, the old dogmatics has realized its need of other companionship and support. The old dogmatics has thereupon gone down upon its knees to the new hermeneutics. In due time, both hermeneutics and dogmatics, in somewhat changed clothing and with tempers sweetened by their quarrel, have been found walking once more by the same path, and guiding themselves hand in hand.

The Church Father Origen held in his culture and practice as an exegete and a theologian the elements of both science and imagination. This fact gives a many-sidedness to his views of the Bible and of dogma; at times it almost leads us to accuse him of criminal duplicity. But in accordance with the tendency of his age, and as was inevitable from his limitations, he held these elements without fusing them. In exegesis and in dogma, then, Origen is a grammarian, an historian, a philosophical free-thinker; but also an allegorist and a mystic. He was the outgrowth under Christian influences of that desire to reconcile faith and speculation which had prevailed in Alexandria for several centuries. For him Scripture had body, soul, and spirit. Its literal meaning was full of anthropomorphisms, contradictions, foolishnesses, immoralities. But when the grammatical dissection of the "body" of Scripture revealed these imperfections there was still left the soul, and, above all, there was mystery, there was spirit.

The impulse to grammatical and historical interpretation which lay in Origen reached its highest development within the ancient church in the so-called School of Antioch. It reached this development only to die almost wholly out of the consideration of the ancient church. Jerome, indeed, had the true instinct, and made a half-hearted attempt to obtain currency for the true principles; but he lacked character to give them a rational and independent culture. The allegorical and the speculative tendencies of Origen, especially the allegorical tendency, were more deeply rooted in the age than were his more scientific grammatical and historical tendencies. Under the pressure of Augustine's example and influence, and by the strong help of the necessities of the times, a dominant method of exegesis was established for the succeeding centuries. This method was the *allegorico-dogmatic*. The title "allegorico-dogmatic" expresses the result of a previous conflict and a subsequent fusion of two tendencies. The need of dogma became more and more keenly felt as the church was re-

quired to define her position and organize her discipline in the face of heresies within and of opposing systems of thinking on the outside. The church required the control of the allegorical interpretation in order to limit and assert her own dogma. But the allegorizing of the time was not at first easily brought under a strict control. For if we answer the question, what the Bible is, by assuming that it is body, soul, and spirit, and then answer the question, what the Bible says, by passing over what it says as body, in order, by means of allegory, to make it say as spirit what the church dogma has already decided must be said,—if we try to combine allegory and dogma in this way, there is danger from two sources. There is danger that the so-called "body" of Scripture may assert its natural claims; and if this happens many questions are raised to the prejudice of dogma which allegorizing cannot settle. There is also danger that allegory itself may discover a so-called "spirit" in Scripture that will not prove kindly to the traditions which it was invited to serve. Heresy as well as orthodoxy finds it convenient to get dogma from the Bible by the allegorical interpretation. Hence arises an inevitable conflict. It becomes necessary then for dogma to define how far allegory may go. In other words, the question what the Bible is must be answered in such a way as to put certain restrictions on the inquiry as to what the Bible says. Precisely so it happened in the ancient church. But by the time of Augustine, and from that time onward to the Reformation, there was a kind of truce between, or fusion of, the two. The allegorico-dogmatic way of answering both questions, namely, what the Bible is and what the Bible says, became regnant. The allegorical interpretation helped the traditional dogma in its answer to the question, What the Bible is, as well as in its answers to other questions; and the traditional dogma informed the allegorical interpretation what it should make the Bible say.

It was inevitable that that revolt against tradition and authority which constituted the Reformation should extend in all directions. The early Reformers, although they were not always clearly conscious of what they were doing, and were not always self-consistent, were obliged to propose new answers to both of the two questions we are considering. They were compelled by their position to answer the question, What is the Bible? They were compelled by the answer which they gave to this question to consider, with uncommon diligence and from new points of view, the further question, What does the Bible say? They came to modify the

traditional Roman Catholic opinion both as to the nature of sacred Scripture and as to the true way of interpreting it. It is wonderful to see how Luther threw off the shackles of traditional dogma and traditional hermeneutics, and wonderful also to hear what a noise he made with his shackles as he threw them off. He would no more take Jerome's interpretation because it was Jerome's, or because it was in accord with churchly dogma, than take the churchly dogma itself because it was supported by the traditional interpretation. Even so early as 1520 he declared he would not submit to authority in exegesis (*Leges interpretandi verbum Dei non patior*). Allegories are "awkward, unclean, earthy, sluttish rags, and shags of interpretation." We are to go with a knowledge of Hebrew, and with a Christian experience of the Pauline type, straight to the Bible and ask it what it says. But Luther had also his own view, or rather had several views which it is not quite easy to reconcile with each other, as to what the Bible is, and this view was always with him to guide him as an interpreter. He, too, was obliged to answer both our questions in their mutual dependence. And since he could not make the biblical books all speak precisely as did his beloved Paul, he was forced to interpret as much as he could of these books according to the so-called "analogy of faith," to resort sometimes to allegory for a help in the hard places, and to let some books and passages go as of comparatively little worth.

The position which the post-Reformation theologians assumed; as a result of their conflict with the Roman Catholic principle of authority, involved a reaffirmation of the old principles in another way. The authority of tradition was re-established in very opposition to the same authority. Against the authority of church tradition was erected the authority of a traditional dogma as to what the Bible is, and, therefore, as to what it must be supposed to say. The one word which describes both the biblical hermeneutics of this era and its conception as to the nature of sacred Scripture is the word "dogmatic." Interpret the Bible strictly according to the so-called "analogy of faith," and hold that the Bible all *is* (every book and chapter, and verse and word) an infallible source of dogma,—such is the primal requisition of the post Reformation era. The limits of this era may be placed at 1600 and 1750

**A. D.**

But, as time went on, more and more minds were coming forward who would receive neither half of this twofold requisition. Scientific interpretation was being applied to all other ancient lit-

eratures ; why should it not also be applied to that of the Bible ? Progress in the same scientific interpretation was combining with many other forms of scientific researches to make men consider anew the answer which post-Reformation dogmatics had given to the inquiry into the origin and nature of sacred Scripture. Is the Bible, indeed, a perfectly infallible storehouse of science, history, law, prediction, ethical maxims, and religious dogma ; is it also without a literary blemish or a single fault in expression and style ? If it be not this, what is it ? And how shall it be discovered what it is ? How otherwise, indeed, so well as by critically and scientifically interpreting the language of Scripture ?

At the middle of the last century, dogmatics, especially when there was a call for answers to objections against its views regarding the nature of sacred Scripture, was to be found in an exhausted condition. The theologians were for the most part silent, except when they were compelled to speak. But the period of silence was followed by a period of revolution. Tholuck represents the theology of the eighteenth century as "whirling around" upon the pivotal point of the year 1750. Many hands labored to promote this revolution of thought as to both what the Bible is and as to how we shall ascertain what the Bible says. But among them all few are so worthy of being held up before us to-day as are those of Semler and Ernesti. The new movement with which these names were connected proposed new answers to both the above-mentioned inquiries. It proposed to use grammar, lexicon, history, and criticism rather than dogma, in order to find out what the Bible says ; it also considered that the Bible is literature rather than an infallible storehouse of dogma. The modern era of hermeneutics fairly began with Semler ; but in his work of rendering interpretation an historical and a scientific affair he was aided by Ernesti. Semler considered the authors of the Bible as children of their own time and age.

It cannot be denied that the movement to which I have just alluded has won the day so far as to establish beyond intelligent dispute those true principles for which it entered into contention. The best Christian thought of this century no longer considers the entire Bible as an equal and infallible storehouse of information in science, history, ethics, and dogma. The best exegesis of this century, even when in the hands of the most devout believers in the truths of Christianity, no longer declines to consider the sacred books as thoroughly human. But the modern movement still has the old question upon its hands ; and, fundamentally con-

sidered, it employs the same circle in its argument. Let it be granted that the biblical books are literature, and that they are to be understood as literature. Let it be granted that their language is human, since we know nothing of any other language than human language; and that all their declarations of fact and truth are to be submitted to the questioning of the conscience and reason of man. We have still to ask, What *kind* of literature is the Bible? We have still to inquire, whether the way in which the facts and truths of the Bible bear the testings of the human conscience and the human reason does not require us to admit that the Bible is not only human but also in some sense divine.

The most strictly grammatical and critical view of the function of the interpreter does not prevent the raising of the questions which lead necessarily and forthwith into the very heart of the doctrine of sacred Scripture. The post-Reformation dogma proposed to convert the whole Bible into a parade-ground of proof-texts. But the drill, with our improved grammars and lexicons, and with our voluminous critical theories as to the origin of the separate books, may be made as barren as the drill with splinters and straws from the parade-ground of dogma. However one approaches the Bible to find out what it says, one will carry one's personality along in the approaches; and the whole history of the progress which both dogma and hermeneutics have made shows that the fate of the two is, to a large extent, always united. Moreover, at present we do not see that the advocates of any extreme view as to what the Bible is are for that reason kept the better from foisting this view into their interpretation of the Bible. Kuenen and Keil, Wellhausen and the most firm believer in verbal inspiration, all are compelled, in some large degree, to unite the solution of these two inquiries. Keil may take with him whatever grammar and lexicon and Introduction to the Old Testament (even that of Wellhausen) he chooses, he will be pretty sure to understand every prophetic passage in the light of his theory of prophecy; and Kuenen will do the same. Either Keil or Kuenen (and, in our opinion, profitably both) may suffer a change of view as to what the Bible is, and as to what the Bible says; but neither one of them can break utterly through the firm connection which exists between the two inquiries. The history of biblical interpretation and of the doctrine of sacred Scripture shows that the interpretation and the doctrine are most intimately related.

What history has shown to have been thus far true, the reason of the case makes it clear must always remain true. For example,

it is in part by textual criticism that we determine what the Bible is. *In concreto*, the Bible is for us a certain text ; that is to say, it is a certain number and order of words which make up the diplomatic form of certain ancient writings. More precisely, the Bible, in so far as it is a text, must be constructed out of various texts, which come to us in different manuscripts, and which differ in respect to many minutiae. But all interpretation is, of course, directly dependent upon the text ; for interpretation involves the unfolding of the meaning of the text as representing the consciousness of the author. It strives to reproduce the consciousness of the author as this consciousness once really existed, and now stands expressed in and through the text. A hundred years were required, however, even partially to exorcise the dogma that the Bible must have had an infallible text (*verbatim et literatim*) ; we have not yet reached the period when a dogmatic construction of the idea of what the Bible is will consent to leave textual criticism at liberty to select and promulgate a critical text. What but the influence of traditional dogma can account for the great anxiety, now manifest in certain quarters, to vindicate the authority of a so-called *textus receptus*, when even the name *receptus* has only the dignity belonging to a shrewd business expedient of an enterprising publisher ? What but the same influence can account for the keen, witty, and unscrupulous defense of the traditional text, as though, indeed, it had prescriptive rights against Christian scholarship ? Shall we, however, pride ourselves upon our ability speedily to outgrow the principle which gave strength to the position of the more ancient exegetes and dogmatists ? We may, indeed, hope to understand this principle better than they, and to guard ourselves against many of the misapplications which it received at their hands. But I cannot see how criticism will ever fight itself wholly free from the necessity of constructing a text of the Bible under the influence of prevalent scholarly opinion as to the nature and origin of the Bible. We might perhaps be helped out of this necessity, if some complete, authenticated, verbatim text of Scripture were let down all at once from Heaven, and then supernaturally secured against all corruption. But there is, of course, no such text of the Bible. Indeed, it could easily be shown that there never has been any text at all resembling this of any portion of the Bible. It could, furthermore, be shown that considerable of that text which we are compelled to take as ultimate is itself a growth ; such a statement is, indeed, in no unmeaning sense, true of the

entire Old Testament letter, as we now have it; that is, of the so-called Masoretic text of the Hebrew Scriptures. In our lack of some one external authority for the precise letter of the Bible, therefore, we are obliged to weigh probabilities, and to construct one text out of several texts. And since there is inevitable conflict on minute points among the various external authorities, textual criticism is obliged to resort to so-called "internal" considerations. It is obliged, that is to say, to conjecture which of two or more readings is the most likely to be what a particular author, under particular circumstances, would say. But this conjecture, in turn, involves an opinion as to who the writer was, and what were the spirit, intent, inspirations, and limitations under which he wrote. Such an opinion is an opinion as to what a particular part of the Bible is; it can scarcely fail to be influenced by the more general opinion as to what the whole Bible is.

The relation between the interpretation of the Bible and the doctrine of sacred Scripture is not simply an indirect one, through the text, or the history, or the stylistic peculiarities of the books; it is also a relation which springs out of the very nature of interpretation itself. For what is the function of interpretation? Interpretation requires the reproduction by the interpreter, within himself, of the consciousness that originally expressed itself in the language which he interprets. "To expound an author," says Immer, "means to do away with the difference between him and us." In the case of the Bible, however, the difference between the author and the interpreter is a difference both of what may be called cast of consciousness and also of language in which the consciousness is expressed. To interpret the Bible, then, requires that the interpreter shall so do away with the difference between himself and the author as to get through the foreign language into the author's most vital consciousness. To interpret the Bible requires, further, that the interpreter shall reproduce the consciousness of the author, first, in his own consciousness, and shall then, in that objective picture called a comment, set this consciousness bodily forth, in the dress of a modern language, before the reader. It follows that there is involved, first of all, in the function of the interpreter, a familiarity with the languages in which the original authors of Scripture set forth their own states of consciousness. But this familiarity cannot be gained without raising over and over again the general question as to the nature of the Bible. The two languages in which these ancient states of consciousness were recorded are, of course, Hebrew and Greek. Outside of the

Bible, however, we have scarcely any means of studying Hebrew. With Greek the case is, indeed, somewhat different. The New Testament Greek may be approached with considerable preparation derived from beyond the borders of the New Testament itself. This preparation may be arranged in a kind of series of steps drawing nearer constantly to these sacred borders. There is classic Greek, there is the later literary Greek, and the later spoken Greek, the so-called *kouȳ*. There is, above all, the Greek of the Septuagint, which is this *kouȳ* as it developed in Alexandria and became saturated, by the usage of the Jews, with Hebraisms of style, and with Hebraistic ideas. But besides this external preparation, a special and thorough acquaintance with the peculiarities of New Testament Greek is indispensable for the interpreter of the New Testament. Such an acquaintance can come only by a direct or indirect resort to the New Testament itself. We have, then, in biblical Hebrew and in New Testament Greek, certain specialized forms of language, an acquaintance with which can be gained in no other way than by a comprehensive and detailed study of the Bible. It comes about, then, that no one can be prepared to tell what the Bible says who has not had some more or less ample opportunity to discover for himself what the Bible is.

It may be said, in reply to the argument sketched above, that many, perhaps the majority, of interpreters of the Bible make a poor use of their opportunity; and, further, that it is best for the interpreter to keep himself as free as possible from all fixed theories as to the origin and nature of sacred Scripture. There is considerable truth in this reply. It is a particularly pertinent truth that the interpreter of the Bible should be on his guard against prejudices, should hold no suddenly framed and remorseless theories of sacred Scripture, and should keep his soul open to light, from whatever quarter it may come. But, on the other hand, it must be admitted that the art of the interpreter solicits him to a growing opinion as to the nature of that literature which it is his art to interpret. How, indeed, shall he prevent himself from forming such an opinion,— how any more than the interpreter of Plato or of Tacitus, or even of Shakespeare or of Goethe? Nay more, some opinion of what the Bible is becomes necessarily involved in the most purely scientific study of the languages, to expound the meaning of which is the function of the interpreter. For it is one of the plainest results of biblical linguistic science that the meanings of the biblical words, and the terms of the biblical sentences, and the entire biblical style (in

the most comprehensive meaning of the word style) are the direct or indirect result of a great historical and organic movement of ethico-religious ideas. The words, the sentences, the so-called style, are these ideas embodied; and the attempt to understand the language, without some intelligence as to this system of ideas, would be as foolish as it would be futile. Yet it is this system of ideas which gives to the biblical books whatever of peculiar character they possess, as literature; and to know these ideas is to know, so far forth, what the Bible is. Of the truth of what I have just been saying with respect to the intimate relation which exists between the question, what the Bible is, and the other question, what the Bible says, the science of biblical linguistics furnishes innumerable illustrations.

But, after all, the language, whether it be that of the original writer, or that of the modern interpreter, is only a means to the ultimate and true function of interpretation. This function is, as has already been said, to reproduce the consciousness of the author whose work is interpreted. The final purpose of the art of hermeneutics is the communion of souls. It is, of course, the total consciousness of the author as far as expressed in, or suggested fairly by, his language, which needs to be reproduced. We are to think his thoughts after him, feel as he felt, or at least clearly and faithfully picture to ourselves and to others how he felt, and enter wholly into his purposes. It is true that the best scientific exegesis does not attempt all this in detail: but this is because such exegesis is rightly content to leave to each reader some work for his own thinking and imagining to do.

Let it be granted that the work of the interpreter of the Bible is the one work of reproducing the consciousness of the writers of the Bible. He cannot possibly accomplish this work without growing opinions and convictions as to what the Bible is. For here again we may say, the Bible is what it is made to be by the consciousness of its authors. "No one who is another thinketh the same thing with that other;" but "he who is like, knoweth his like." In the case of the Bible the consciousness of the authors is previously and preëminently an ethico-religious consciousness. Their thoughts and feelings are stirred by certain alleged facts, and in view of certain historical ideas, which they consider to be of great ethical and religious import. To think their thoughts after them, and to enter into their feelings, is the great art of the interpreter. Kinship of thought and feeling, community established in the inner life between the ancient writer

and the modern reader,—this is the result, and this the function, of hermeneutics. But it follows directly from this principle of all hermeneutics that, in the special case of the Bible, there must be a very intimate and strong connection between the answer given to these two questions, namely, What is the Bible? and What does the Bible say?

We need not have the least disposition, then, to dissent from the main principles of all hermeneutics, as they are laid down by that great master of the art, "the giant" August Böckh. We may freely admit what he declares, that no well-grounded distinction in principle can be made between so-called "sacred" and so-called "profane" hermeneutics. Every sacred book, since it is a human book, must be interpreted (so far as the mere function of understanding its meaning is concerned) according to human laws. The science of language knows of no language which is not human language, and of no mind which is not a human mind.

But, as Böckh himself goes on to explain, the one theory which holds true for all languages and all subjects and all minds, varies in the form of its application according to the material to which it is applied. If, then, we say that the Bible must be interpreted just like any other book, we are obliged to add in the next breath, *as to principle, and just as far as it is like any other book.* And this again brings us around to the old question, What is the Bible? How far is it like, and how far unlike, any other book?

It would be exceedingly interesting, did time permit, to show in detail, how each one of the four varieties or kinds of hermeneutics, which Böckh finds involved in the attempt to reproduce the original consciousness of an author, requires a somewhat special application in the case of the biblical writings; and, also, how the application of each one of these so-called "kinds of hermeneutics" involves some opinion as to the origin and nature of sacred Scripture. But the mere mention of a possible line of argument must suffice.

Two of the four kinds of interpretation depend upon objective conditions, two upon the more purely subjective. The four kinds of hermeneutics are the grammatical, the historical, the individual, and the generic.

Grammatical interpretation is, if possible, even more indispensable in the effort to arrive at a scientific knowledge of the meaning of the Bible than in the case of other ancient writings; it is the indispensable basis of all sound and safe exegesis of Scripture. It

is a true thought, much emphasized by the earlier leaders of the Reformation movement, that general philological skill and learning, as well as specific acquaintance with the languages of the Bible, are a moral obligation upon the exegete. But, alas! what crude philology, what violations of grammatical principles, what twistings of the meanings of words, are due to theories, both so-called orthodox and so-called heterodox, concerning the nature of sacred Scripture. "Tendency" influences have been the opprobrium of grammatical exegesis; they are so to the present day. A tense is no barrier to the exegete, who is pledged at all hazards to reconcile historical discrepancies, or to make the sacred writers support the current orthodoxy; the established meaning of a word cannot withstand the critic who is determined to find his theory of evolution in Genesis, or of the conflict between Judaizing and Pauline Christianity in the books of the New Testament. Witness the unscholarly violence done, in the supposed interests of right dogma, to the aorist, in 1 Pet. iii. 18 ff., and the many attempts to invent new meanings for particular uses of well-known words and phrases, such as the word "day," in Genesis i., and the phrase "sons of God," in Gen. vi. 2. Witness the determination to save the Evangelist Luke from even a partially mistaken view of the time of the event recorded in the first verses of his second chapter,—a determination which has led not a few of the harmonists to make the author of the Gospel (I use the language of Tholuck) a writer of "gibberish." But what is the remedy for this evil influence of theory over grammatical interpretation? The remedy lies in both better grammars and better dogma; there is no adequate remedy from either one of the two without the other.

What is true of grammatical interpretation is yet more emphatically true of so-called historical interpretation. Historical interpretation is preëminently the function of the so-called "higher criticism;" the "higher criticism," as applied to the elucidation of Scripture, is, in itself, nothing worse or better than historical and genetic interpretation. It aims to see the writings in the environment, from which and out of which, in part at least, they arose. Every question of exegesis becomes thus, in part at least, a question of historical antecedents and of historical environment. The question of the understanding of a single passage (as, for example, the passage in which Jehovah proclaims himself as the I AM) and even of the understanding of a single word (as, for example, the word "Jehovah," the word "Torah," the words "Son of

man") becomes thus a part of a larger historical question. The one inclusive historical question in the Old Testament is the question of the origin and development of the Hebrew religion; in the New Testament it is the question of the origin and earliest development of the Christian religion. Already, beyond the small circle of trained scholars, the students of the Bible in general are becoming somewhat dimly aware of the profound relations which exist between views as to what the Bible is and the legitimate function of so-called historical interpretation.

Still more than has been claimed above may justly be claimed for the two subjective kinds of interpretation, namely, the so-called individual and the so-called generic. We know what the individual writer means, as fast and as far as we know the individual characteristics of the spirit of the writer. But how shall we, in our lack of a personal acquaintance and of other outside helps, — how shall we know the spirit of a biblical writer, except by interpreting his writings? We know the better what Paul means as we learn the better what manner of man Paul was; but we have no other so good means of knowing the personality of Paul as by finding out what he says in his writings. But here is the occurrence of the same circle in argument again. We are only applying in a particular way the general principle that we must learn what the Bible says and what the Bible is in a mutual relation of dependence between the two questions. The very principle of "generic" interpretation requires the forming of a moral and religious consciousness, which is after the same type as that of the biblical writers, in order that we may faithfully and accurately reproduce their consciousness. The poet understands what the poet means; the man of science understands what the man of science means, the philosopher what the philosopher means. And, other qualifications being at all equal, the man of the new birth, and so of the Christian consciousness, knows what the new-born soul means; knows best how to interpret by reproducing the states of the biblical religious and Christian consciousness.

It is obvious, however, that preparation and skill in all these so-called "kinds of hermeneutics" are necessary for the highest and most successful exercise of the great art. Grammatical, critical, and historical aptitude and training must be united to a broad and penetrating way of thinking, and to a generous sympathy with all that is in man. Therefore, in the special case of the Bible, both a special training in biblical languages, criticism, and history, and also a lofty, unprejudiced way of thinking the pe-

culiar thoughts and of sympathizing with the peculiar feelings of the biblical writers are indispensable to the best exegesis. But these latter factors in the equipment plainly imply a certain way of regarding the Bible, if not a definite theory as to what the Bible is. Even the more purely grammatical and critical factors in the equipment and functions of the biblical exegete, as has been shown, cannot be wholly separated from the influence of opinion as to the origin and nature of the biblical books.

We may safely conclude that the relation which has existed historically between hermeneutics and the doctrine of sacred Scripture is a rational and necessary relation; and much as we may deprecate the abuses and mischief which have been connected with the practical working of the relation, we cannot destroy the relation itself. The Bible will always be interpreted in the light of opinion concerning the greater subject of the origin and nature of the Bible; I call this subject "greater" because it transcends any one of the particular schools or methods or treatises produced by hermeneutics proper.

The only real and permanent advance, then, will include the better, and yet better answer to both of our two questions. To decry the influence of theological belief in hermeneutics and to decry the use of scientific means of interpretation are alike useless and unphilosophical. The growth of the science of biblical interpretation, as a part of the general science of all hermeneutics, will inevitably change and improve theological opinion as to the origin and nature of sacred Scripture; but this improved opinion will, in turn, favor and assist the further improvement of biblical hermeneutics. At present our commentaries are, on the whole, rather in advance of our formulated doctrine of sacred Scripture. As a result, the interpreters are agreeing together as to what the Bible says, in a manner which implies views as to what the Bible is that neither they themselves nor the theologians have clearly formulated. The theologians, on the other hand, are trying to fit the new exegesis into their former theories as to the origin and nature of the Bible. But as it becomes apparent how much of what hermeneutics declares that the Bible says is really unverifiable as said by the Bible, it will also become more apparent how much of what theology has taught concerning the origin and nature of the Bible is really untrue. Not that theology and hermeneutics are solely and always directly dependent upon each other, for there are other considerations than those which come from interpretation that influence our opinion of the nature of sacred Scripture, just as

there are other influences than the more purely theological, which determine the interpretation of the Bible. But, inasmuch as this connection between interpretation and the doctrine of sacred Scripture certainly exists, and inasmuch as it is destined to continue to exist, we must look to see the growth of hermeneutics and the growth of theology mutually dependent.

What is the Bible? To answer this question I must know somewhat thoroughly and comprehensively what the Bible says. What does the Bible say? To answer this question I am led to form an opinion as to what the Bible is. This is, however, the *circulus interpretandi* in which scientific hermeneutics moves, rising from the particulars to the general truth, and then viewing the particulars anew in the light of the general truth. The circle is not vicious: the rather does it represent that spiral path by which man rises to a better and yet better comprehension of the Word of God. That professed teacher of Christian truth upon the basis of an interpretation of the Bible who is not duly informed concerning the nature and origin of the biblical books is, therefore, an uncertain and unsafe guide of the popular opinion as to the nature and applications of that truth.

*George T. Ladd.*

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## HOW ENGLAND IS DEALING WITH ILLITERACY.

THE problem of illiteracy in the United States is at last receiving attention in the halls of Congress. For this the heart of every patriot may well respond — Amen. The cloud came up above the sea only as big as a man's hand, but it is now rapidly gathering headway. It casts its dark shadow before. It is the earnest of the great social problems that will fill the near future of our national career. American institutions are still to receive their severest tests. The crucible must yet try the metal and discover how much is pure gold. It is important that we make use of the experience of other and kindred nations as they are facing the same dangers. It is proposed in this paper to give a brief account of the method our mother country is taking to rid herself of the heavy and dangerous burden of illiteracy.

The year 1870 marks an era in the history of elementary education in England. The fires of discontent had been smouldering for some time, when at last the extreme ignorance of the masses of

laborers in Great Britain shamed all parties into action. The attention of Parliament was arrested, and the question was thoroughly discussed with much heat. The liberal spirit prevailed, and government took upon its shoulders the task of remedying deficiencies, established an Education Department at London, and sent out inspectors through all England, Wales, and Scotland, with authority and ample funds to lay the broad foundation of a thoroughly efficient educational system that would right the evils of illiteracy. The subsequent acts of 1873 and 1876 regulated the machinery of the law, added the sanction of Parliament to the proceedings of the Department, and gave an abiding stability to a scheme of reform which is rapidly revolutionizing the state of affairs throughout the country. Time was (in 1825), when Lord Melbourne questioned the advantage of general education as a means of promoting knowledge in the world, since people got on without it. The Bishop of Durham "believed that education was not likely to make its way among the poor;" and the Bishop of Exeter said, if, when rector, he had started a school in his parish, the squire would have laughed in his face. There are still to be found in England a few who view with dismay the education of the laboring man and are loud in their assertions that education will unfit him for his place in life; make him restless, ambitious, knavish, and a bad citizen in general. It has been the tyranny of such principles that has constantly kept one quarter of the inhabitants of Great Britain in a cloud of ignorance.

But at last England is abreast with the times. She has made careful studies of the systems of other countries, and is perfecting the details of her educational machinery. She is raising the occupation of teaching into a profession. A few years more of practical legislation and vigilant inspection will enable her, according to the present outlook, to far outstrip the United States in her progress toward a perfect system; and to leave us behind, floundering in the veritable slough of despond of illiteracy and consequent bad government.

I. The question of religious instruction in the elementary schools has been the battle-ground of all the recent educational reforms in England; and in opening the discussion of so intricate a theme, it seems best to take it up at this strategic point. To understand how fiercely the battle has been fought, one has only to glance at the compendious debates of Parliament, the important place given to the discussion in the columns of the press, and to observe the mountain pile of pamphlet literature, to which all

parties have contributed liberally. On the one hand there stood the extreme Conservative forces, represented principally by the Church of England, who would make religious instruction the foundation of the educational system; and hence would connect most intimately the school and the church. Bitterly opposed to this plan stood the so-called secular party, who would expunge from the schools every subject that bordered on the religious. Between these extremes there were found every grade of opinion; and, as the event proved, that common sense which is ingrained in the English nature gave its sanction to an intermediate position — a position in favor of religious instruction not sectarian, with perfect toleration to all creeds.

To obtain a clear idea of this controversy, it will be necessary to glance for a moment at the different kinds of schools in England and briefly notice their history.

The oldest and numerically the strongest class of schools is under the control of the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church, instituted in 1816, and incorporated in 1817. This society, until 1870, had in its control the educational interests of England. Its schools were established in all the cities and towns, as well as in every rural parish under the immediate superintendence of the rector. Through all its career it has worked with unremitting energy in stirring up an interest in education, when legislation on the subject has been lax. It has extended its schools, and improved the means of instruction through all parts of England, and its influence is now universally felt, even by bodies directly opposed to its principles and its methods. Religious instruction forms a prominent feature of the daily routine. It consists in the study of the Bible, reciting from the same, and reading in the Book of Common Prayer. We see here the counterpart of an ordinary American Sunday-school, attached to the day school. These National or Voluntary schools, as they are called, still form the great majority of the schools in the rural districts, and remain strong in many cities. They represent the Conservative party when any question of educational reform is mooted, especially when the subject of religion comes up. With admirable firmness they have opposed the strong efforts made of late years to secularize elementary education; and in the main they may be said to have carried their point. Their schools still give the same amount of religious instruction; but parents can withhold their children from such instruction as conflicts with their creeds or notions. This so-

society has a large number of training colleges (or normal schools), and prepares more teachers for work than all other schools combined.

The second great class of schools in England is under The British and Foreign School Society for Promoting the Education of the Laboring and Manufacturing Classes of Society of every Religious Persuasion. This society was organized in the latter days of the last century by Joseph Lancaster, a Quaker. On his leaving for America, his work was taken up by a committee, who gave the organization its present name. The society was firmly established in 1808, under royal patronage. Since that date it has been steadily advancing until its principles have been adopted in great part by government in the Board schools. The object of this society purports to be "the education — scriptural and secular — of the children of the poor, without distinction of sect or party." Its principles are non-sectarian, the Bible being the only book of religious instruction, as distinguished from the catechisms or formularies of any particular church. Its operations are directed to promote elementary education on this basis at home and abroad, by the training of teachers, by the employment of well-qualified agents and inspectors, by friendly coöperation with all other promoters of elementary education, and by donations of books and other school material. The work of this society before 1870 consisted in the organization of schools. Since, at that date, government took to itself this task, the British and Foreign Society directed its energies more particularly to its training colleges, of which it has four in successful working order. The majority of its elementary schools have been transferred to School Boards; which system, indeed, seems to have been its natural outgrowth. Mr. Forster, the framer of the act of 1870, has long served as one of its vice-presidents, and many of the promoters of the recent reforms came from its ranks.

The third and last class of schools, the Board schools, came into being on the passage of the "Elementary Education Act of 1870." This, as we have already seen, was a provision for the supply of sufficient schools throughout the country. It was not intended to supersede either the National or the British schools. It placed in the hands of the Education Department at Whitehall, London, the task of inspecting England and Wales, of ascertaining the exact needs, and of supplying new schools, so that every child in the country might have instruction. With this great authority in its hands, the Department went about its work. It had the

power to cause the election of a School Board wherever it found a lack of efficient schools, the erection of suitable buildings, the employment of qualified teachers, all at the expense of the rate-payers and the government treasury. As might have been expected, the interests of the National schools would often clash with the duty of the Department; and the latter, backed by public funds, generally won in the ensuing struggle. An intense rivalry sprang up all over England, which has subsided more and more as the National Society has increased the number and efficiency of its schools, or has yielded to the inevitable. In fact a great impetus was given to the National schools. From 1869 to 1878 the places provided for scholars in church schools were increased from 1,300,000 to 2,252,794 or about 70 per centum; and its friends now say with truth that education costs less under their system than in Board schools.

The main attack by the National Society upon the reforms instituted was in regard to religious instruction; and the feeling that called out the attack is still strong. The relation of the Board schools toward religious instruction is as follows: Any efficient elementary school in England, whether a National, a British, or a Board school, can come under the patronage of the Education Department and receive a government grant, corresponding to its general efficiency, examinations, etc. Over all England an average of fifteen shillings (nearly four dollars) is annually paid to each school for every scholar who attends regularly, and passes creditably the annual examination. In the Act of 1870 we have the following clause: "Such grant shall not be made in respect of any instruction in religious subjects;" and again we find: "Every School Board may from time to time, with the approval of the Education Department, make by-laws . . . determining the time during which children are so to attend school; provided no by-law shall prevent the withdrawal of any child from any religious observance or instruction in religious subjects, or shall require any child to attend school on any day exclusively set apart for religious observance by the religious body to which his parent shall belong," etc.

This is the famous "conscience clause" which has caused such a stir in the religious controversy, but which does the greatest credit to its tolerant framers and supporters. It is at the option of the School Board whether or not it shall have religious instruction in its schools; *in any case* such instruction must come outside of the school hours, which are from ten to twelve o'clock in

the morning, and from two to four o'clock in the afternoon. There have been rare cases where School Boards have decided to exclude religious instruction altogether, as was the case for a time at Birmingham. But these cases have been notorious exceptions. The contest at Birmingham was especially interesting. The determination to secularize was deep-rooted, and for a time successful. But public sentiment experienced a reaction, the policy was set aside, and to-day unsectarian religious instruction is given in all her Board schools. Many School Boards make use of a text-book carefully prepared for such instruction. The possibility and practicability of teaching religious subjects undenominationally has been demonstrated. The cases of the withdrawal of children by parents from such instruction are not one in a thousand.

In connection with this discussion it is interesting to notice English opinion of religious instruction given in American schools. Says Bishop Fraser of Manchester, who visited this country to investigate our school system, and who has shown great liberality of opinion: "For 'religious instruction,' in the sense which we in England attach to the words, it cannot be said that any provision at all is made under the American school system. Anything like 'sectarian' — which, as it is interpreted, means anything like doctrinal or dogmatic — teaching, anything of the nature of a creed, or which requires the children to utter the phrase, 'I believe,' is implicitly forbidden in all schools; in some States it is forbidden in terms. It is true that everywhere — at least I believe everywhere — under the system, provision is made for reading the Bible, and almost everywhere provision is made for opening the work of the day with prayer. But the disjointed inconsecutive way in which the Bible is read, — to-day a psalm, to-morrow a section from the gospel, the day after a paragraph from one of the letters of Paul, — in all cases unaccompanied by a single word in the shape of note, explanation, or comment, cannot and does not amount to anything that can be called systematic religious instruction."

II. *The Power of the Education Department.* The fact that any elementary school, properly organized and conducted, can, by coming under the Education Department, obtain annually the average of four dollars per child (who successfully completes a year of study), has given it an authority against which it is practically useless to contend. It has complete charge of the annual inspection of all schools that come under the law, of the maintenance of a sufficient number of efficient schools, of the payment of all grants

earned by the schools at their several examinations, of the support of training colleges for teachers, and of the interests of elementary education in general throughout the country. A detailed report is made annually, stating in full the progress and state of education in town and country. Having its head at Whitehall, the school administration sends out its branches to even the most remote sections, carrying with it a national influence. The rural schools are under the same regulations as the city schools; they have the same inspectors, the same examinations, teachers from the same training colleges, the same resources for money, and the same kind of regulating authority. There is, however, still left ample room for local coloring.

There remains this difference between Board and National schools; the former depend upon three sources for money, (1) the government grant, (2) fees paid by scholars (from two to ten cents per week), and (3) local taxation; the National schools, instead of taxing the neighborhood for the deficit, depend on voluntary subscriptions. This is a popular feature, but liable to break down as friends fail. In their early history these latter schools were purely voluntary. By the munificence of churchmen they were founded and equipped and were carried on under the fostering care of the parish rector and his associates. As we have seen, they are still greatly in the majority, providing for nearly 3,000,000 children, while the Board schools provide for only about 1,500,000. The large centres have, almost without an exception, adopted Board schools. The great strength of the National schools lies in the rural districts. There is still more or less elbowing. Every now and then a National school gives up the struggle for existence on the voluntary plan and becomes a Board school; and good authorities (such as Lord Derby) predict an eventual extinction of voluntary elementary schools. On reviewing the strength and growing efficiency of the National schools we must conclude, however, that such a result can come, if at all, only in the very distant future.

**III. Compulsory Education.** One great aim of the Education Acts was to enforce the attendance at school of every child in the country. Fourteen years of practical working have shown the wisdom of the measures adopted. Although the law is not always rigidly enforced in many remote and thinly populated regions, its end has been attained with remarkable success in all the crowded centres where ignorance swarmed. A careful comparison of the educational statistics of Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, or

London of twenty years ago, with those of to-day makes one feel assured that conservatism in England has after all relaxed its grasp on the institutions of the country, and that a quiet revolution is taking place under the very eye of the House of Lords. Of course it is too early even now to mark any great results in the progress of intelligence and industry in the adult English working-man. The standard of education is still low in comparison with other Protestant nations. The statistics on the subject of illiteracy are uncertain. The latest authoritative estimate (1876) states that 16.3 per centum of the male and 22.1 per centum of the female adults in England and Wales can neither read nor write. The figures for certain crowded sections are more accurate. Manchester, a city of 500,000 inhabitants, has in round numbers 75,000 adults wholly illiterate. It will be safe to say that such a state of affairs will never be repeated in England.

Let us glance at the compulsory law. In the Education Act of 1876 we read as follows : "It shall be the duty of the parent of every child to cause such child to receive efficient elementary instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and if such parent fail to perform such duty, he shall be liable to such orders and penalties as provided in this act. A person shall not after the commencement of this act take into his employment (except as hereinafter mentioned) any child (1) who is under the age of ten years ; or (2) who being of the age of ten years or upward has not obtained such certificate either of his proficiency in reading, writing, and elementary arithmetic, or of previous due attendance at a certified efficient school, as in this act in that behalf mentioned, unless such child, being of the age of ten years or upward, is employed and is attending school in accordance with the provisions of the Factory Acts (half-time system) or of any by-law of the local authority sanctioned by the Education Department. Every person who takes a child into his employment in contravention of this act shall be liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding forty shillings" (\$10). Then follow regulations that adapt the law to the necessities of various localities.

If the parents are unable to pay the weekly fees (never more than ninepence and frequently but twopence), these on application are paid out of the poor rates. Compulsion begins when the child reaches the age of five years. If the parents habitually neglect their children, or if the children are found "habitually wandering or not under proper control, or in the company of rogues, vagabonds, disorderly persons, or reputed criminals, it is

the duty of the local authority, after due warning to the parent of such child, to complain to a court of summary jurisdiction, and such court may, if satisfied of the truth of such complaint, order the child to attend some certified efficient school." In the first case of non-compliance the court may order the child to a Certified *Day Industrial* school, or if there is no such school suitable for the child, then to a Certified Industrial school. In the second or any subsequent case of non-compliance the court may add a penalty to the sentence.

To fully understand the working of the compulsory law it will be necessary to look into these industrial schools to which vagrant and vicious children are sent. The Day Industrial schools are generally under the charge of an efficient matron with assistants. The children, usually about one hundred, are from a circuit of two miles about the school building. They are committed by a magistrate, generally for three years, for irregular attendance at the ordinary schools, or for truancy and vagrancy. There are two classes (in the particular school in mind), senior and junior. At a quarter before six o'clock in the morning the doors are opened, although the children are not compelled to be present before eight; and from that hour until six o'clock in the evening the superintendent is responsible for the children. The attendance is not marked until between nine and ten o'clock, as soon as the Scripture lesson is over. The children are furnished with a substantial breakfast, dinner, and supper. The fee for each child is two shillings (fifty cents) each week. If any are too poor to pay this amount the parish pays it for them when the fact is attested before a magistrate. During one half of the day the children are employed at some industry,—sewing, scrubbing, making slippers, match-boxes, sacks, paper bags, etc. Cleanliness is especially enforced. Music is a chief ally to the teachers. During the other half of the day the children learn and recite their lessons. The school is open for voluntary attendance on Sundays, and religious instruction is given twice during the day.

The Certified Industrial schools are managed on the same general plan, save that the children are kept under the eye of the supervisor all the time. The most elementary branches of study alone are attended to, supplemented by easy manual labor and domestic work. The children are taken out for recreation almost daily and they pass comparatively happy lives. At the expiration of their period of committal, or when they have reached a proper

age, the girls are put into good families and started in life, while the boys are given respectable work. These schools are numerous in England and seem to be a constant and efficient factor in the successful working of the compulsory law. A few cities have truant schools where the bad characters in the industrial schools are sent. They are severe in *régime* and effective in discipline.

So much for the institutions provided for violators of the compulsory regulations: let us see now how the law is carried out. As we have noticed, it was intended first of all to reach the dense masses of ignorant children in the cities. These have been the first battle-fields of the law. As yet the rural districts have not taken it up with much zeal, and in many places it is a dead letter. The agricultural and financial depression of late years has caused untold misery in England, and it has been difficult to severely enforce the compulsory statute. It is a matter, educators think, which must work slowly until the people are educated up to the idea. Novel methods are resorted to by various School Boards to secure obedience to the law. In some cases, as at Birmingham, officers are appointed to superintend certain wards, and pass their whole time in calling at every house and in ascertaining the condition and whereabouts of the children. This rigid method leaves no way of escape. The writer of the present article listened to examinations of large numbers of "defaulting" parents in several important cities. They were from the lowest classes in every case. They were ragged, slovenly, and defiant. Three fourths of them were Roman Catholics, in a particular case in mind. Each one was questioned with great kindness by the examiner. Almost all pleaded the inability of poverty. Their families were large, wages were low, starvation was but a little removed from their doors, every shilling a child could earn was needed. The committee treated the cases with great tact. The duties they owed to their children were finally recognized, and every parent promised to do better. The greatest difficulty presents itself in the "moving population." In fact the law is slowly winning its way against obstacles that would daunt any other than a far-seeing statesman. Even at its present stage of progress it may be called eminently successful. Between 1836 and 1848, out of 335,429 persons arrested and committed to jail in England, 90 per centum were wholly illiterate. Under present arrangements, with population on the increase, the official report informs us that crime is on the decrease, and that, too, in spite of the alarming prevalence of drunkenness. In the case of juvenile offenders, where the law

ought to be effective if anywhere, there has been marked improvement.<sup>1</sup> Between 1870 and 1875 the number for each year averaged 1,373; in 1880 it was 1,084; and in 1881 and 1882, 842. The condition of the adults, of course, has not materially changed; but in many cases the increased knowledge of the children has driven their elders to their books to an extent hardly conceivable, until you visit one of those large silent reading rooms in the cities, and see the hundreds of men and boys poring over the magazines and books furnished by public munificence.

IV. *The Pupil-Teacher System.* To an American, one of the most noticeable features in the English system is the universal practice of employing pupil-teachers. Wherever you go you find classes — often large ones — taught in whole or in part by boys and girls between fourteen and eighteen years of age, who in turn are under the superintendence of head masters and mistresses. These boys and girls, beginning at an early age, have before them a regular series of promotions with increasing wages. Their advancement depends on their general success in management and instruction, and the successful issue of an annual examination before the Queen's inspectors. As a general rule the year's work is not difficult, and these youths advance easily through their pupil-teacher age, and, having passed final examinations, are admitted into the training college. Ordinary elementary schools (grammar schools) are classified into six "standards." Examinations are held yearly before government inspectors. If these are passed by a child, he or she advances from a lower to a higher standard, and the school of which he or she is a member receives an annual government grant averaging about four dollars per child. The highest standard (the sixth) is expected to pass an examination on the following subjects: "Reading with fluency and expression; a short theme or letter, the composition, spelling, grammar, and handwriting to be considered; proportion and vulgar and decimal fractions; parsing and analysis of a short complex sentence; outlines of the geography of the world; outline of the history of England from Henry VII. to the death of George III." Having passed with credit this highest examination, and having determined upon the profession of a teacher, the child, usually about fourteen years of age, makes application for a position as a pupil-teacher. Pupil-teachers are boys and girls employed to serve in a day (never a night) school on the following conditions: "The school must be reported by the inspector to be under a certificated teacher, held in

<sup>1</sup> See Mr. Mundella's speech before the House of Commons.

suitable premises, well furnished and well supplied with books and apparatus, properly organized and skillfully instructed, under good discipline, likely to be maintained during the period of the engagement; the pupil-teachers must be not less than fourteen years of age at the date of their engagement, must be of the same sex as the certificated teacher under whom they serve; but in mixed schools female pupil-teachers may serve under a master and may receive instruction from him out of school hours, on condition that some respectable woman, approved by the managers, be invariably present during the whole time that such instruction is given. Not more than three pupil-teachers may be engaged for every certificated teacher serving in the school." Pupil-teachers serve four years before passing into the training colleges, receiving during such yearly service \$50, \$65, \$85, and \$110 respectively. During these years the young aspirant carries on his or her studies under the special direction of the head master, becomes fully acquainted with all the technicalities of the profession, and gets a wide experience with human nature. It is the policy of the Education Department to slowly raise the standard of pupil-teachers; and in time the system will rid itself of some of its unfortunate elements, and be an efficient member of a great national organism.

V. *Teaching Staff and Training Colleges.* The three classes of teachers in elementary schools are certificated, assistant, and pupil-teachers. Assistant teachers are recruited both from the ranks of the pupil-teachers who have finished their engagements, and from outside candidates who pass the required examinations. These differ but little from pupil-teachers, except in point of maturity, and in not being required to pass an annual examination. They cannot assume control of a school.

In all England and Wales there is a corps of about 25,000 certificated teachers of elementary schools. There are eighteen training colleges for masters and twenty-four for mistresses. These forty-two institutions accommodate 3,194 students and send out yearly about 1,500 teachers who have had a training of two years. This just satisfies the annual loss of about six per centum in the ranks. The colleges are under the charge of (1) the National Society, (2) the British and Foreign Society, and (3) the Roman Catholics. The Education Department has not discovered a necessity for more, and consequently we find none under School Boards.

This is not the place to go into any detail as to these colleges, but a few words in regard to the teaching profession in England

are essential to even a cursory glance at the recent advance in public elementary education. Since 1870 a great and beneficial change has taken place in the social condition of teachers, their salaries have been materially increased, and their whole manner of life rendered more comfortable. This has attracted great numbers into the profession, and the standard is rapidly rising. Teaching is exclusively a profession in England, and when once taken up is followed through life. In 1870 the average salary of a master was £97 12s. 9d. (\$475); it is now about £118 14s. 3d. (\$600). That of ladies in 1870 was £57 16s. 5d. (\$290); it is now £71 2s. 2d. (\$350). As superintendents of schools many gentlemen are receiving \$1,500 and many ladies \$1,000. Besides this, over 15,000 teachers (out of 25,000) are furnished with comfortable houses erected on the school grounds.

As the traveler wanders through the large cities of Great Britain he sees standing out prominently here and there fine, large brick or stone school-houses almost palatial in exterior appearance. Edinburgh has granite buildings. Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and London vie with each other in the attractiveness of their public educational buildings. These Board schools have all been erected since 1870 at the expense of millions of pounds, and we see only the beginning as yet.

From this brief summary of the recent progress of elementary education in England, we cannot fail to draw the fruitful lesson that if a government sees the dangers of illiteracy and with a strong hand goes to work to eliminate it, the issue cannot be doubtful. England has attained success, it must be remembered, in a limited territory. Great Britain is hardly larger than one of our States of average size. She leaves Ireland and Canada and all her colonies to work under different systems. While with us a national system does not seem advisable, state systems should be organized on the same solid basis as that of the English elementary schools. Where war has weakened the commonwealth, and where dense masses of ignorant people are congregated, our common interests demand that the general government should lend its aid. If it is advisable for our National Congress to barricade the waters of the Mississippi by massive levees for hundreds of miles along its dangerous course, it is just as advisable to raise its levees against the strengthening tide of ignorance and consequent vice that threatens so many fair fields, and whose hoarse murmurs reach our ears ever and anon with ominous forebodings. Maine is injured and threatened by the ignorance and lawlessness of

California ; Minnesota by that of Louisiana. If we are to pay any Southern claims let it be by helping to educate the masses, and by putting into their hands the safe instruments of intelligence and sobriety.

We need in our country those same elements that make the educational system of England strong, namely, a teaching profession, careful inspection, rigid obligatory laws, and the teaching of those subjects that will practically affect the lives and morals of our poorer and ignorant masses. The poorer children of our country need more than the three R's ; they need to be taught how to live.

In these early days of our history as a nation we are laying foundations. The work of our hands and hearts must influence the centuries and the millions that throng them.

*Henry W. Hulbert.*

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#### CHILD NURTURE IN THE CHURCH.

NEARLY two hundred years ago the Rev. Cotton Mather made this wise observation : "The Lord hath not set up churches merely in order that a few old Christians may keep one another warm while they live, and then carry away the church with them when they die ; but that they may nurse successively another generation as subjects to the Lord, to stand up in his kingdom when they are gone. And if we do not keep in the way of a converting, grace-giving covenant, the church will die a lingering death." I suppose none of us would dispute the general soundness of Cotton Mather's proposition. It is possible, however, that some may wonder why his prophecy has not come true. If this principle be a correct one, how is it that our churches still continue to live and are strong ?

There are, it seems to me, two reasons for this.

One is that in spite of much unskillful nursing, and even no nursing, a given number of children do, nevertheless, persist in growing up after the ways of their fathers. There is a certain tenacity of life about a child, — physical, moral, and religious, — which stands him in good stead. If he is born well and lives in a pure atmosphere, he has a considerable advantage in his struggle for existence. In one of her bright letters Sara Coleridge quotes the adage of an old nurse, "O Lord, ma'am, it is not very easy to

kill a baby ;" and the letter-writer adds, "So I think it is not very easy to spoil a child." On reflection one is inclined to accept this as a grateful truth. It seems indeed to have been the solacing and quieting hope of many churches, and even of some Christian parents. They have done nothing, directly, toward making Christians of their children ; but they have fondly hoped that, under the working of some mysterious power, these children would somehow survive the attacks of all spiritual foes, and would finally force themselves, unaided, into the kingdom of Christ. In many cases this has actually been the result. The exceptional has proved true.

But there is another reason why the proscription of Cotton Mather has not been executed upon our New England churches, and that is because they have, to a considerable degree, fulfilled the conditions specified by him. Let us not flatter ourselves that this idea of "Child Nurture in the Church" is a discovery of the present generation. It is not a new subject. It is only coming up with a new sense of its importance and in a new form. There are just now blessed intimations that we are entering upon a revival, which we trust will be powerful and permanent, — a revival in zeal and wisdom for the saving of the children. Some of our ministers and churches are feeling deeply on the subject, and are anxiously seeking for more effective methods. It is therefore well for us to look the whole field over and see what changes, if any, are necessary from the theories and measures of former days. We shall then be ready to work understandingly toward a definite result.

Our New England churches have always had a stern sense of the duty which they have owed to the "rising generation." Probably there was more preaching on this subject in former times than there is now. The nature of the Abrahamic covenant, the importance of infant baptism, the duty of family worship, the sin of profaning the Sabbath and neglecting the sanctuary, the necessity of a firm parental government on the principle of "spare the rod and spoil the child," — all these were insisted upon. The Christian nurture of that day was of a heroic sort, and there was not always much show of affection in it. But it did put the children in effective training for a life of principle. It inculcated habits of obedience, virtue, and reverence. It was emphatic in behalf of doctrinal instruction and moral discipline. It prepared the way for final submission to the claims of a righteous God. The law was the school-master which led to Christ.

If the object of Christian training is to hold the child in the firm grasp of commandment for a future conversion in mature years, then the old measures are satisfactory and sufficient. Our fathers did not expect an early conversion in their children, and they did not labor for it. Their reliance was upon the sovereign grace of God. Conversion involved a stubborn contest with that grace, and culminated in submission. It was a mighty wrestling, a grand crisis in the spiritual life. The experience looked for was that of a man, not that of a nursling. The religious training of the children was, therefore, a moral and intellectual regimen, by which they might be gradually strengthened for the great struggle when it should come. It was, perhaps, the best possible preparation for a future conversion in mature years. It was, at least, thoroughly consistent with its aim.

But a change is working now. Perhaps it ought to be said that the change has already been wrought in the mind of the churches. It is in reference to the *object* of Christian training. It is generally believed at the present time that the object of our endeavors should be the child's *immediate* conversion; that we should expect this at a very early period in its life; that, indeed, as soon as it can know its mother the child may know Christ, and that instead of training him *for* a Christian life to be entered upon at some indefinite future time, he may most frequently be trained *in* a Christian life already entered and recognized. Of course such a change as this in our conceptions is fundamental. It puts the whole subject in a different light. We have an entirely different aim before us now, and we must of necessity proceed in a different way. The old measures cannot lead to the new results. Our different aim compels us to take a new path.

We shall not enter upon the fundamental question in this discussion. Let that be taken for granted. Our children may early become Christians, and ought to. We conceive it to be our privilege to help them at once, and without delay, into the Saviour's grace, and then to give them, as Christian children, the nurture of the church. This is our theory. But it is one thing to recognize the desirability of child piety; it is quite another thing to understand it and to adapt our plans and methods to its development. This is just now the pressing necessity, and our suggestions are on this point.

I. In our efforts for the conversion of the children we must recognize the difference between the experiences of a child and the experiences of a man.

This is perhaps the most difficult, as it is the most important thing for us to do. We have been accustomed in the past to demand a certain definite regulation experience at conversion. It is natural for us to think that this must be required now in the case of our children. But a moment's reflection will convince us that we ought not to ask such a thing. Such an experience no more fits these children than their fathers' clothes.

There has been much extravagant assertion on both sides of this question, and there is great danger in either extreme. It is neither a *man's* conversion nor *no* conversion that we are to seek, but simply the conversion of a child. Dr. Joseph Parker, for example, has been willing to say, "It is now taught that children have to be converted, but Christ taught that men were to be converted and to be like little children,—a direct inversion of narrow theological churchmanship. It is declared that children are born corrupt, but where is Christ's authority for saying so? Christ says, 'of such is the kingdom of heaven.'" Now we would appeal from these interpretations of the London Congregationalist to the more orthodox utterance of a Massachusetts Unitarian. After describing the "inborn tendencies and biases to evil" in the infant heart, the "passions that are there coiled up and sleeping, but which may one day strike their serpent fangs through that tender bosom," Dr. E. H. Sears asserts that "if no recreative power shall infuse healing virtue and restore heavenly order, these hidden forces shall surely come forth and be dramatized on the face of the earth and ravage it in their terrible outgoings. All culture," he says, "superinduced from without, all mere education, would have no other effect than to furnish these propensities with more keen and polished weapons to do their work." This we believe.

Conversion is necessary. But conversion may come without violence. It may be the sweet experience of some tender moment, when the prayer is being offered at the mother's knee; and neither child nor mother may mark the instant of the change. It may come before spiritual consciousness altogether, so that the child "emerges from infancy with the marks of God's grace upon him." This is indeed the normal way of entering the Christian life. "The natural and easy way for a child," says Professor Phelps, "is to grow up a Christian, so as never to remember the time when he was not one." "The new birth," says Neander, "is not to be a new crisis, beginning at some definable moment, but is to begin imperceptibly, and so proceed through the entire life."

"Boys and girls who become Christians normally," says the Rev. James G. Merrill, "become Christians gradually."

This is a truth which those who work among the children must constantly recognize. At an early age, earlier perhaps than we have been accustomed to think, by the teaching of the simplest truths of Christ's dear love, the little heart is opened to the Holy Spirit's influence. The door swings loosely at the first, and is moved by the gentlest impulses. Christ stands waiting there, and the humblest exercise of trust, the feeblest prayer, will not pass unheeded. At the slightest opening of the door the Lord himself will pass silently in, and the child's heart becomes the "temple of the Holy Ghost." Evil may enter also just as easily, but Christ is there. The conflict with indwelling sin is a lifelong conflict, but God's Spirit is present, and the child is regenerated. He may not understand this at the first. He probably will not. His mind is not competent to grasp the thought of his own experience. He has not arrived at a theologic conception of it. But he has it nevertheless. And it may be our first duty when we find him, to stand as Eli to Samuel. "Eli perceived that the Lord had called the child," and he interpreted to him the fact of the divine communication.

II. It therefore becomes evident that our plan must be directed not only toward the conversion of the children, but also and especially toward their training in the Christian life.

A great deal of labor for children fails because it falls short of this requirement. We are bent on their conversion. We pray for this, and exhort to it, it may be for years after the child has already experienced it. The boy's mind finally becomes confused and his patience exhausted, and he wearies in the fruitless struggle for that which is already passed; or else he makes pitifully vain attempts to realize some false ideal which it is not possible that he should ever reach. All our effort, and his, too, is a failure, because it is misdirected.

If a child is a Christian, many think he ought to be a saint. The piety they want to see is that unhealthy, unearthly piety which is described in some monstrosity of a biography. They cannot seem to understand that a Christian child is an imperfect, immature, and often sinful child, who prays to his Saviour and is trying hard to subdue strong passions and conquer an unruly temper. He has good qualities and bad ones mingled together, and he is wholly undeveloped in his character. We received a letter recently from a young mother, from which we are sure a few words

will be instructive on this matter. Referring to the couplet of Goethe,—

“Talent forms itself in solitude ;  
Character in the storms of life,”—

she says, “I sometimes hear people talk about the Christian character of children, and I have wondered how they could apply this big phrase, so weighty with meaning, to the little ones. Doubtless ‘a child is known by his doings,’ yet it seems to me that it is not so much character that we should expect to see in children as those tendencies and convictions which, when the stress of life is upon them, will develop into mature and symmetrical character. It is not given to many of us to attain unto the fullness of Christian experience until after years of tossing; perhaps never; yet the youngest among us, our little boys and girls, may lead truly Christly lives, patterned after Him of whom we read, ‘And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon Him.’” It is in such a Christian life as this that our children are to be trained; *not for it, but in it.* They may easily be brought to Christ, and then begins that “child nurture in the church” which is to be wisely and kindly and faithfully followed up until mature character is finally established.

Just here is where the strain comes most heavily upon us. It is no light task with which we are charged. It requires a deal of patience and watchful sympathy to follow these growing children of ours through the successive stages of their development, and give them all along the right sort of guidance. “Boys and girls are a variable quantity.” They are not the same this year as last, and in half a dozen years what wonderful changes come over them. We must grow with their growth; our sympathy must be discerning, and our methods flexible, as we take upon ourselves something of the divine condescension and train them carefully in the principles of righteousness and the graces of a Christian life. We like that word now coming so much into use, child “nurture.” It is something more than teaching; it is more than guiding. It enters into the child’s life, and gives it nourishment, and causes it to grow. To nurture is “to train up with a fostering care like that of a mother’s.” Just this is the mission of our churches to the children. They are to be parental, maternal.

III. If we accept these principles, then our plan may look to the saving of *all* the children under the care of our churches.

This is a work in which we may have large expectations. It is

not like other kinds of Christian effort. It promises vastly greater results. In attempting to save grown-up men there is a lamentable waste of forces. It is necessarily so. A large part of our exertions amount to nothing, because the man is proof against them. It is different with the children. They are reached far more easily and far more effectively. If we would only set ourselves at it, all the children in all our homes might be well developed, experienced Christians in a score of years. There need scarcely be an exception. We say this so confidently because there are communions where this has been their history. A pastor in one of our hill towns, only the other day, told us that this was the rule in his church. He said that while nearly every young man left the old parish between the ages of sixteen and twenty, he intended that they should go away Christians, and he was very seldom disappointed. They are sought early and they are won for Christ. It is a grand and noble work, and it pays.

That branch of the Christian church which acts most wisely and promptly and efficiently in the disciplining of its children is the one that will be most greatly prospered in the coming years. It will stand foremost in rank and power in conquering the world for Christ!

IV. And now as to specific methods; in what practical ways can this child nurture in the church be best performed?

1. We should say by all means let the first endeavor of the church be to incite the parents to the work. They are the church's officers for this ministry. The old proverbs are true: "An ounce of true mother is worth a pound of priest." "They who rock the cradle rule the world." And the exhortation is not to mothers alone. The chief apostolic command on this matter is, "Fathers, bring up your children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." The church cannot serve the children better than to be the parents' monitor, and constantly to keep before them the privileges of their high calling in the Christian home.

There is that sweet privilege of offering the child in the covenant of the Lord. "I have lent him to the Lord; as long as he liveth he shall be lent to the Lord." Of all the good things that can be done for the child, or the man, in after life, nothing can ever supply the loss of a definite and entire consecration to Christ in infancy by the mother who bore him. That church does an inestimable service to its children which inspires parents to make this solemn dedication. Some would construe this as meaning, revive the old doctrine and practice of infant baptism. But we

would not put it in just that way. Let us rather say revive the practice of infant consecration. Exhibit the beauty of God's covenant with the family; show the connection between the faith of the parent and the salvation of the child; and then from the spirit proceed to the form. The covenant being entered into, the seal of it will be sought, if only the privilege be open; and that of which the beautiful and sacred rite is a sign will follow, if indeed it has not already been achieved,—even the child's regeneration.

It is too late in the history of our Puritan churches to establish the practice of infant baptism by thrusting it upon the parents as a prescribed rite. It can never be revived among us in that way. Begin farther back than this, and at the opposite pole. Urge that of which the rite is the expression. Work from within outward. Sow the seed of loving responsibility, devotion, and faith, and the flower will grow. It is not the sustaining of a sacrament that we are anxious about, it is the saving of our children. If there were an alternative in the matter (as fortunately there is not), I should say better far the consecration in the faith of the covenant without any rite at all, than the rite itself, continued never so faithfully, as an empty form or an irreverent display. Better the teaching of faith in Christ, for his living grace upon the child, than of faith in a Sacrament, for whatever influence that may have upon the child.

After this consecration, there is the culture of the home; the instruction; the example; the sympathy; the kindly but firmly enforced discipline,—all that goes to make up the daily drill in Christian living. The first and best training that the church can give the children is the training of the parents for these various offices in the household life.

2. But the church must go on from this to more direct and personal ministries to its children. Parents cannot do it all. The church is the nourishing mother to all of us. It is by her watchful sympathy and constant instruction that we older ones are helped forward toward heaven; and surely the children should have their share in her attention. It may be well if her first care be for them.

We cannot see how this care can be given except by establishing special agencies in the church for this special work of child-training. This does not ignore the influence of the regular means of grace,—the public worship, the prayer-meeting, the Sunday-school. These all play an important part in the religious development of our children, and they may be made increasingly

useful in this direction. But the case evidently demands a more special treatment. What shall it be? We hear a great deal just now about children's societies and children's sermons, children's meetings, and children's covenants; what shall we do about these? Shall we introduce them into our own church work? If so, how, and where, and when? We are confused sometimes with the thought of them. They are measures with which we are unacquainted, agencies which we do not know how to operate. And too often the majority of us cast them all aside as impracticable. The more sensible thing would be to study them thoroughly. These various sorts of Christian endeavor are the outworkings of a deep sense of need. It is effort in the right direction. The results which have already followed some of the undertakings have become a practical recommendation of them. Something ought to be done, and we may at least receive suggestion.

We shall never succeed in any or all of these schemes, however, except as we have a definite object before us, and work steadily and persistently toward that. This is not an amusement, either for the church or the children. It is an endeavor to build up in Christian character. Novel methods and attractive names are often a snare. But if we have a thing to do, we may select the proper instruments. Perhaps you will use methods which somebody else has attempted. Perhaps you will invent your own. At any rate, they must be made your own, and adapted to your own surroundings. We cannot see, for example, how a pastor can do all he ought for his children, unless he finds some way of coming into personal contact with them; knowing them, advising them, giving his pastoral counsel and sympathy. But whether this should be by five-minute sermons on Sunday, or by general children's meetings on a week day, or by meeting separate Sunday-school classes with their teacher at his study, or by seeking them out personally one by one, depends altogether on the pastor and the conditions under which he works.

Children need instruction; they are to be "nourished up in the words of faith and of good doctrine." They need moral discipline; so that the conscience, intelligent and discerning, shall dominate the whole personality. They must be trained in the habit of self-denial, in the spirit of love, and sympathy, and sacrifice. Looking forward to the future, it would seem that our boys especially should be prepared to do the great benevolent work of the churches. We are extending our missionary enterprises on every hand, elaborately organizing them for future generations; are we

training our youth so that they will become the intelligent, sympathetic, and generous supporters of these great Christian charities? Then there are all the various forms of Christian activity at home, to which we know the children will soon be called; and all the temptations of social and business life, to which they will soon be exposed. It is not too much to ask of the church that it shall have every one of these things in view as it seeks the Christian nurture of its children. The pastor ought to attend to some of them. Some may be intrusted to the Sunday-school teachers. Some may be best provided for by a simple organization. But in some way and by somebody such work as this should be undertaken and performed, in every church.

By these means the children may be held gently but firmly through all the years of early Christian growth, until, with something of mature experience and intelligent belief, they may be brought into formal connection with the church on the public confession of their faith. While "joining the church" should not be the ostensible aim of this training, yet one ought carefully to examine either himself or his methods, if a large number do not come forward to this duty at twelve or fourteen, or at least sixteen years of age.

The act of uniting with the church will, we think, most naturally take place somewhere along this border line of childhood and youth. It marks an epoch in the person's life and it should be made much of. It is wonderful how rapidly the person changes and advances after this age is past. My subject does not legitimately take me into this eventful and changeful period of youth, but there is no time when the church nurture is more imperatively needed than in just this turning point of life — say from twelve to eighteen years of age. It is the time when the confidential relations of the child with the parent are most likely to be disturbed. The feeling of independence grows. Individuality asserts itself. The confidences sought are with those outside the family and with persons of their own age. This is a natural tendency. It is unwise to fight against it. It cannot be overcome. It must be directed. The soul is moving out into an individuality of its own, and forming new associations according to its affinities. It is a critical period. For this period the whole previous life should be a preparation. Through it the church should be especially watchful and helpful. Now is the time of all others for the forming of Christian associations. These young Christians need now to be brought near together, and in each other's aid

and sympathy to find a defense against evil. Here is a wide mission for "Societies for Christian Endeavor," or whatever other organizations or plans, by which the youth may help themselves, under the best possible outside influences, into a thoroughly established Christian life.

In conclusion one or two words may be said about the workers in this field.

First, it is a work which cannot be intrusted to inferior hands. The children must be strongly led. The men and women who seek to *give* character must themselves *have* character. It needs wisdom, vigor, power, to do the work. The best and strongest among us are none too nobly equipped. Attention has been called to the fact that it was the leader of the Apostles, the "rough and ready Peter," who was bidden, "Feed my lambs."

Second, the work will call for the best that we have to give. Pastors cannot make this their professional plaything. It may be delightful work, a refreshing change from the dull labors of the day; it must be joyful or it will fail; but it demands thought and energy and that sort of persistency that never tires. The children need our best selves, our genuine selves, without affectation. There is a silly notion which some people cherish, that in order to work with children one must be childish; that the "mentally weak and the morally flimsy" will satisfy the child's demand. Over against this false conception we wish to emphasize the very opposite fact. Simplicity is needed, but it is the simplicity of purity and clearness, the simplicity of large and luminous truths and principles consistently applied.

"Ah, my friends," said Horace Bushnell, "these children can make room for more gospel than we, and take in all precious thoughts of God more easily. The very highest and most spiritual things are a great deal closer to them than to us. And to speak to them fitly, so as not to thrust in Jesus on them as by force, but have Him win his own dear way, by his childhood, waiting for his cross, tenderly, purely, and without art—Oh, how fine, how very precious, the soul equipment it will require of us." "After all, there is no cheap way of making Christians of our children. Nothing but to practically live for it makes it sure. To be Christians ourselves! Ah, there is the difficulty!"

*James W. Cooper.*

## THE UTAH CHURCH-STATE.

IT is not a little strange that to the nineteenth century and to the United States of America should be reserved the most astounding and most successful attempt made in modern times to set up a theocracy pure and simple, of Mosaic pattern, though with divers material latter-day improvements added,—an attempt to give power absolute and unlimited to a priesthood claiming direct inspiration and divine authority for every word and act; to unite all civil and ecclesiastical functions in the same persons; to subordinate the social, the financial, and political wholly to the theological and sacerdotal; and thus to reduce the state to a *simulacrum* without blood or bones,—the merest abject creature of the church. But just such an amazing scheme of hierarchical rule was inaugurated by Joseph Smith, Jr., and Sidney Rigdon in the year of grace 1830; was unfolded and applied for fifteen years in the Mississippi Valley with an enthusiasm and vigor which never flagged; was brought into practical and most potent operation by Brigham Young after the exodus from Nauvoo in 1847; and exists full-fledged in Utah to-day,—the real cause of the most troublesome and obnoxious Mormon matter, the actual source and spring of an irrepressible conflict with the most cherished religious and political ideas of fifty millions.

The founders of Mormonism, in their handling of Scripture, were nothing if not literal. They found much mention made of the kingdom of heaven in the Old Testament and the New, and affected to find also the predictions of Daniel, Isaiah, and the rest fulfilled to the letter in the *régime* of their prophet. This reputed finder of the Golden Plates aspired to be the builder and autocrat of that kingdom. Nor was it at all in his thought to fashion or lord it over a realm purely spiritual in which the humblest and holiest should be highest. His was to be a dominion temporal and material as well; was to be first and chiefly of this world, wielding an arm of flesh and carnal weapons, was to look sharply after the ballot box and the revenue, control wholly for its own ends the legislature, the executive, and the courts. The form of civil government might be that of a republic, of a monarchy like England, or of a despotism like Russia, the spirit and controlling force would be always, everywhere, and only priestly. Thoroughly furnished by constant illumination of the Holy Ghost with angelic ministrations, abundant and daily revelations direct from heaven,

Smith and his successors would revolutionize the politics of the world, and so transform them as to make the statute book, the administration of justice and society itself, to be but the reflection of the will of Jehovah! So ran and runs the Mormon dream. A literal kingdom is in the eye of the Utah priesthood. For this they eagerly hope and pray. This is the one goal of desire and endeavor: political dominion, a temporal kingdom in which Latter-day Saints shall wear all the honors, and receive all the pay.

This idea and ambition can be traced back almost to the birthday of the Mormon church, certainly to the beginning of "gathering" to Kirtland, Ohio, in 1831. Three years later we find the "prophet" leading an "army" westward to deliver the Missouri Zion from its foes with musket and sword by "throwing down their towers and scattering their watchmen." It is a significant fact that the first outbreak in a series of conflicts which ended in the expulsion of "the Saints" from the State occurred at the polls. Thus early in their career had they learned to vote solid for the candidates named by "the Lord." The woes which befell in Illinois five years later, and which culminated in that dreadful tragedy in Carthage jail, and in sudden and disastrous flight under stern stress of mob violence, were of similar origin. Nauvoo was possessed and governed by Smith and his coadjutors in independence and defiance of the authorities of the county and State. Few politicians of his time were more reckless and unscrupulous than this most unprophetlike of prophets. Without shame he flattered and fooled and betrayed Whigs and Democrats alike, and so was presently feared and hated by both parties. At the date of his death this strange being held, or had recently filled, among others, such incongruous offices as these: register of deeds, licensed tavern-keeper, prophet, seer, and revelator for the church, lieutenant-general of the Nauvoo Legion, mayor of the city, was also candidate for the presidency of the United States, while almost his last act was to send by the hand of one of his "apostles" a petition to Congress asking authority to raise and command an army of 100,000 for use upon the western frontier! Brigham Young, his successor in the headship of the priesthood, received the prophet's political schemes and policy as a sacred inheritance, and soon after, leading some 30,000 devoted and fanatical followers to the fastnesses of the Rocky Mountains, and as he supposed far beyond the reach of interference from the Republic, or any secular government, saw and seized the opportunity to inaugurate in its fullness the visible and material kingdom of God. Two years later,

or in 1849, this is the situation as Lieutenant Gunnison found it: "While professing a complete divorce of church and state, their political character and administration is made subservient to the theocratical or religious element. They delight to call their system of government a Theo-Democracy. For the rule of those not fully imbued with the spirit of obedience, and sojourners not of the faith, tribunals of justice, and law-making assemblies are at present rendered necessary. But by the rules and regulations vouchsafed from heaven are they guided in temporal affairs, so that those holding the revelations of God's will are the ones who make laws, the rulers and executors. In fact the president of the church is the civil governor *because* he is the seer of the Lord. Even the legislature can make no law upon, or regulating what is given in revelations to the prophet. All are to obey the presidency, at home in all things, and abroad in spiritual things, independent of every consideration. The priesthood is supreme in the state. This order has the control, and ought to make the civil regulations, because it receives revelations from day to day. In the selection of officers by ballot the elective franchise is made subservient to a vote for the nominee of the presidency." That same year an election was held in the settlements at which the decision was *unanimous* and as follows: Brigham Young, governor; Willard Richards (second counselor), secretary; Heber C. Kimball (first counselor), chief justice; John Taylor (apostle) and Newel K. Whitney, associate justices; Daniel H. Wells, attorney-general, and each bishop justice of the peace in his ward. Two years later Heber C. Kimball is president of the Senate, and Jedediah M. Grant (now second counselor) speaker of the House. And after that same fashion it continued until two years since, when the Edmunds Bill ousted all polygamists and so thrust these chief priests forth from the offices which they by prescriptive sacerdotal right had filled so long. The federal government has been alike despised and abhorred from first to last, and even yet has scarcely begun to possess its own in Utah. It cost millions in 1857-58 to persuade the Mormon church to allow non-Mormon executive and judicial officials to enter the territory and perform their legitimate functions. The enactments of Congress have been steadfastly and scornfully nullified. The United States courts for more than thirty years have been compelled to fight for standing room. It was not until 1870 that the governor could break up the treasonable "Nauvoo Legion," hinder its annual gatherings for drill under the lead of church magnates, and so bring the militia of the Territory under federal control.

The Mormon teaching concerning the scope of church authority, that is, of the power of the "holy priesthood" to command, is not in the least lacking in positiveness or point. The arrogant claim to universal and unlimited rule has been made abundantly, and with refreshing plainness and vigor, in public discourse, in the church papers and periodicals, and in various volumes which have long been standard, notably in the works of the Pratts, Orson and Parley P., and in the "Letters" of Orson Spencer. Said Sidney Rigdon in 1844: "Men have labored under the mistaken idea that salvation was distinct from government, that they could build a church without government, and that that *thing* could save. When God sets up a system of salvation he sets up a system of government. When I speak of government I mean what I say. I mean a government which shall rule over temporal and spiritual affairs." Said Brigham Young at the same conference: "It is time to have a President of the United States. Elders will be sent out to preach the gospel and electioneer" (337 were sent, some to every congressional district in twenty-seven States and Territories, to secure electoral votes for the politician "prophet"). Spencer lays down the divine principle in this uncompromising style: "The priesthood is that order of authoritative intelligences by which God regulates, controls, enlightens, saves, or condemns all beings. By means of this order God teaches and governs all things. Out of the line of this order there is no power whatever that is acknowledged and approved of God. Magistrates, rulers, kings, potentates, and principalities, if not legitimately ordained and clothed with the authority of this priestly order, are usurpers. Jesus exercises all power through a delegation of it to the different orders of his priesthood. The command to obey is imperative on all men. Hence, whatever orders of civil government, or of domestic compact, or of business or commercial transaction may contravene the established order of priesthood, the same must bow to the requisition of the inspired priesthood of God. All other forms of government have proved a complete failure. By means of this order the kingdoms of this world, whether temporal or spiritual, Pagan or Christian, are all to be merged in one universal kingdom, which will embrace politics, arts, war, merchandise, science, and religion; kings and rulers of all grades will then be chosen of God through the priesthood, of which rulers will be a part and portion, and without being ordained to the priesthood, no man ever can rule in this kingdom. Jesus Christ came to establish a temporal kingdom fully as much as a spiritual kingdom. It is strange, in-

deed, that a sectarian clergy should borrow the idea that his kingdom was not temporal as well as spiritual." According to Parley P. Pratt ("Key to Theology") : "The priesthood holds the power and right to give laws and commands to individuals, churches, rulers, nations, the world ; to appoint kings, presidents, governors, judges ; and to ordain or anoint them to their several holy callings ; also to instruct, warn, or reprove them by the word of the Lord. These are the representatives or ambassadors of the Son of God to mankind. To receive them, to obey their instructions, to feed, clothe, and aid them, is counted the same as if all had been done to the Son of God in person." But Orson Pratt, in his "Kingdom of God," is still more explicit, and fairly outdoes the chiefest in his fervid setting forth of the theocratic rule whose beginning is in these last days. According to his startling allegation, "The kingdom of God is the only legal government that can exist in any part of the universe. Any people attempting to govern themselves by laws of their own making, and by officers of their own choice, are in direct rebellion against God. For 1700 years (from A. D. 1830 backward) the nations were entirely destitute of a true and legal government. All the emperors, kings, princes, presidents, and lords acted without authority. Not one of them was called or anointed by the God of heaven, not one has received revelations or laws from Him. Their authority is all assumed. Their laws are but the productions of their own false governments, and the whole superstructure, from first to last, is a heterogeneous mass of discordant elements, in direct opposition to the kingdom of God. The Almighty has decreed to rend and break in pieces all earthly governments, to cast down their thrones, to turn, overturn, and break up the nations, and make a way for the establishment of an everlasting kingdom, to which all others must yield, or be prostrated, nevermore to rise. Awake then, O ye nations, for with you the Lord hath a controversy ! The plagues of the last day are at hand, and who shall escape ? The dreadful majesty of the kingdom shall strike terror to the hearts of kings !" In 1853 John Taylor asserted : "The priesthood is the only legitimate rule on earth, and all the nations will have to submit to it." In 1854 it was editorially declared in the "Millennial Star :" "A theocracy, or government of God through his prophet, seer, and revelator is the only form of rule able to give permanent happiness and prosperity. If the whole people follow the dictates of the Spirit, it will make manifest whom the Lord has chosen ruler, and also make known to those that govern what is for the best interests of the people.

This is the reason there are no party politics [in Utah], no dissenting votes in the election of officers in *church or state*. The spirit of revelation is the nominating power. The officers of the priesthood are chosen by revelation, or by the dictation of the Holy Spirit through those who hold the priesthood." In 1856 Brigham Young's counselor prayed: "May we accomplish the great work thou didst commence through thy servant Joseph. May we have power over the wicked nations that [the Mormon] Zion may be the seat of government for the Universe!"

Such stalwart teaching could easily be multiplied a hundred-fold. Nor must it by any means be regarded as simply fervid and eloquent, but empty speech. For every haughty word it would be easy to find in Mormon history a tyrannical deed to match. And the Utah hierarchy, by its very constitution, as no other the world ever saw, is fitted to rule with a rod of iron over the brains, hearts, and consciences of men. Note these particulars. Elsewhere the vulgar many are unpossessed of sacerdotal sanctity and power, but here, in theory, *every* male (if white) belongs to the priesthood, either Aaronic or Melchizedek, while as a matter of fact, in a population of 138,876 not less than 28,853, or one to every four and a half of old and young, male and female together, are priests, and so office bearers, have been ordained, initiated, and anointed, have received oaths, grips, and pass-words. Then, too, there are various grades and orders in the priesthood, and by diligence and faithful doing the humblest may rise at length to the highest rank. Thus, according to official statistics just published (April, 1884), this great host of inspired bosses is classified as follows, beginning with the least: Of deacons there are 5,022; of teachers, 1,786; priests, 1,611; elders, 12,191; seventies, 4,747; high priests, 3,413; patriarchs, 68; apostles, 12; and a first presidency of three. Each rank, too, has its specific duties, and is organized into societies or "quorums," with several officers and frequent meetings, and each lower grade is thoroughly drilled into obedience to every higher. Still further, the claim is stoutly maintained that each one, according to his need and station, is thoroughly furnished for his tasks by the Holy Ghost precisely as were the prophets and apostles of ancient days, and hence, in all fitness, it belongs to them to rule. Then, finally, the fact is to be emphasized that magnifying their holy office, they set no manner of limits to the scope of their authority. Their God is by no means a being merely religious, but a mechanical, a business, a political God as well (so teaches

George Q. Cannon, who stands but one remove from the exalted place once held by the "prophet" Joseph himself); and in like manner, nothing is too earthly for their touch. They therefore echo the voice of God and utter his mandates in the home and the school, in buying, selling, and at the polls, in relation to irrigation, marriage, amusements, and no less in collecting tithes. Brigham Young's famous dictum may well set forth the sum and conclusion of the whole matter: "I have a perfect right to dictate in everything, *from the setting up of a stocking to the ribbons on a woman's bonnet!*"

It must in honesty be admitted that such strong meat of doctrine is seldom set nowadays either before the saints or the dwellers in sinful "Babylon." But thousands still live in whose ears for years rang continually the command, "Obey counsel, and ask no questions," and to whom was applied on all occasions the infamous test: "Will you promise to obey the priesthood, *right or wrong?*" The most shocking Mountain Meadows massacre, and dark deeds of blood by the score and hundred, prove to what lengths this precious theocracy was ready to go. But the times have changed. The Mormon is nothing if not politic and shrewd, and so the current teaching is much more mild. Handbooks are issued from the church press which conveniently omit such dogmas, make the priesthood out to be most innocent and lamblike, — a very tame and colorless affair. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the fathers receive fulsome praise. It is roundly denied that the church ever meddles with civil matters, and it is fiercely asserted that elections in Utah are free. All which protestations and asseverations provoke only a broad smile from such as have convincing evidence of the facts in the case. Even under the operation of the Edmunds Bill the church magnates name every candidate and control every vote. A Mormon is neither Democrat nor Republican, but only and always a slave to the priesthood. At the closing sessions of the late legislature a strong delegation of apostles and presidents sat with the law-makers (?) night and day, to watch their movements, and dictate the mind and will of "the Lord." Within two years men have been cut off by the church for selling land to "gentiles." Within a year two men have been heavily fined for taking civil cases into the federal courts. Within six months the church curse fell on one who dared to vote the Liberal ticket, and within a few days John Taylor *forbade* the city council of Salt Lake City to adopt the standard time, etc.

Yes, political supremacy, domination in everything, is still to the Utah hierarchy dear as the apple of its eye. If they cannot fill the offices, life is scarcely worth living. Wearing the honors and gathering the tithes is "three fourths" of existence. A church attending only to piety, religion, prayer, and song, rebuking of sin and fostering of righteousness, is an idea inconceivable, something altogether stale, flat, and unprofitable. In the Mormon millennium the extant successor of Joseph Smith, with wives multitudinous, will be found occupant of the White House, and his trusted friends holding the chief seats in every department of government. In that day not an office, high or low, in the nation or the several States, but will be held by a priest after the orthodox order of Joseph Smith! Smile not, for this is the deep laid plan and this the sure expectation. And as steps leading to that end, Utah is to be thoroughly possessed and held, at any cost, as a centre of priestly authority, and by immigration and systematic colonization, Idaho, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Wyoming, and New Mexico are to be occupied, and from these other States and Territories.

What an amazing scheme to find its birth in the nineteenth century, after long and weary generations of fiercest warfare against pope, prelate, and presbytery for persistent meddling with matters purely secular and civil! No idea is more thoroughly bred in the bone of Teutonic races at least, than that the priest, as such, and the church shall let politics alone. How incredible, too, that a theocratic attempt, so aggressive and defiant, should originate, and for fifty years find generous favor and support, in the very midst of this Republic, where from the first the fundamental thought and most cherished endeavor have been to put church and state entirely asunder and keep them distinct, leaving each in its place and sphere to be independent and untrammeled; that in all which relates to civil affairs there shall be free speech, unlimited discussion; that at the polls men shall meet not as sectaries, but only as fellow-citizens; and that the confusion and strife of the bitterest political antagonism are vastly better than any unity and order secured by ecclesiastical authority. The article standing or falling of the Utah church-state differs *toto celo* from this conception, and it is at this point that Mormonism is essentially unpatriotic and even traitorous, absolutely un-American and anti-republican.

*D. L. Leonard.*

**NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AS AFFECTING POLYGAMY IN UTAH.**

A PHILOSOPHICAL student of the political history of the United States might easily trace a tolerably close parallel between the course and attitude of men and parties toward the institution of slavery, sixty-five years ago, and their present attitude toward that "twin relic of barbarism," polygamy. To be sure, the Utah abomination occupies no such ground of vantage as that from which slavery fought. Slavery was already intrenched in the South a century ago. It was recognized in the Constitution in a shamefaced way. It had the sanction of that "sovereignty" which, under the Articles of Confederation, each State "retained," and the new government of the Union received no authority to interfere with it. Polygamy, on the other hand, has no such sanction. It exists in, at least, it is tolerated by the laws of, no State of the Union.

When slavery began to invade the territories and to establish itself in the new States, there came a great contest between the systems of the North and the South. Men first hesitated, and doubted as to the power of Congress to exclude slavery from the Territories, and then they yielded. Those who did not represent constituencies directly interested in the extension of the institution professed to abhor slavery, in principle and in practice. But they persuaded themselves that it was a domestic concern of the States themselves, which the latter alone had a constitutional power to regulate. As slavery grew more bold it claimed the full right to existence in the Territories. The controversies and conflicts which that claim produced need not be mentioned for present purposes.

Polygamy has fully domesticated itself in one Territory. It has spread more or less into the adjoining Territories. So strong has the religious sect which upholds the practice become in one of the States of the Union, that it is said almost to hold the political balance of power between the two parties in that State. What is the consequence of this growing strength? Just what might have been expected: that one of the two great political parties of the country has arrived at the point of hesitating. The sentimental abhorrence of polygamy is not lacking; but constitutional doubts, identical with those which, in 1819, were so convenient a pretext for the few Northern men who joined with

the Southern senators and representatives in fastening slavery upon Missouri, are now given as reasons for not eradicating it. One distinguished senator has already gone farther than this. He has intimated that the social condition of some Northern communities is such that their representatives have no right to express horror at the institutions of Utah. In effect, he advises New England first to pluck the beam out of its own eye. If this does not signify that he, for his part, sees nothing very abominable in polygamy, and is indisposed to support a measure to exterminate it, even so far as he believes the national power extends, it is not easy to understand what force Senator Brown's argument has.

Polygamy needs, and knows how to take advantage of, all constitutional doubts, all comparisons which are to her credit, all semi-apologies for her peculiar institution. While it would not be fair or true to charge upon the whole Democratic party a willingness to defend or even to tolerate polygamy, yet it cannot be overlooked or denied that all the encouragement which the Mormons receive comes from that quarter. While that party cannot be held responsible for the fact that the well-meant but timid laws assailing polygamy are scornfully violated, there can be scarcely a doubt that if the people of the United States were united in supporting those laws, and unchangeable in their determination to eradicate it, the Mormons would see that their institution was doomed, and would reconcile themselves to the fact. It may be said with truth that the temptation not to lose the favor of a growing sect has been taken into consideration.

The question of polygamy is a part, in a political sense it is the most important part, of a much broader one. By settling that broader question on correct principles, and only in that way, can the country acquire the right to deal directly, at close quarters and effectually, with the institution which threatens so much mischief in our far Western Territories. It is the purpose of this article to maintain the proposition: *That the national government should acquire, by an amendment of the Constitution, full and exclusive authority over the whole matter of Marriage and Divorce.*

Heretofore the agitation of this subject, neither very active nor prolonged, has treated of divorce only. It is believed, however, not only that the arguments in favor of a national divorce law are applicable, almost without change, to the subject of marriage, but that jurisdiction over divorce cannot be complete and effectual without authority over marriage also. Moreover, in no other

way than by exercising authority over the entry into the married state can Congress extirpate polygamy in the Territories, or deal with it at all in States of the Union should it ever, by any means, get a foothold in one or more of them.

The Protestant churches, all over the world, have discarded the Roman Catholic doctrine that marriage is a sacrament, and that no union is valid unless it has been blessed by the church. They have not however adopted, in its fullest extent, the idea that marriage is merely a civil contract. They regard it as an institution of divine origin. When two persons enter into the relation of husband and wife they become those "whom God hath joined together." But Protestants also recognize the hand of God in civil government. "The powers that be are ordained of God." Neither does this imply, in the Protestant view, that the church must sanction a civil government before it becomes authoritative over the people who are under it; nor does the approval of marriage by God render it essential to a valid marriage that it shall be solemnized by a religious ceremony. The Christian church everywhere, and in all forms, prefers that men and women entering into the most sacred, intimate, and enduring relations to each other, should do so in a manner which indicates that they acknowledge the union to be entered into in the sight of God, and that He joins them together. It does not so universally insist that they shall do so. In all countries, and particularly in those where there is separation of church and state, whatever concerns the law of marriage and divorce is, must be, and should be within the exclusive control of the state. The civil government is solely responsible for the preservation of public order and the care of the public morals. The churches are independent and voluntary organizations, which have a duty to watch over their members, and to make the burden resting upon the civil government as light as possible. But they can punish violations of their own laws only, and those by no other than spiritual penalties.

It is consequently necessary, in the interest of good government and of harmony between church and state, that the churches renounce all authority over such matters, and confine their efforts to securing proper laws to be administered by the civil authority. These laws should be based upon the Christian idea of marriage, — its solemnity, its sacredness, its durability. But this end can only be compassed in the usual way, and by working through the ordinary channels of political action. The arguments in favor of the change proposed are, therefore, political arguments; and the

churches have no additional reasons to advance. They have only a very deep interest in such a settlement of the question as shall conduce to public order and public morality.

Let us consider, first, the state of the marriage laws.

There are four particulars in which marriage laws may differ from each other locally, in the same country, in such a way that inconveniences and scandals may result from the confusion, namely, as to (1) who may contract marriage; (2) what evidence of eligibility and notice of intention shall be given before the ceremony is performed; (3) how the evidence that a marriage has been celebrated shall be preserved; and (4) what constitutes a valid marriage.

It is not too much to say that the laws of no two States of the Union agree on all these points, and that in only rare cases do the laws of two States agree entirely on any one of the four points. The laws relating to the age at which young people are free to marry, and those prescribing the degrees of consanguinity within which no persons may marry, are completely different in adjoining States. Again, while in some States no license at all is required, in others not only is a license necessary, but a certain time must elapse between the declaration of intention and the ceremony. There are good registration systems and bad ones; and in some States there is no observance even of the faulty registration laws on their statute books. And finally the determination of what is a valid marriage rests upon the ludicrously diverse decisions of the courts of all the States, in accordance with the law of each State.

Various evils result from this condition of things. What is done in one State, under its laws, is valid in every State. The Constitution enjoins that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts . . . of every other State." There was, not many years ago, a notable case of a literary man who wished to contract a marriage which the law of the State where he resided forbade. He visited a neighboring State where the law was different, was there legally married, and returned to reside in his old home with his wife. Although it was a clear evasion of the law, the chances are that an attempt to invalidate the marriage would fail, because of the constitutional provision above quoted. Runaway matches are facilitated by the looseness of the laws of some of the States. Very important questions as to the succession to property are at all times liable to arise, and good registration laws are needed to insure the determination of these questions in accordance with truth and justice.

It is merely a truism to say that in a country like ours, where a person may change his citizenship by a mere change of residence, and where what has been done according to law in one State is not to be questioned in any other State, all the statutes are substantially reduced to the grade of the most lax system. A man and a woman have only to find out where they may be legally married, and go there. Uniform laws are consequently almost, if not quite, as much a necessity as good laws; and a good law in any one State is of no avail, because it may be openly evaded with impunity so long as there is another State where the laws are not good. The law is thus brought into contempt. It is observed and obeyed by those who have a right to marry because that is the easiest course to be pursued. It has no effective restraint whatever for those who wish to violate it.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these and other evils resulting from the treatment of marriage as a "local issue" have not thus far proved so intolerable that one might expect them to overcome the intense conservatism of the American people in matters which concern the national Constitution. There have been thousands of neighborhood scandals, yet very few persons seem to have attributed them to their true cause, the lack of uniformity in state laws; still fewer are those who have considered the transfer of jurisdiction over the matter to the nation as a remedy for them; and no one has even tried to conquer the political indolence of the people when a grave question like this is placed before them.

Possibly the people may be aroused by having it pointed out to them that, in addition to the minor advantages of the change proposed, this plan points the way to an effective dealing with the great social, moral, and political evil of polygamy. There are constitutional doubts, as has been said already,—not well-grounded ones, we think,—as to the power of Congress to impose political disabilities upon polygamists in Utah even while it is held under territorial government. No one will maintain that Congress has the power to impose such disabilities upon the people of a State. But a national marriage law would enable the government to suppress polygamy, whether in a State or in a Territory, by the imposition of actual penalties for violation of the statute.

Let us face the facts as they are. The Mormons hold, or profess to hold, that plural marriages are not only permissible but praiseworthy. They constitute an immense majority of the people of Utah. Under any system of popular government they will

rule. So long as the laws against bigamy not only appear to be but are aimed at them, and so long as a special law limits the right of suffrage in Utah alone, they will persuade themselves and some tender-hearted people who are not of them, that they are suffering for conscience' sake. The absolute failure of the present laws, of the bill which is pending, should it become a law, and of the most radical measure aimed at Utah, may be predicted with the greatest confidence. Possibly it would be different if those laws had the nearly unanimous support of the people of the country, and if the Mormons were convinced that there was a settled determination to enforce them in all their rigor until polygamy had been rooted out, and to deny admission to Utah until all danger from it had been dispelled.

That, however, is not the case. The Mormons, rightly or wrongly, believe that they have friends in the States. They are aware that their assistance to one of the political parties may be so necessary that all repugnance, real or feigned, to their "peculiar institution" may be conquered, and Utah admitted as a State. At all events, the chances are so good that they are willing to take the consequences of the existing hostile legislation, and wait patiently for a turn of the wheel of fortune. Meanwhile they do not suffer greatly. None of those who are living in plurality are troubled in their families. Some of them are disfranchised, but the cause is upheld by others who have the same views about polygamy as they hold, but who do not practise it. They evidently do not believe in the permanence of the law.

Nor would it be much worse for them were the radical suggestion of the repeal of the territorial charter, and the government of Utah as a prefecture, to be adopted. No doubt, if that method of dealing with them were employed, their political lot might be a hard one for a time; but they might count confidently upon the springing up of a sympathy for them, and so long as they could discover indications of such sympathy they would hope for deliverance, and wait for it.

Were Congress, in conformity with an amendment to the Constitution, to enact a marriage law, uniform throughout the country, that would settle the matter finally and forever. Bigamy would necessarily be prohibited by it, and the prohibition could never be removed. It would apply to all the States and to the Territories. Nor would it be a mere idle declaration of disapproval. Physical penalties would be affixed to violations of the law, which, under the administration of courts removed from local influence, could be visited upon offenders.

Under such a system, we should have, first, — to follow the order of existing evils mentioned above, — a uniform system of law regulating the power to contract marriage. This, so far as the Mormons are concerned, would forbid the marriage of a man who had one wife living. Next, we should have a uniform and adequate system of license. At present, even in States where the requirements under this head are most strict, no person is required to give proof that his statements are true. Two residents in Maine can procure a license to marry in Massachusetts on the unsustained assertions of one of the parties. A Mormon who has one wife living can go away from home and marry a second wife without flaunting his disobedience to the law in the face of the authorities. But under a national system, nothing is easier than to prevent violations and evasions of the law. It is only necessary to require that each party to an intended marriage shall procure from a designated local officer — say the postmaster, for a suggestion — of the place where he or she lives, a certificate that he or she is of lawful age, and is reputed to be unmarried. There should be a penalty for willful misstatements by the officers, who would, of course, also be removed from office for falsehood or carelessness.

Then, too, each person authorized to solemnize marriages under a national system would be under oath to obey the law. He would be forbidden to perform the ceremony except upon the production of the certificates already referred to; he would be liable to a penalty if he disobeyed. The certificates would be preserved by him, or filed, as the authority for his act. He would be required to report his doings, and there would be a full and accurate registration. Thus the law would have within its control and be enabled to hold to a strict accountability both those who certified to the marriageability of parties and those who celebrated marriages, besides having the power to punish those who contracted bigamous unions.

How would this affect the Mormons? It would render impossible the solemnization of plural marriages by any officer deriving his authority from the United States, and it would drive polygamy into secrecy. Possibly the abomination might survive as a secret rite for a time, but it could not have a long life. At present a Mormon who defies the law is a hero; he suffers for the sake of conscience. But his conduct is respectable only because it is open and avowed. Were he to do secretly what his church enjoins, he would lose the approval of his own conscience and the respect of his fellow religionists. It is true that all cases of a

violation of a national marriage law must be tried before a local jury; but the only questions to be submitted to a jury, upon the trial of a Mormon for bigamy, would be of the simplest character. A religion which should be dependent upon the favor of perjured jurors could not long survive; nor could it receive a more damaging blow than would be inflicted by members who should deny the act which constituted the legal offence, or who should sneak behind perjury or the technicalities of the law to escape the temporal penalties of the law for having violated one of its provisions.

In considering this matter, we must always remember that the Mormons are a religious sect, and that thousands of them, if not the great body of them, are sincere. It is in human nature to respect men who obey their consciences, whether the acts themselves are approved or not; but it is a part of ordinary morality not to tell falsehoods. No sincere Mormon could marry several wives and then deny that he had done so. Were any Mormon to do so, he would show that he feared the civil penalties of his act more than he regarded his religion; and he would be a hero neither to himself nor to those who were acquainted with the facts. We conclude, then, that polygamy could not survive openly anywhere, under a national marriage law, and that the secret practice of the abomination would destroy it and the church which tolerated it.

Unless this measure be adopted, there is great trouble in store for us. We can pretend to hold polygamy in check as long as we hold Utah in the territorial condition. But how long is that to be? Already she has population enough to entitle her to a representative in Congress, and, according to custom, she should be admitted as a State. So long as the present disposition of the people continues, she will not be admitted. But what is gained by delaying her admission? Nothing but delay. Not the slightest progress is made towards extirpating the evil which is the sole reason for refusing to make Utah a State. Moreover, there are very strong objections to the territorial form of government for a community so numerous as is that of Utah.

We are experiencing them in Dakota. Chief among them, and the only one to be mentioned here, is the spirit of political outlawry which is bred. Factions and divisions occur in every body of men, large or small. They invariably spring up in the territories. As the people are shut out from all participation in national affairs, their party feelings can find free play only in local matters. So long as the population is small this does little harm; but when it becomes large, the whole people chafe under the wrong, as they

deem it, of being excluded from the Union, and partisanship runs high over the pettiest questions. In the case of Utah, the evil has taken a different but quite as serious a form. There we have a community which is practically unanimous in opinion, but has scarcely a single interest common to the rest of the country. Only by giving Utah the privileges of a State can we hope to introduce there the divisions which, view them as we may, would at least remind the Mormons that they are Americans. Yet we cannot do that, under present circumstances; nor refuse to do it, without increasing danger to the peace of the country.

Nor yet can we safely or reasonably adopt the policy of agreeing to admit Utah on her consenting to give up her peculiar institution. We cannot reasonably do it, because we have never made that condition in reference to any of the States heretofore admitted, and because not one of the existing States has in its constitution a prohibition of bigamy. We cannot do it safely, because such a provision in a state constitution of Utah would be idle and meaningless. Though it were made an irrevocable part of that constitution that there should be no bigamy in the State, it would not have the backing of public sentiment or the support of law. However profuse the promises made prior to the admission, there would be afterward neither a disposition on the part of the people to perform them nor a power outside the new State to compel the performance.

Finally, there is a perpetual danger that political expediency, or a fancied party necessity, may bring about the sudden admission of the Territory just as it is. Two votes in the Senate are at the disposal of the party which is willing to affront public opinion by conferring the privileges of statehood upon Utah. It is a temptation which will not always be resisted. True, it would be a political crime, and the party which might gain a temporary advantage by it would be punished ultimately. But meanwhile the mischief would be done.

Before entering upon a very brief discussion of the second branch of the inquiry, that which concerns the matter of divorce, it should be said that whatever tends to show the expediency of a national divorce system tends also to point to the propriety of placing marriage under the same jurisdiction. Not only is it expedient on general grounds that the same authority should preside over both concerns, but it is essential to the effectual working of any system that it should be so. Unless the court which pronounces a decree of divorce has the right to forbid the remarriage of that party to the suit who has been guilty of misconduct, there

is no security against divorce by agreement. Manifestly, if divorce is placed under the jurisdiction of the general government while marriage is left to state law, it will be incompetent for a United States court to forbid either party to marry again.

The evils of the present system of divorce are various. They do not all result from divided jurisdiction and lack of uniformity in the laws, but some of them do. As this part of the subject has been pretty fully discussed by others, no attempt at an exhaustive examination of it will be made here. Only the chief difficulties and the typical cases will be briefly recapitulated.

More important than anything else, perhaps, is the practice just referred to, of agreed or collusive divorces. The parties are tired of each other. One or both has been guilty of unfaithfulness, or cruelty, or some other offense. For the same reason or for different reasons, both wish to be free. One of them brings suit for a divorce; perhaps there are counter-suits. When the case is tried a vast amount of unhappiness is brought to light, and the divorce is decreed. Loose ideas on the subject of divorce have prevailed in this country for so many years that an argument may be necessary to convince men that this is all wrong. A divorce decreed against a husband or wife should be of the nature of a penalty. Our loosest laws hardly admit the simple unhappiness of a married couple as a valid cause of divorce. They presume that one of the two must have done something wrong. One has deserted the other, has acted with cruelty, has been unfaithful, has neglected to provide support for a wife. In such cases the law should set the aggrieved person free. Under the present system it does, in effect, set both of the parties free. The English law forbids the remarriage of the person against whom the divorce is decreed; it refuses divorce in all cases where the collusion of the parties can be shown; it refuses divorce if there have been wrongs on both sides. In this country the contrary is the fact in each particular. For while there are some States where a prohibition upon remarriage follows a decree of divorce, this is easily defeated by the removal of the person who is placed under disability to another State, beyond the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the decree. Evidence of collusion between the parties is never presented, there being no officer charged to investigate it, as the queen's proctor does in England; and if it were presented there is no law that the bill shall be dismissed and the divorce refused for that reason. And so far from its being a ground for refusing a divorce that there have been mutual wrongs, evidence to that effect seems to be regarded by our courts as a double reason for granting a decree. To those

who know how to take advantage of our laws, they are capable of being used as a means of sanctioning and legalizing "free love."

Another class of evils arises out of the looseness of our state laws. Divorces are decreed for frivolous reasons and on insufficient evidence. This is a matter of common notoriety and of public scandal. In fact it is disputed by no one.

The remaining evils are those which come from the variety of laws, and the ease with which a person desiring his or her freedom may choose the State where the divorce is most likely to be granted and may remove thither. These evils, too, are so well known and so fully admitted that it would be a waste of space to dwell upon them or even to detail them at length.

The direct and immediate effect of any national divorce law whatever would be to abolish altogether the last named class of evils. There could be no more migration of persons seeking divorce to the place where the law was the most favorable to the particular set of facts which they had to allege. The scandal of divorce without due notice to the person against whom the libel has been filed would be done away with, for the national authority extends everywhere. There would be not only a uniform law, but a uniform interpretation of it, so that what does not constitute desertion in one State could not constitute it in another State.

A national system would not, necessarily, do much more than this. For the rest we must depend upon the wisdom of Congress and the skill of the President in selecting judges. But there is reason for believing that the chances are in favor of a good law, and of good judges. At present the States have no inducement to enact stringent divorce laws. To do so is merely to drive persons seeking divorce to States where they can find more favor, thus doubling the scandal. It is therefore fair to assume that in many of the States the laws are not up to the level of public sentiment. They would be improved if it were worth while to make them better. But in any event the present condition of things is intolerable, and no law which Congress may conceivably pass could fail to work an improvement. Were the statute no more acceptable than the most objectionable of the present state laws, we should have a uniform law, uniformly interpreted, and administered by judges of a high grade, not dependent upon popular favor.

A proposition of this sort will naturally meet with both active and passive opposition. The latter will be by far the more powerful and disheartening. If the public can once be made interested in the subject the success of the agitation will not be distant. For while there are possible objections, they are none of them forcible.

It will be said that the old system has been in force ever since the formation of the American colonies and that it has worked well. This is partially true. It did work well when the communities were small, when the facilities for traveling were not so great as they are now, and when a removal from one State to another was more of an event than it is at present. As the country grows the evils of the present system increase. And it is no argument against the proposed system that the old one has worked well, provided it can be shown that the new will work quite as well at all points, and better at some points.

Again, it will be said, and truthfully, that the change will impose a new charge upon the national treasury, that it will require an addition to the judicial establishment, and an increase of the number of national officeholders. In a very important sense this is the reverse of an objection. For, whatever addition may be made to national expenditures by the change, there will be a corresponding diminution of the charge upon the States; and the national taxes are far less burdensome in their nature and much more easily collected than are the state taxes.

But the strongest argument of the objectors will be that this is a step in the process of centralizing the government and concentrating all power in the nation. Suppose we grant that for the sake of argument. Is it a dangerous step? Does it lead to another step beyond? Are any useful or valuable privileges either of the States or of individuals to be assailed by it? The right to marry will remain unchanged, the process will not be altered, the ceremony will still be performed by the local magistrate or by the family clergyman. The authority to celebrate marriages will be derived from the general government, and no longer from the State; but that will make no difference whatever to the contracting parties; and it is inconceivable that a State should regard the loss of jurisdiction over the affair as the loss of a valuable privilege. As for divorces, the country is interested that they shall be granted or refused on principles of justice, and on the principles of the New Testament. Assuredly this can be done as well by national as by state courts. It can be done better by the national courts, because there will be one law for Maine and for Texas, as there should be. Under the present system it has come to pass that English courts have refused to recognize American divorcees as valid. But in this country, though a divorce might be refused in the State where the petitioner commonly resides, it can be obtained in another State, and the decree must, under the Constitution, be recognized as valid in every State. To avoid this

legal absurdity is a gain that more than offsets all the fancied disadvantages of centralization.

For after all they are fanciful. There is nothing whatever in the character of the American people that calls for one system of marriage and divorce in one part of the country and for another elsewhere. Perfectly uniform laws would abolish many scandals, but they would be an inconvenience to no person whose intentions are honorable and upright. And, finally, the retention of jurisdiction over this subject could be desired by no State on other than sentimental grounds.

In spite of all this, however, the experience of the country with its Constitution is such that there is good reason to fear that the repugnance of the people to any change whatever may be overcome with great difficulty. Since the defect in the Constitution exposed by the narrow escape of the country from a presidency of Aaron Burr forced Congress and the States to adopt a new method of choosing the President and Vice-President, in 1803 and 1804, no amendments have been made except those which were a direct result of the war. It is not likely that the inertia of the public can be readily overcome, when a matter of no more popular interest than this of marriage and divorce is at stake.

Yet it is worth while to make the effort and to continue making it. Unfortunately there is no clause of the Constitution from which a power over this question of social government can be "derived." Possibly a wit might find an argument upon the fact that one of the objects of the Constitution, as set forth in the preamble, is, "To insure domestic tranquillity;" but even since the legal tender decision the most strained construction would hardly make that phrase applicable to the case in hand. It must be recognized that the proposed change admits the national government into a field from which it is now completely excluded. But if it is wise and useful to introduce the change, the fact that it is a radical departure from the old system should have little weight in the discussion. The Constitution makes a division of rights and powers between the nation and the States. Constitutional interpretation has very largely increased the sphere of national action and no harm has resulted. It is not to be taken for granted that a further change in the same direction, though an amendment be necessary to effect it, will be detrimental to any interest. On the other hand, this particular change is demonstrated to open the way for many useful reforms, beside giving the country security against a great and growing evil.

*Edward Stanwood.*

## EDITORIAL.

## AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES CONCERNING THE BIBLE.

IT is becoming evident, and we should be thankful for it, that the body of Christian scholars agree concerning the ground of the Bible's authority, and differ only in some of their conclusions. There is practical agreement as to the premises of the great argument, while difference of opinion is to be found only concerning some of the inferences. It must, therefore, come about in due time that there will be substantial agreement in respect of the general conclusions which shall be held.

It is agreed that the ground of the Bible's authority is its inherent truth, recognized by the reason, conscience, and faith of believers in Christ; that any sanction it may have obtained from the church through creeds, preaching, common beliefs has been given in view of the truth found in the Bible; that the Bible has authority in the church and world to-day because it gives the gospel of Christ with purity and completeness to mankind. This is Protestantism, and the only danger to the Bible is in departing from such a view towards Catholicism, which rests the authority of the Bible back upon something other than the Christianity it perpetuates. A suggestive confirmation of this agreement was furnished by the recent discussion at Andover, during the anniversaries, on this very subject. Papers were read by two gentlemen supposed to be quite wide apart in their views of the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible, but both of them maintained, in nearly identical terms, that the authority of the Bible is the truth it contains; both of them considered the best statement on the subject to be the noble utterances of the Westminster Confession, by which far above any outward authority stand "the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole," and which still further declares that "our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." While we stand on this solid foundation we may be free from solicitude concerning all that pertains to the letter, the human medium, and the historic stages of Scripture. The large and fundamental agreement in postulates gives confidence that liberty to investigate and to theorize can only inure to the exaltation of the Bible.

We have no disposition to minimize doctrinal differences, nor to throw any off their guard at points where vigilance should be incessant; but, on the other hand, much harm may be done by magnifying differences and expending strength, much needed elsewhere, at points where there is no real danger. We are satisfied scholars may safely be left to adjust

details of structure to the true doctrine of Scripture, and that the working forces of the church may devote all their energies to the extension of the kingdom of Christ. A somewhat irreverent writer, having read the revised version of the New Testament soon after it appeared, and concerning which there was so much solicitude in many minds, said that he could not see but that the plot was about the same as in the received version. All modifications of theories concerning the origin and growth of the Bible are sure to leave its essential truths untouched. But while there is no occasion to fear that the Bible will not vindicate its divine authority, no little injury may be done the gospel by an overweening regard for the letter of Scripture. If more is claimed for the Bible than it claims for itself, some may fail to distinguish its real sources of power, and some may be repelled from the truth which is unwisely made to rest on the absolute infallibility of every part.

Three views are taken at present by friends of the Bible, who agree in affirming that the final ground of authority is the Christianity which is scripturally preserved in the Bible. One and the same motive governs the adherents of them all, namely, reverence for the Scripture and a desire to preserve the gospel in its integrity. There is no occasion to stigmatize those who hold any one of these views as enemies of the truth, while it may very well be that one is more in accordance with the facts, and more favorable to the success of the gospel, than either of the others.

The first view is that the Bible is entirely free from mistake in every particular ; that if error is admitted at any point the authority of the whole is overthrown ; that the revelation given by God must, in the nature of the case, be perfect ; and that accuracy is therefore to be claimed even for those scientific, chronological, and historical details which accompany the religious truth contained in the Bible. It is held that if error is conceded at one point we shall not be sure at any point. Those who defend this theory believe that the object of the Bible is to preserve the gospel of redemption in the knowledge of men, but that this object cannot be secured if the record is imperfect at any point. While the motive which induces such a theory is excellent, it must be admitted that the theory itself is extremely hazardous, for it puts the Sacred Book, with all its contents, at the mercy of each of its minutest parts ; it makes the gospel itself depend on the scrupulous accuracy of a scribe who copied a genealogical list, or the scientific correctness of some annalist of the prescientific period. This is not only a perilous theory, but it keeps the question of the Bible's authority always open. It becomes necessary to defend every detail which may be criticised in the light of advancing knowledge. We cannot concede superior virtue to those who take this extreme view, nor allow them to reprove others who do not agree with them. They take tremendous and perpetual risks without securing corresponding advantage. They lay a burden upon the shoulders of Christians too heavy for them to bear.

This theory we reject, both because the authority of the Bible rests on other and surer grounds, and because we have too genuine a regard for the Bible to expose it to so constant a peril.

The second theory is that the Bible was not given to teach science, history, geography, chronology, but moral and religious truth, that its authority rests on spiritual and ethical grounds, and that if errors of detail are discovered the integrity and authority of the Bible will not be impaired ; but that no mistakes have yet been found, that an explanation has been made or may be made or will be made of any apparent discrepancy or inaccuracy, that many alleged mistakes have been proved to be no mistakes at all, and so it will be of all as yet unexplained passages. This view has the merit of recognizing more clearly the real nature of the authority of the Bible, of permitting scholarly examination of every particular, and of leaving a safe way of retreat. It also refrains from applying a preconceived theory to the facts of Scripture. But it seems to be too much bound by the letter, and to be somewhat afraid that the actual admission of a mistake would really break down the Bible's authority. It betrays an uneasy sense of the existence of mistakes for which it feels obliged to make room, and practically admits that there are errors of detail. It does not, however, take an unfriendly attitude towards scholarship, and professes itself willing to accept the established results of criticism.

The third theory is that there are undeniably some imperfections amounting to erroneous statements in accounts of natural phenomena and in details of history and chronology. Some of these are owing to the fact that the writers had only the knowledge of their times, and that God did not see fit to enlighten their ignorance ; others are due to slips of memory, or misunderstanding of that which they had seen or heard. The freedom from error is indeed remarkable, but there is not absolute freedom from error, and it is not an injury but a service to the Bible and to the gospel frankly to admit such as appear. The recognition of them serves only the more clearly to distinguish the revelation which is the almost exclusive theme of the Bible, and to produce comparative indifference to the results of inquiry in the field of criticism. Such errors as exist are admitted not because any satisfaction is felt in the discovery of them, nor because there is any wish to set aside the supreme authority of the Word, but because nothing is gained by ignoring facts, and because Christianity is best subserved by separating the letter which killeth from the spirit which giveth life. The fear that admission of error anywhere will produce uncertainty everywhere is not well founded, for each instance is decided on its own merits, and the passages which are open to question are as well known as the rocks along the sea-coast which are marked on a chart. As well say, if there is a rock on this side of the harbor how do you know but there is one on the other side ; if you admit rocks anywhere you admit them everywhere. Christian

scholarship as truly as the Coast Survey deals with particular facts, considering each by itself. Besides, admission of an imperfection or inaccuracy which plainly exists gives weight to assertion of the perfection and accuracy of the great whole; while refusal to admit positive evidence of the slightest error destroys the value of stout affirmations concerning that which is essential.

The point to be made is that the second and third theories as well as the first are plainly within the limits of evangelical faith. Both stand on the postulates of Christianity of which the Bible preserves a full and clear record. Both hold that the Bible records a divine revelation given to the world. Both contend for the right, and one for the duty of distinguishing the treasure from the vessel, the Divine from the human. In the end we believe it will be found that the first theory more than either of the others or almost any other is fraught with danger, and that those who hold it while they may think they are doing God service are really heaping up unnecessary difficulties, and keeping the Bible in an apologetic attitude. We believe, then, that the theory which is commonly supposed to be most commendable is more dangerous than any other, and that a theory which does not ignore the human imperfections of the Bible but recognizes them for just what they are makes the defense of Scripture easy, and leaves the moral and spiritual truth it perpetuates conspicuous in its own clear shining.

In view of the substantial agreement on what is fundamental for Scripture, we see the value of that for which the phrase Christian consciousness stands. A less ambiguous phrase is to be desired, but that which it is intended to signify is of the utmost importance. It asserts that the Bible is known by spiritual tests; that the faith and experience of Christians find its deepest truth; that spiritual things are spiritually discerned; that through the ages Christians are agreed in discovering the very word of God in the Bible; that one impression is made by its contents on all devout minds. In certain respects faith leads the way while reason and scholarship follow after. The practical uses of the Bible by believers have fixed the proportion of the various parts by their relation to spiritual life, and back of that by their relation to Christ. The function of the Bible is to tell us of God as He is made known in Jesus Christ. Scholarship crystallizes experience into theory and finds that the proportionate value of the parts is determined by their relation to Christ, and that nothing can essentially modify the authority of the Bible so long as it does not detract from the power of Christ. In the Scripture we behold as with open face the glory of the Lord, and are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. Having such tests and such results we fear no scrutiny, but rather welcome free inquiry, never forgetting that where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty.

## THE PROPOSED CHANGE IN LIBERAL STUDIES.

PROBABLY few of the college reunions held last month took place without some reference to the discussion begun by Mr. C. F. Adams's Phi Beta Kappa oration of the previous academic year. The changes then proposed received powerful support in Professor Sumner's trenchant though one-sided article in the "Princeton Review" for March, and in President Eliot's paper entitled "What is a Liberal Education," which was read to the members of the Johns Hopkins University on the 22d of February, and published in the June number of the "Century." The position held by the author of the latter article gives it, of course, an importance distinct from that received from the weight of the arguments which it advances. When the President of Harvard University is heard maintaining that American colleges should cease to insist on the study of Greek as a condition of the degree of bachelor of arts, those interested in liberal education must consider the great change proposed as at least one of the possibilities of the near future. The arguments urged in favor of it are effective. Liberal education means gaining vital and fruitful knowledge. Such knowledge comes from studying the literatures and sciences which have the largest value. "We may be sure that the controlling intellectual forces of the actual world, century by century, penetrate educational processes, and that languages, literatures, philosophies, and sciences which show themselves fruitful and powerful must win recognition as liberal arts and proper means of mental discipline." The history of university education is a history of the gradual enlargement of the range of studies, as one new knowledge after another forces itself into the circle. "It was more than a hundred years after the widespread revival of Greek in Europe before that language was established at Paris and Oxford as a regular constituent in the academic curriculum, and physics and chemistry are not yet fully admitted to that curriculum. . . . The revived classical literature was vigorously and sincerely opposed as frivolous, heterodox, and useless for discipline, just as natural history, chemistry, physics, and modern literature are now opposed. The conservatives of that day used precisely the same arguments which the conservatives of to-day bring forward; only they were used against classical literature then, while now they are used in its support."

That the literatures and sciences which have come into existence within three hundred years are at least as able to fight their way to recognition as the classical writings were is assumed to be evident to those who appreciate the wealth of the former, and the intimate connection which both have with modern life. "It cannot be doubted," says President Eliot, "that English literature is beyond all comparison the amplest, most various, and most splendid literature which the world has seen." "What kind of knowledge," he says, "can be so useful to a legislator, administrator, journalist, publicist, philanthropist, or philosopher, as a well-or-

dered knowledge of history? Political economy, on account both of its importance and its intricacy, demands a large place in the modern curriculum." "Constitutional history," says Professor Sumner, "has grown into a great branch of study of the highest importance to the student of law, political science, jurisprudence, and sociology. . . . The years spent on Greek grammar and literature would be priceless to the whole mass of our youth, if they could be spent on this study." On the strength of these considerations it is urged that what must be done sooner or later should be done now. The prerogative which the classics have hitherto enjoyed of being the one road to a liberal education should be taken from them. Modern languages and their literatures, history, and physical sciences should be put on an equality with Greek and Latin in their respective bearing on this degree. A student who has made in one or more of these attainments representing an amount of labor equivalent to that now expended in gaining the bachelor's degree should also have the certificate which formally declares its possessor to be a liberally-educated man.

If this is presented as a step to be taken at once by our American colleges, it will meet with the opposition of many who are in sympathy with the general conception of university education presented, and who heartily believe important changes to be needed in our collegiate education. The new literatures and sciences must be fairly represented in the teaching of our colleges if these institutions are to keep their old place in the regard of the country. Let their teachers insist never so stoutly that their chief office is to do purely disciplinary work, their pupils are old enough intelligently to pursue studies which give knowledge, and if the colleges cannot or will not put men in the way of mastering sciences indispensable to modern life, their influence will surely wane. They give a degree: it is more than a certificate of attendance at prayers and recitations during four years, and a measure of fidelity in doing an allotted number of tasks; it proposes to represent some mental acquisitions; if these acquisitions never include certain things which many men ought to know, there is one bond cut which ought to bind the college to the community. For example, many professional men, especially ministers, feel themselves to be cruelly hampered by their inability to read works written in French or German. They believe that the years in which they ought to have gained a reading knowledge of those languages were spent within college walls. Whether they blame their colleges for this serious mistake in their education, their gratitude to them is lessened by the loss of this great service. So as regards a knowledge of history or political economy or constitutional law. A young man can gain a knowledge of these if he will study some years after graduation. But at graduation he has reached an age at which he might be expected to have some solid acquisitions, and he cannot afford to wait years longer before beginning his professional studies. So in his case his college has lost just the best part of its opportunity.

Hebrew, too, which cannot receive in the theological seminary an amount of attention commensurate with its importance, and which can be studied in the German gymnasium by those looking toward the ministry, is offered as an optional in only two or three of our colleges. That the criticisms upon the narrowness of our curriculum of liberal study are well taken, that our colleges will gradually become universities, offering instruction connected with the principal branches of knowledge, and giving a degree which stands for attainment in some chosen field as well as a general discipline of the faculties, we firmly believe. This may involve the option of omitting the study of Greek. At present we are more conservative even than Germany in insisting on the study of Greek as indispensable for a degree in the arts, for a graduate of a *Realschule* can enter the university and gain there the much-coveted degree of doctor of philosophy. Within twenty years great changes have been made in the courses of study prescribed by our colleges in the direction suggested. At that one in which the writer graduated, German used to be studied as an optional only one term; now it can be studied four hours a week for two years. A chair of history and of political economy have each been founded, and recently a knowledge of the rudiments of one of the modern languages has been added to the requirements for admission, which is offset by a diminution of the amount of Greek required.

But President Eliot's suggestion, regarded as a proposition to be immediately adopted, takes on a different appearance. To put the new studies on an equality with Latin and Greek as elements of liberal education implies, as he himself says, the option of omitting them from the curriculum of the preparatory school as well as of the college. He thinks that a choice of three among the four languages, Latin, Greek, French, and German, should be allowed at college admission examination. That the opportunity thus offered of omitting Greek would be seized by many may be confidently assumed. What are they to receive in its stead? "Modern languages," says President Eliot, "or history, or one or more of the natural sciences." Very well, if getting a liberal education means nothing more than acquiring a fixed quantity of some kind or kinds of useful knowledge. But we hold that it has another aim of at least equal importance, the full and symmetrical development of the faculties. This the advocates of the new studies do not deny, but they insist that discipline is sure to be gained by acquiring knowledge, and that it need and should not be made a distinct aim. This President Eliot assumes, when he says that "it is a waste for society, and an outrage upon the individual, to make a boy spend the years when he is most teachable in a discipline, the end of which he can never reach, when he might have spent them in a different discipline, which would have been rewarded by achievement." We think that the assumption implied here is hasty, and a violation of that experimental method which President Eliot employs in his article. From its being desirable to know modern litera-

tures, or history, or the physical sciences, it does not follow that the study of either of them will give such help in gaining exactness and breadth of mind as comes from studying the most perfect of literatures enshrined in the most perfect of languages. Certainly it will not until the art of teaching the new science or literature has reached a maturity approaching that reached by classical teaching. It seems strange to us that while so much is made of the experience of the race in regard to the subject-matter of liberal education, it has not been worth while to seek light from the past as to the actual process of giving it. If it is worth while to remember that the superior value of the classics caused them to thrust other studies from their predominant place in the university curriculum, it is also worth while to remember that belief in the superior intellectual results given by the precise study of the Greek and Latin languages has caused far more labor to be given to the methods of teaching them than there has been given to finding out the way to teach any other branch of knowledge. Is it claimed that these languages have been too minutely studied, that months and even years have been consumed in examining syntactical and etymological minutiae, which should have been given to the classical literatures and ancient history? The answer is, that the source of the value of grammatical and philological study has caused it to be carried farther than was consistent with the best use of the time at command. Man is always making too much of things which he feels to be very important. His doing so does not prove that they are not important, or that work done for and through them, within due limits, is not indispensable.

To see how idle it is to undertake to settle the problems of liberal education merely by general considerations as to the relative importance of certain departments of knowledge, it is only necessary to look at Germany. No other nation has, at any rate during the present century, cultivated education so carefully; no other has done so much, by means of education, both to strengthen itself and to add to the world's stock of knowledge. In trying to find what human experience teaches as to the best way of training the faculties, we must give great weight to its preferences. They are, as we know, strongly in favor of the classics (along with the mathematics, of course), taught most exactly on the linguistic side and most broadly on the historical. The *Realschule* is reckoned an inferior means of education to the *Gymnasium*, though its pupils are admitted to the universities. The united testimony of the professors of Berlin to their inability to keep pace with the graduates of the *gymnasia* is too well known to need more than an allusion. The *gymnasium* is the only avenue to the learned professions. Yet in a country whose preparatory schools give vastly inferior opportunities for extra-classical studies than those furnished by the *Realschulen*, it is urged that the preference given to Greek be abandoned. That means that many boys will have, instead of fairly good teaching in the noblest of languages, indifferent teaching in French or German, or history or physical science. If expe-

rience in educational matters is not an utterly false guide, they will suffer by the substitution.

To enlarge the opportunities for pursuing modern studies, it may, as we have said, by and by be necessary for our colleges to give the option of omitting Greek; but those who value liberal education will not, without strenuous protest, suffer this to be done, until assured that the mental character of the undergraduate will not materially suffer from the substitution.

It seems to us that instead of urging such substitution it would be wiser to try to broaden and deepen the preparatory studies. The graduates of the German gymnasia are little if any older on the average than the graduates of our academies. Yet they have studied Latin and Greek more widely and profoundly, and have learned much about at least one of the modern languages. It is because they began the serious work of education earlier and were obliged to pursue it more vigorously. It may not be possible to make the course of study followed in our high schools more exacting, but it is possible to prolong the four years to six. Or if parents are unwilling to send away their sons to study at so tender an age, it is possible to provide schools which shall give good instruction in the rudiments of Greek and Latin, and to push the academical requirements up to meet their work. Two or three years are practically thrown away in the lives of our American boys which might be made to do good service. Let them be so used, and the preparatory course can be made sufficiently large and thorough to guaranty a liberal education even if the modern studies be chiefly followed at the university.

#### THE ANDOVER REVIEW. VOL. II.

WITH the present number the Andover Review begins its second volume. Attention is called to the statement of the publishers that covers in cloth for binding Vol. I. can be had of them for fifty cents. Separate numbers, in good condition, will be taken in exchange for the volume bound in cloth, upon receipt of one dollar. The bound volume will be sent to new subscribers, with the remaining six numbers of the year, for four dollars.

It will be gratifying to the friends of the Review to know officially that its circulation quite exceeds the estimates and expectations of the editors and publishers. The Review goes by actual subscription or sale into nearly every State and Territory of the country, and the circulation abroad is unexpectedly large. The rate of increase has been from the first constant and gratifying.

We take occasion to remind our contributors, specially those with whom we may have no personal correspondence, of the need of as much brevity in their articles as the treatment of the subject proposed will allow. We invite the utmost thoroughness and accuracy of treatment,

but also such condensation and adjustment as may fit the articles to the pages of a monthly. We desire to present in each number a suitable variety of subjects in the body articles, without abridging the space allotted to the other departments of the Review.

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## BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

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### THE LANGUAGE OF NIMROD, THE KASHITE.

THE farther Mr. Hormuzd Rassam's and M. de Sarzac's admirable excavations extend the field of cuneiform research, the farther presses forward our knowledge of West Asiatic antiquity, the earliest history of man. Every day, also, the circle widens of those consecrating their enthusiasm and energies to this new department of learning. With this new devotion blends new recognition of the immense significance of Assyriology, in itself and in its relations to science. More than thirty centuries of man's history, from the year 3800 B. C. down to Antiochus Soter (293-261 B. C.), are embraced by it. To the old world-monarchies of Babylonia and Assyria come and associate themselves, as smaller dominions, the ancient kingdoms of Elam, Media, Armenia, and the neighboring regions. The vast import, then, of Assyriology for ancient history and geography, for linguistics in general and especially for our knowledge of the sacred language of the Old Testament with its sister idioms, for the history of art, religion, and civilization, cannot be too highly appreciated.

With these thoughts Friedrich Delitzsch, the well-known head of the Leipzig school of cuneiformists, introduces his new work on the "Language of the Kossaeans,"<sup>1</sup> — a book intended not alone for the small circle of the author's fellow-workers, but of general interest, above all to the historical investigator and the Old Testament exegete.

The Kossaeans are the wild, predatory mountaineers in the rough valleys of the far-off Zagros<sup>2</sup> mountains, between Media and Babylonia, occasionally referred to as *Kooraio* by the classical authors, as Polybius, Strabo, Arrian, and Diodorus. Old Testament exegetes like August Knobel in his "Völkertafel der Genesis"<sup>3</sup> combined with these Kossaeans the *Kush* in the biblical description of Paradise, and, as has now become evident, this conjecture was right; for the *Kush* of Genesis ii. 13 is indeed not Ethiopia, but the land of the Kossaeans or *Kašši*, as they are

<sup>1</sup> *Die Sprache der Kossäder. Linguistisch-historische Funde und Fragen von Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch, Professor der Assyriologie an der Universität Leipzig.* Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1884. vi and 76 pp., small 4°. M. 10,00.

<sup>2</sup> Delitzsch derives the name *Záypos*, p. 3, n. 2, from the Assyrian *zaqrū*, "high, lofty." From the same stem *zaqdrū* we have *ziggurratu*, the name of the Babylonian pyramid, a tower rising in stories, Akkadian *Esagila*. Cf. also Delitzsch's *Wo lag das Paradies?* Leipzig, 1881, pp. 124 and 216, and especially François Lenormant, *Die Magie und Wahrsagekunst der Chaldaer*, Jena, 1878, p. 402.

<sup>3</sup> Giessen, 1850, p. 250.

called in the cuneiform texts. So also Nimrod, the mighty hunter,<sup>1</sup> the founder of Erech, Akkad, Babel, and Kalneh, in the land of Shin'ar (Genesis x. 8–12), was not an Ethiopian or Kushite, but a Kossaean or Kassite. When he is made in the genealogical tablet a son of the Ethiopian Kush, the brother of Miqrain, “Egypt,” it rests, as Eberhard Schrader<sup>2</sup> first pointed out, on a misunderstanding, on a confusion of this Asiatic *Kash*, the land of the Kashites or Kossaeans, with the better known African *Kush*.

On page 128 of Delitzsch's admirable “Paradies,” in which the *Koσσαιοι* are treated of in several passages (*e. g.* pp. 31 and 124), this seemed hardly probable to him. Now, however, he asserts, p. 60, n. 1, of the book before us, that Schrader's opinion forces itself also upon him more and more. To me the acute conjecture of the celebrated Berlin academician seems beyond doubt, especially as in all likelihood there was written originally in both cases not **וְיָה** but **וְיָה**.<sup>3</sup> We shall have to correct the **וְיָה**, Genesis ii. 13 and x. 8, to **וְיָה**.

Concerning the nationality of this people of **וְיָה** or Kossaean, Assyriologists have hitherto leaned to the opinion that a connection existed with the non-Semitic aborigines of Babylonia, the Sumero-Akkadians; so, for instance, Schrader, KAT. 289 note.<sup>4</sup> Delitzsch, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion (p. 40) that no relationship is to be established for the Kossaean, either with the Elamitic or Susian (p. 45), or with the so-called Median or Scythic, the language of the second system of the trilingual Achæmenian inscriptions.

We should not like to decide the question so quickly, since as yet we know scarcely forty Kossaean words<sup>5</sup> and about ten times as many Sumero-Akkadian, whose reading and meaning are fully settled.<sup>6</sup> The fact that we find the Kossaean expressions for “star, god, sun, man, king, lord, servant, earth, land, wind, foot” and “to go out” given by the Babylonian scholars as *dakash, bashghu, sagh, mali, ianzi, buri* or *ubri*,

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the cuneiform legends of Nimrod, see my essay in No. 3 of vol. iii. of *The Old Testament Student*, Chicago, 1883 (November). The edition of the cuneiform text of the Babylonian Nimrod epic, there announced, appeared at the beginning of this year as vol. iii. of the *Assyriologische Bibliothek*, edited by Friedrich Delitzsch and myself, Leipzig, 1884, J. C. Hinrichs, 78 plates in 4°, autographed by myself.

<sup>2</sup> *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, 2d edition, Giessen, 1883, p. 87. I cite this work as KAT. KGF. are the same author's *Keilinschriften und Geschichtsforschung*, Giessen, 1878.

<sup>3</sup> As is known, the vowel letters **וְ** and **וְ** were inserted at a later period. Cf. Bernhard Stade, *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Grammatik*, Leipzig, 1879, § 30; Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Hebräische Grammatik*, 23d edition, § 7, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Compare also A. H. Sayce in the introduction to his learned paper *The Languages of the Cuneiform Inscriptions of Elam and Media in the Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, vol. iii. part 2, London, 1874, and François Lenormant, *Die Magie*, Jena, 1878, p. 369, n. 3; *Les origines de l'histoire* vol. ii. Paris, 1882, p. 105, n. 2. These remarks should have been certainly quoted.

<sup>5</sup> See the alphabetical list on p. 39 of Delitzsch's book, and compare Lenormant, *Die Magie*, Jena, 1878, p. 370.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. the Akkadian Glossary in part IV. of my *Akkadische und Sumerische Keilschrifttexte*, Leipzig, 1882, J. C. Hinrichs, 4°, pp. 148–156. I cite this work as ASKT, and the *Syllabary and Vocabulary* in the first part as S<sup>a</sup> and V<sup>a</sup>.

*meli* or *kukla*, *miriash*, *iash*, *turughna*, *ghameru* or *saribu*, and *eme*, while in the Sumero-Akkadian vocabulary, as far as it is known, we have for these notions *mul(u)*, *dinger*, *babbar*, *lu*, *lugal*, *u(n)*, *ur(u)*, *ki(n)*, *kur*, *im(i)* or *ger ger*, *e(n)*, is not at all "sufficient to forever answer in the negative the question of the relationship of the Kossaean to the Sumero-Akkadian" (p. 41). In Ethiopic these twelve words would be rendered by *kôkab*, *amlák* or *ege'â-behér*, *gahây*, *sâb'e*, *negûs*, *egzâ*, *gabr*, *medr*, *hagar* or *behér*, *naffâs*, *egr*, *wéq'a*, and in Arabic by *najm*, *allâh*, *shams*, *insân*, *mâlik*, *rabb*, *'abd*, *ardh*, *bilâd*, *rîh*, *rijl*, *châraj*. Nevertheless, no one will doubt that Arabic and Ethiopic are closely allied.<sup>1</sup>

Besides, even out of the very small number of Kossaean words thus far known, there are several which can safely be regarded as dialectical modifications of corresponding Sumero-Akkadian roots. The Kossaeans said, according to l. 37 of the Kossaean-Assyrian Glossary, for "to go out" Assyrian *açû: eme*. For this we have in Akkadian *e*, which, however, as I have shown in my "Sumerische Familiengesetze,"<sup>2</sup> is shortened from *en*, or, with the vowel of prolongation, *ene*.<sup>3</sup> The difference now between *eme* and *ene*<sup>4</sup> is not greater than between מִלְכִים and מלכין.<sup>5</sup> *Kara*, "help," then might be connected with Akkadian *kara*, "to protect," Assyrian *éteru*; the first syllable in *turughna*, "wind," Assyrian *shâru* (שָׁרָע), could be combined with the Akkadian *tu*, which is given in S<sup>h</sup> 616 (V R. 21, 15 g) as the pronunciation of the ideograph for "wind." *Meru* in Kossaean *gha-meru*, "foot," is perhaps Sumerian *meri*, the dialectical form of the Akkadian *ger*, "foot." The name of the Moon-god, unfortunately mutilated in the glossary, is probably to be restored to *Shi-[in]* or *Shi-[na-ash]*.<sup>6</sup> *Sagh* (written KIT),<sup>7</sup> "Sun-god," could stand for *lagh*, which is one of the Akkadian readings of the ideographs for "sun;" *shur* in *shuriâsh*, the other Kossaean name of this god, could be the Akkadian *shir*, "light" (II R. 8, 9 a), so that the name would signify "light of the lands," Assyrian *nûr mâtâti* (IV R. 17, 12 b; 19, No. 2, 52). *Kamulla*, the Kossaean name of *Ea*, the god of the depth, might be composed of *ka*, "mouth, face," and *mu(l)la*, "shining, clear, pure," corresponding to the Akkadian surname of this god: *nin-ige-azag*, "lord of the shining or clear countenance." *Shugamunu*, as the lion-god Nergal was called among the Kossaicans as the god of the

<sup>1</sup> Compare also August Dillmann's remarks on p. 4 of his admirable *Grammatik der äthiopischen Sprache*, to which I have already drawn attention on p. 522 of my essay on the Sumerian dialect, *Göttingen Nachrichten*, 1880, No. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Leipzig, 1879, p. 48, 21. I cite this book as SFG.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S<sup>h</sup> 84; II R. 62, 52 c; IV R. 11; 33 and 35 a; 15, 68 a; 16, 13 a; 21, 47 a; 22, 51 a; 26, 25 a; 27, 10 b; 30, 10 a; V R. 23, Rev. 26; ASKT. 45, 7 and 10; 64, 17-19; 73, 21 and 24, etc.; 78, 29 and Rev. 1 (cf. IV R. 8, 42 b).

<sup>4</sup> For the interchange between final *m* and *n* in Sumero-Akkadian compare Delitzsch, *Assyrische Lesestücke*, p. 47, n. 2; *Paradies*, p. 208, l. 11; *Die semitischen Völker und Sprachen*, Leipzig, 1883, Otto Schulze, p. 471, n. 158.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Gesenius, *Hebrew Grammar*, § 87, 1 a.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Henri Pognon, *L'inscription de Bavian*, Paris, 1880, p. 167, and my *Beiträge zur assyrischen Lautelehre*, in the *Göttingen Nachrichten*, 1883, p. 109, n. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Lenormant, *Die Magie*, p. 370.

mid-day sun, might be—Akkadian *Saga-mula*, “shining head.”<sup>1</sup> The other name of the god Nergal in Kossaean *Dür* might be—Akkadian *U-gur* IV R. 24, 5 a, or—*dun*, “mighty,” very frequently employed as an epithet of the gods, especially of Shamash. We should then have an interchange between final *r* and *n*, as in *Karduniāsh*, the Kossaean<sup>2</sup> name of the district of Babylon, in which the *kar* has been heretofore universally deemed a dialectical variation of the Akkadian *gan*, “garden,” Assyrian *ginū*.<sup>3</sup> The readers of this Review are aware that according to Professor Delitzsch’s theory Paradise, the garden of the Lord, planted by Yahveh in Eden, was situated in this province of *Karduniāsh* or *Gindunish*, a name which the “Father of Assyriology,” Sir Henry Rawlinson, declared many years ago to be the prototype of the biblical *Paradise*. Still more evident is the connection between the Kossaean *mali*, “man,” and the Sumero-Akkadian *mulu*; the more so as the *u* may have originated in the obscuring influence of the *l*, as in Akkadian *gula*, for *gala*, “large;” see my “Akkadische Sprache,” p. 7. That *Ghala*, *Ghali*, the Kossaean name of the goddess *Gula*, could quite well be a dialectical variation of the Akkadian *Gula*<sup>4</sup> has already been pointed out by Schrader in his review of Delitzsch’s work, in the “Literarische Centralblatt” of February 16, 1884, col. 249. And finally, when the royal name *Kurigalzu*<sup>5</sup> in col. I. l. 16 of the “Rassaim King List” is rendered by the Assyrian *Re’ibishi*, “be my shepherd,” I presume that it is not too far-fetched to see in *gal* the Akkadian root *gal*, which is translated in II R. 38, 20 c; IV R. 15, 33 a; 28, 7 a; 29, 37, 39 and 41 a; 69, 49 a; ASKT. 59, 30, etc., by *bashū*, “to be,” and in the *zu* the sign of the second person: compare the Akkadian *adâ-zu*, “thy father,” and *garena-zu*, “thou wast,” II R. 16, 22, etc.<sup>6</sup>

I cannot pursue this matter any farther at present, and will now confine myself to a brief outline of the contents of Professor Delitzsch’s interesting little book. The author treats first of the Kossaean nation. The notices by Polybius, Strabo, Diodorus, Arrian,<sup>7</sup> and others are quoted; the first chapter, filling eighteen pages, however, is chiefly devoted to the cuneatic records of the *Kaššû*. The account of the campaign against

<sup>1</sup> Cf. ASKT. 78, top line, and p. 207, No. 40 and 41; KAT. 67, 10; II R. 48, 35 c; IV R. 25, 45 b; 27, 21 a; V R. 29, 9 g.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Lenormant, *Origines*, II. 106; Delitzsch, *Paradies*, p. 65.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Delitzsch, *Paradies*, pp. 133–136.

<sup>4</sup> For the change of *gh* and *g* in the beginning, compare p. 522, n. 4, of my essay on the Sumerian dialect, in the Göttingen *Nachrichten* of November 3, 1880.

<sup>5</sup> Kurigalzu was the most celebrated of the Kossaean princes, the builder of the powerful fortress *Dür-Kurigalzu* (“citadel of K.”), considered as the key to the land of *Karduniāsh*, and now represented by the mound of ruins known as *Akarkâf*, twenty kilometers west from Babylon on Nahr Isa, along the road from Bagdad to Hilla. Cf. Delitzsch, *Paradies*, p. 207; *Kossäer*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Delitzsch thinks, p. 23, that it is uncertain how the name *Kurigalzu* is to be analyzed.

<sup>7</sup> Compare for this the valuable treatise of the distinguished Strassburg Orientalist, Theodor Nöldeke, entitled *Griechische Namen Susiana’s*, in the Göttingen *Nachrichten*, 1874, No. 8, pp. 173–197. It is a pity that Delitzsch did not peruse this excellent essay, which is cited both by Schrader, KGF, 176, and by Dillmann, *Genesis*, p. 168. Cf. also Lenormant, *Origines*, II. 108, 5 and 109, 2.

the Kassū in the Annals of Sennacherib is given in translation,<sup>1</sup> and then there follows, pp. 6–11, the notice of the Kossaean kings in the so-called Synchronistic Tablet<sup>2</sup> K. 4406, which has been partly published in II R. 65 and III R. 4, No. 3: Kara'indash, Burnaburiāsh, Karaghardash, Nazibugash, Kurigalzu, Nazimaraddash, and Karaburiāsh. Berossus terms this Kossaean dynasty "Arab kings,"<sup>3</sup> just as he inaccurately calls the Elamites Medes. It is possible, however, that this "Arab" denotes only "nomads" or "inhabitants of the desert," since עֲרָבִי, "Arabian" (p. 11), is derived from עֲרָבָה, "desert." These Shepherd-kings or Babylonian Υκρος<sup>4</sup> came, according to Delitzsch, p. 12, upon the throne about the year 1500, and reigned for three hundred years. From 1200 to 900 there follows, a period which Delitzsch (p. 14) terms the *Semito-Kossaean*. During this time there reigned, among others, *Shagashaltiburiāsh*, or shortened *Shagashaltiāsh* (about 1050 b. c.), *Simmash-shighu* (about 1150), *Melishighu*, *Agu-kak-rime*, etc. Most of these names are taken from the invaluable "New List of Early Babylonian Kings" (K. 4426) which Mr. Theo. G. Pinches published in the Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology, January 11, 1881.<sup>5</sup> This highly important text contains, altogether, the names of about two hundred Akkadian, Sumerian, Kossaean, and Semitic kings, with the Assyrian translation of their meanings. Unfortunately, the tops of the first and second and the bottom of the third and fourth columns are broken off. Nineteen of the names preserved are Kossaean, and through these fifteen words of this peculiar dialect have been furnished to us.

This foundation of our Kossaean lexicon has lately received an unexpected addition in a small, splendidly preserved Kossaean-Babylonian vocabulary, which was found in March of last year by Mr. Theo. G. Pinches, the sagacious successor of the late George Smith in the British Museum, and by Professor Delitzsch among some clay tablets shortly before sent to London by Hormuzd Rassam.<sup>6</sup> This tablet contained, in Neobabylonian writing, forty-eight Kossaean words, with their Semitic equivalents, eight of which had been already disclosed to us by the Assyrian translation of the Kossaean names in the "Rassam King List." The glossary begins with the names of twelve divinities,<sup>7</sup> which are followed by expressions for the most common conceptions, like *ilulu* and *dagigi*, "heaven;" *ulam* and *simmash*, "child;" *barghu*,

<sup>1</sup> Compare for this *Das sechsseitige Prisma des Sanherib*, Inaugural-Dissertation von Reinhart Hörring, Leipzig, 1878, 4°.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. A. H. Sayce's translation and remarks in *Records of the Past*, vol. iii. London, 1874, pp. 25–86.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Vorsemittische Kulturen*, p. 331.

<sup>4</sup> Of Τκως, Κοσταῖοι, Ἀράβες, Φοίνικες, I shall treat in a special article. The translation βασιλεῖς ποιμένες seems to be only a popular etymology of the Egyptians.

<sup>5</sup> See also Delitzsch in my *Familiengesetze*, 1879, p. 54, n. 2.

<sup>6</sup> The tablet is six centimeters broad and about nine centimeters long, and marked in the collection of the British Museum : 82. 9–18. The color of the clay is light gray.

<sup>7</sup> The national god of the Kossaceans seems to have been called *Kassū*. The storm-god *Rammān* (Hebr. רַמְנָן, 2 Kings v. 18) had among the Kossaceans the name *Ubriāsh* or *Buriāsh*; the god *Merodach* (Hebr. מְרוֹדָך, Jer. 1. 2) was called *Shugura*, and the goddess *Beltis* (בעלִתְה) *Mirizir*.

"head;" "shir,"<sup>1</sup> "bow;" "nazi," "shadow;" "miriâsh," "earth;" "ianzi," "king," etc.<sup>2</sup>

Ianzû was already known to us from the black obelisk of Shalmaneser II. (860–824 b. c.)<sup>3</sup> as the name of the ruler of *Namri*,<sup>4</sup> a district which bordered closely upon the Kossaean boundaries, and was perhaps even included in them. So also in Sargon's inscriptions, the king of the land of *Na'iri* is called *Ianzû*. Delitzsch very cleverly conjectures that this *Ianzû* is not a proper name, but only the Semiticized Kossaean royal title *ianzi*, corresponding to the use of the biblical פָּרָעֹה, Pharaoh, without, however, drawing any other conclusions, except that the Kossaean hads had for some time also power on the neighboring countries.

The third section, pp. 51–54, bears as its title, "The Religion of the Kossaens." It contains, among other things, valuable observations concerning the god of the planet Saturn, *Adar* or *Adarmalik*, Hebr. אֲדַרְמַלֵּךְ, in whose honor, as we learn from 2 Kings xvii. 31, the inhabitants of the πόλις Ἡλίου, Sippara, Hebr. סִפְרָוִים, burnt their children with fire. According to Delitzsch, אֲדַרְמַלֵּךְ is the god of the scorching sun ("Gott der sengenden Sonnengluth"), and originally identical with the fire-gods Malik-Moloch, Gibil, and Nusku, Hebr. נְסֻךְ, נְסַרְךְ, as Joseph Halévy<sup>5</sup> proposes to read, instead of the unintelligible נְסַרְךְ, 2 Kings xix. 37; Is. xxxvii. 38. From line 13 of the Kossaean-Semitic glossary we learn also that the god Nergal (Hebr. נֶרֶגֶל, 2 Kings xvii. 30), the idol of the inhabitants of Kutha (Hebr. פָּתָחָה), is identical with Nusku<sup>6</sup> and Adar.

Adar as well as Nergal was, as Delitzsch remarks (p. 53, n. 2), god of the chase. The Kossaens, according to line 8 of the glossary, called him *Maraddash*, מָרָדֵשׁ; and in this word, it seems to me, we have at last found, what has long been sought for in vain, the explanation of the name Nimrod, the mighty hunter before the Lord. מָרָד in the name נִמְרוֹד is evidently the name of the Kossaean god of the chase. The final ו does not belong to the stem, but is a termination peculiar to the Kossaean.<sup>7</sup> It might be well to

<sup>1</sup> The Kossaens were, like the Sutaeans (Hebr. עֹשֶׂה, Ez. xxiii. 23), famous archers. The Sutaeans seem to have spoken a Semitic language. Cf. the Sutaean words *zalchu*, "lead," *namâlu*, "bed," *pîtu*, "child," *Zizânu*, "the god Adar," Delitzsch, *Paradies*, p. 236; *Kossäer*, p. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Compare in addition the twelve Kossaean words above cited on pp. 89, 90.

<sup>3</sup> The biblical king of this name, שָׁלָמָנֵאשׁ, 2 Kings xvii. 3; xviii. 9, is the Shalmaneser IV. who reigned from 727 to 722, between תְּגִלָּת פְּלָאָסָד, 745–727, and נִזְנֵן (Is. xx. 1), 722–704.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Paul de Lagarde, *Armenische Studien*, Göttingen, 1877, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup> Mélanges de critique et d'histoire, relatifs aux peuples sémitiques, par J. Halévy, Paris, 1883, p. 177, n. 1.

<sup>6</sup> According to ASKT. 76, 8, it might seem as if *Nusku*, the *nuntius deorum*, were a female deity, corresponding to ποθένεμας ὄντα "ips: bi-i-li can only be feminine imperative of בְּלִי=בְּלִי". On the contrary, the masculine suffix *shu*, in l. 14 and 20, argues against this. If the name is Semitic, it might be connected with נֶסֶךְ, "prince." Cf. Lyon, *Sargonstexte*, p. 58.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the names *Karduniash*, *Kara'indash*, *Karachardash*, *Nazibugash*, etc., also *dakash*, "star," *simmash*, "child," *miriâsh*, "earth," etc. Lenormant, *Origines*

note that Josephus (Arch. 1, 4, § 2) has instead of the Νεβρώδ of the LXX. the form Νεβρώδης, although this is likely to be nothing more than the result of assimilation to the numerous Greek proper names in ὁδης. What the נ in נִמְרָד signifies will, no doubt, become clear very soon. It is not impossible that it is a shortening of the Kossaean *nazi*—Assyrian *çillu*, “shade, protection,” which appears in the names of the Kossaean kings *Nazi-Shighu*, *Nazi-Buriâsh*, *Nazi-Bugash*, etc. In this case Nimrod would be shortened from *Nazi-Maraddash*,<sup>1</sup> who appears in col. I. 53 of the “Rassam King List” among the Kossaean rulers, and is explained by *Cil-Adar*.<sup>2</sup> If שֻׁם, *Shuqamuna*, can be contracted in Kossaean to שֻׁם, *Shumu*,<sup>3</sup> might also stand for [שְׁמַרְדָּן]<sup>4</sup> The name would then mean “the one who is under the protection of the god of the chase,” or “the protégé of the god of the chase.”

In two appendices, then, two celebrated Babylonian kings are treated of: the Kossaean *Agum*, whose large votive inscription has been newly published, pl. 33 of vol. v. of Sir Henry Rawlinson’s “Cuneiform Inscriptions,”<sup>5</sup> and the powerful ruler *Chammurabi*, whom almost all Assyriologists also regarded as a Kossaean, while M. Joachim Ménant has always declared him to be a Semite. Delitzsch now inclines to the opinion of the French cuneiformist. He even considers the name *Chammu-rabi*, which in col. I. 48 of the “Rassam King List” is explained by *Kimtarapashtu* “(of) numerous progeny,” Semitic, deriving *chammu* (S<sup>h</sup> 769) from an Assyrian stem *chamámu*, “to bind.” One of the most ancient pure Semitic inscriptions of this king is given at the end both in transcription and translation. To the Kossaean king *Agum* Delitzsch assigns a relatively late date. According to his view there exists no reason for placing him before the Semito-Kossaean period. The opening words of his inscription, col. I. 1–43, are transcribed and translated, pp. 56 and 57, the results of Delitzsch’s careful collation of the original text being added in the foot-notes.

Very useful are also the lists, scattered through the book, of the Elamitic divine and royal names (pp. 42 and 43), and of the seven Elamitic rulers corresponding to the eight Median tyrants of Berosus (p. 68, n. 1); of the Median magistrates (p. 48), already communicated to us by the late George Smith, p. 228 of his “Assyrian Discoveries,” from a fragment of an octagonal clay prism of Sargon,<sup>6</sup> along with the six Median

ii. p. 105, n. 2, already says, “La désinence *ash* est très-fréquente dans l’onomastique virile ou divine de l’idiome des Kashhi, or Cissiens, qui fournirent une dynastie régnant sur la Babylonie du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle environ avant J.-C. au milieu du XIII<sup>e</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Delitzsch, *Kossäer*, pp. 20 and 27, 2.

<sup>2</sup> For this compare the name of the Philistine king of Gaza: *Cil-Bel* (KAT. 107 and 355, etc.; *Paradies*, 291); also Hebr. בֵּלְעָלָל; later בֵּלְעָלָל, Dillmann, *Exodus & Leviticus*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 328.

<sup>3</sup> To the identity of *Shumu* and *Shugamunu* Lenormant first called attention, *Die Magie*, p. 370. This is unfortunately not cited in Delitzsch’s book, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> It is to be remembered that, as was mentioned above, the Kossaean king שְׁמַרְדָּן is also called שְׁגַלְתָּהִירְתָּן.

<sup>5</sup> A portion of this tablet, the fragment K. 4348, had been already published, II R. 38, No. 2.

<sup>6</sup> They brought Sargon tribute in the ninth year of his reign, i. e. 713 b. c. According to Delitzsch (p. 49 at the bottom) these Median names bear an un-

proper names from the Asarhaddon Prism, col. IV. l. 19–21 (p. 49) : *Uppis* of *Partakka*, *Zanasana* of *Partukka*, *Ramaté'a* of *Urakazabarna*; the kings and districts of *Na'iri* (p. 50) from the monolith inscription of the Assyrian king *Shamshi-Rammán III.* (824–811 b. c.), col. III. 45–63 ; a tabular survey of the history of *Babylonia* from the first *Kossaean* king down to *Phul* (pp. 62 and 63) ; and finally the so-called *Neobabylonian Schülertüfelchen* (80. 11–12. 3 in the collection of the British Museum), with the names of twenty-two kings and the years of their reigns (p. 66).

For Old Testament exegetes p. 19, n. 2, is of especial importance, where *Akkad*, hitherto known in the cuneiform inscriptions only as the name of a country, is, in accord with גָּדֵן, Genesis x. 10, established also as the name of a city; not less so, p. 30, n. 5, on the land *Namri*,<sup>1</sup> which had been wrongly read by Sir Henry Rawlinson, Smith, Sayce, and also by Delitzsch ("Paradies," p. 237) *Zimri*, and combined with נָמְרִי, whose kings are mentioned Jer. xxv. 25, together with those of Elam and Media. The reading *Namri* is now finally settled by the Charter of Nebuchadnezzar I. of Babylon<sup>2</sup> (about 1300 b. c.). On the same interesting monument,<sup>3</sup> col. II. 50, also, *Akkad* is to be found preceded by the determinative for "city."<sup>4</sup> Page 46, note, the combining of the נָמְרִי, Ezra iv. 9, with the inhabitants of the country of *Parsua* is maintained against Schrader (KAT. 615); p. 69, n. 1, on the other mistakable *Aryan* stamp. The same view is expressed by Professor Eberhard Schrader in the *Literarische Centralblatt* of February 16, 1884.

<sup>1</sup> The province of *Namri* or *Namar* was situated in the lofty valleys of the *Diyâlâ* and its head waters, north and northwest of *Chalmân* (now *Hulwân*), at the exit of the pass, over which the principal highway from Media to Babylon leads.

<sup>2</sup> The biblical נָבֹכְדָּרָאצֵר or נָבֹכְדָּרָאצֵר b. c., the son of Nabopolassar, 625–604.

<sup>3</sup> This remarkable document is engraved in two columns, of 60 lines each, on two sides of a tetragonal monolith of whitish basalt. It is 62 centimeters high and somewhat rounded at the top. It was discovered, along with numerous other inscriptions, in the winter 1881–82, by Hormuzd Rassam, beneath the ruins of the biblical Sepharvaim (now Abood Habba), in the chamber of an ancient palace, at about three meters below the surface. Between the two columns, with the most carefully executed archaic Babylonian inscription, there are six superimposed fields with constellations, altars, beasts, and mythological figures, cut in with the chisel. On the left of these pictorial representations an enormous serpent is coiling itself up, in all probability the emblem of *Ciru*, the Serpent-god, invoked col. II. 49 of the text. The stone is now in the British Museum. Dr. Hermann Hilprecht, a promising pupil of Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, examined it carefully during his stay in London, August and September, 1882. Through the kindness of the keeper of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, Dr. Birch, and his distinguished assistant, Mr. Theo. G. Pinches, he also obtained a squeeze of the inscription. From this he has published the text in autograph in his inaugural dissertation *Freibrief Nebukadnezar's I.*, Leipzig, 1883, 4°. The inscription contains a Babylonian state document, made out before several high Babylonian dignitaries as witnesses, a charter which attests that a number of cities in the district of *Namar*, belonging to *Reti-Marduk*, the chief (בעל בית) of the house of *Kaziyara*, are declared as free and independent, on account of his bravery exhibited during the Elamitic campaign. Cf. Hilprecht, l. c. p. viii. (See now, also, the *Proceedings* of the Society of Biblical Archaeology of April 1, 1884, pp. 144–170.)

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hilprecht. l. c. p. viii. n. 2, and p. 8, l. 50.

hand, he doubts with good reason the identity of *Kudur-Mabuk's* son *Arud-Sin*, incorrectly read as Sumerian *Eri-Aku*, "servant of the moon-god," with the biblical אֶלְיוֹן מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים, Genesis xiv. 1 and 9.

To many the news will be interesting, that Professor Delitzsch intends issuing half yearly, from now on, "Essays on the History of Religion" (p. 53, n. 1). Old Testament students need not be afraid, however, of having to burden their library budget with the purchase of these indispensable publications regularly twice a year. Moreover, I cannot repress my unfortunate pessimistic skepticism that for some time we shall have to remain content with the gratifying announcement alone, made on p. 24, that the "Assyrian Lexicon," eagerly expected for several years, is at last happily completed. The fruits of the author's comprehensive lexicological collections for the Assyrian, however, meet us in numerous places in the present treatise on the Kossaeans. I will mention among others the explanation of the word *eshitu* (p. 6, n. 1) as "disorder, anarchy;" of the adverb *anna-ma* (p. 7, n. 3) as "friendly, peaceably;" a formation like the Hebrew תָּשִׁימָה;<sup>1</sup> the substantive *tashimtu*,<sup>2</sup> "wisdom" (p. 57); the verb *tullū* (= \* *tulluyni*), "to hang the quiver" (cf. נַעֲלֵת, Genesis xxvii. 13) p. 29, 1; and the combination of *tachūmu* with the Talmudic and Targumic תָּחֻמָּה p. 7, n. 5. On page 8, l. 11, the stem *bulkutu* is at last correctly written with *b*: *ibbalkitu*, not *ippalkitu*. This might long ago have been derived from IV. R. 16, 32 and 64 a; 57, 9 d, as well as from p. 66, l. 14 and 15, of my "Keilschrifttexte." On page 57, note c, also the old mistake *Ishtar qashitti ilāti*, "Istar, the archeress of the goddesses" ("Chaldäische Genesis," Leipzig, 1876, p. 272), instead of *Ishtar qaritti ilāti* (cf. ASKT. 126, 19), "the powerful goddess," has disappeared.<sup>3</sup> Page 74 my reading *e-ni-shu*, "his lord," instead of *be-ilis-shu* is adopted; cf. KAT. 69, l. 10 and 496. Page 7, n. 2, for the character QU the new phonetic value *rik*, and p. 28 for רְאֵת the reading *ara* is made very probable. Whether the Assyrian *amelu*, "man," rendered by the Hebrews in the name of Nebuchadnezzar's successor, מְרוּדָךְ, 2 Kings xxv. 27; Jer. li. 31 (Babylonian *Ameli-Marduk*, "man or servant of Merodach"), as *ävîl*, is Semitic and not connected with the Sumerian *mulu*, "man," Kossaeen *mâli*, *mâli*, I leave undecided. Nor does it yet seem quite clear to me that the name *Adar*<sup>4</sup> is good Semitic (p. 53).

<sup>1</sup> *Ma* or *m*, later pronounced *v*, was in Assyrian, like the Hebrew בְּ an adverbial ending; cf. Pratorius in the *Literaturblatt für orientalische Philologie*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 197. I also believe that the י in יְהִי is the same affix, and not the suffix of the third person. For يَهْكِي compare يَهْكِم = שְׂלִוָּה and أَرْبَمْنَ and أَرْبَوْن, etc., etc. The spelling يَهْكִי is to be met with in only three late passages: Jer. xlvi. 12 and 21; xlxi. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Compare for this the *Nouvelles notes de lexicographie assyrienne*, par M. Stanislas Guyard, in the *Journal Asiatique*, Août-Septembre, 1883, p. 185.

<sup>3</sup> The Assyriological adviser of the *Literarische Centralblatt* (December 15, 1883, col. 1796) would in my place add here, "These readings and בְּלִכְחָה rest, as we should like to remark (without any reproach to the author, however) on private communications of the reviewer, made in 1880."

<sup>4</sup> Adrammelech, Assyrian *Adar-Malik*, the patricidal son of Sanherib, 2 Kings xix. 37, is a name like אֶלְשָׁנָאֵל, which does not mean "God-wrestling" (Gen. xxxii. 29), but "El is king" (Assyrian *sharru*).

Unintelligible to me is the circumflex over the *a* in *shāmā*, "heaven" (p. 25), instead of *shamū* (= \* *shāmāyū*, Ethiopic *sāmāy*) ; likewise the remark that *lugal-e* cannot be read *sharre*, "kings" (p. 20, 1) ; *shame*, "heaven," I think, is written innumerable times ideographically with phonetical complement *an-e*, and only quite exceptionally as IV R. 20, last line purely phonetically *sha-me-e*: cf. also *kur-e* instead of *shade*, "mountains," etc., etc. That *lugal-e* was to be taken as "kings of Babylon" would scarcely have been found out even by an ancient Babylonian scholar. If *cirritu*<sup>1</sup> occurs, K. 4399, Rev., as a synonym of *shibirru* (p. 58), it cannot mean "sceptre," for *shibirru* is ASKT. 120, 16 (cf. CV. p. XLI.), certainly a weapon: *re'u*<sup>2</sup> *ina shibirishu lidūkshi*, "the ruler may kill her with his *shibirru*." Kings, I think, do not usually slaughter females with their sceptres; cf. also Sanherib, Sayce 8, where *shibirru* appears as a variant of *kakku*, "weapon." I also have some doubt concerning the supposed Assyrian *rishqu* (= Talmudic and Targumic נְשָׁבֵן), "spikenard," p. 36: cf. also Delitzsch, "Assyrische Studien," Leipzig, 1874, p. 127, and Schrader in the "Monatsberichte" of the Berlin Academy of May 5, 1881, p. 417. Instead of *rishqu*, II R. 36, 3 d, I believe, it should rather be read *saqqu*, "chief." For the corresponding Akkadian *shara*, see my "Akkadische Sprache," Berlin, 1883 (cited as CV.), p. XXXVII. An old mistake, finally, is the rendering of the ideograph *shughub*,<sup>3</sup> Assyrian *suchuppātu*, by "bullock, juvenus." *Sisē, suchuppāti, imērē* is not "horses, bullocks, and asses," but "horses, mules, and asses," Arabic *cha'il, bighal, hamir*, cf. Qorān 16, 8: *wal-chaila wal-bighāla wal-hamira litarkabūhā*, "and the horses, mules, and asses that you may ride on them." Another name for "mules" appears to have been *paré*:<sup>4</sup> cf. Schrader, KAT. 298, 18 and 579. Whether this word has any connection with Hebrew נִמְלָה,<sup>5</sup> "wild ass," and מַלְאָה (fem. פְּלָה), "mule," is not quite certain.<sup>6</sup> To the references for *gul* =

<sup>1</sup> For *cirritu* the remarks of Arthur Amiand and Stanislas Guyard (*Journal Asiatique*, Août-Septembre, 1883, p. 197, § 19) could have been cited.

<sup>2</sup> The נ in *re'u*, "shepherd," is not an נ (= י), but stands for ו; *re'u* is = *reyu*, *rāyu*, *ra'yū* (cf. *belu*); the נ in *re'a*, "companion," on the other hand (CV. XXXIV.), is an נ: cf. פָּרָעָה = פָּרָעָה, and פָּרָעָה, St. Luke iii. 35 = פָּרָעָה.

<sup>3</sup> S<sup>b</sup> 44; II R. 4, 677, where *su-u-up-pa-tum* is to be corrected to *su-chu-up-pa-tum*. Dialectical by-forms of *shughub*, according to II R. 70, 191-194, are *shu-ghul*, *i-shi* (or *i-lim*?), and *sulgar* (or *sulsha*?). The *shu* in *shughub* is the same that occurs in the word for "yoke," *shudun*, dialectic *shudul*. *Dun* is a synonym of *ger* = *nāgiru*, S<sup>b</sup> 527, and the ideograph for *nāgiru* consists of the character for "frontlet," Akkad. *aga*, Assyrian *agū*, and the inserted *kaskal* = *charrānu* (plene *char-ra-a-nu*, Charter of Nebuchadnezzar, col. I. l. 16), S<sup>b</sup> 303. Cf. also the *shu* in the ideograph for *atūdu* (אֲתָּעֵד), Akkadian *sigga*, S<sup>b</sup> 830. *Shu* I take it = *sachāpu* (S<sup>b</sup> 824), a synonym of *karāmu* (Delitzsch, *Kossäder*, p. 3, 4).

<sup>4</sup> Hebr. מַלְאָה, "juvenile," appears in Assyrian as *puru* (= Akkadian *amar*): see *Johns Hopkins University Circulars* of March, 1884, p. 50 below.

<sup>5</sup> The Assyrian equivalent of the Akkadian *anshu-edina*, "ass of the desert," IV R. 3, 23 a, is, of course, to be read *burimu*, not *puriwu*. *Parū* might be "mulus" and *suchuppātu* "mula."

<sup>6</sup> That the Aramaic name for "mule," סְמָךְ or סְמָכִינָה (Arabic *kaudan*), is identical with *kudin*, which occurs in the so-called Cappadocian Cuneiform Inscription, I communicated to Mr. Pinches in the British Museum in March,

[July,

*abâtu*, "to ruin," Hebrew אָבַד<sup>1</sup> (p. 70, 3) we might add II R. 27, 50 c. d.; cf. for this p. 523 of our essay on the Sumerian dialect. *An-nim* obv. l. 11 of the Hammurabi Inscription (p. 74) is, I think, to be taken as נִילְוִין (Genesis xiv. 18); Assyrian *ilu elamu* or *ilu elâ* (*elînu*) and *mudingir-en-lil* in the following line will have to be explained after the analogy of בְּעֵל שָׁמֶן in l. 18 of the sepulchral inscription of the Sidonian king Eshmunazar.<sup>2</sup> Compare also the Old Testament use of בְּשָׁמֶן in places like 2 Sam. vi. 12, etc., etc. That . . . *gi-ir* l. 14 is to be restored to [*mi*] *gi-ir* appears to me hardly probable; I suppose we should read [*gi*] *gi-ir* and regard the *ir* as a phonetical complement to the ideograph *gi-gi* (SFG. 57 and 58). Just as little can I believe that *ni-nu* Rev. 4 is to be read *i-nu*. I conjecture that it denotes "we" (CV. p. XL. at the bottom)<sup>3</sup> and that the following are relative clauses.

In conclusion, I should like to express the wish that Delitzsch would keep to the concise and exact style of the most excellent notes and appendices to his admirable "Paradies." The *Kossäer*, like the contributions to Dr. Lotz's "Inscriften Tiglathpileses I.", is a little too long drawn out; it might conveniently have been condensed to one third, an article of moderate length for a scientific periodical. In view of the overproduction in our scientific literature and the limitedness of our time we cannot write concisely enough. It costs the single author, to be sure, more time, but saves hundreds of readers a good deal of this priceless article. Should the cost of the Assyriological publications be reduced one half — the *Kossäer* comes to ten marks! — this disaster will certainly be endured. And that these *oligraphical* principles, to use the neologism of a celebrated philosopher, do not affect in any way the thoroughness and perspicuity of the contents is, I think, shown, for instance, in the masterly commentary on Genesis by my venerable instructor August Dillmann. Should there really be at any time some superfluous space, it might rather be employed for the citation of one's predecessors in order to dispel as soon as possible the reproach brought forward, not unjustly, by Paul de Lagarde (Göttingen *Nachrichten* of December 3, 1881, p. 376) of the *unhistorical* character of Assyriology.

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1882. The same opinion was expressed in the *Proceedings* of the Society of Biblical Archaeology of June 6, 1882, by Professor Edward Sachau, of Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> The כ in Hebr. אָבַד as compared with Assyrian אֲבַת rests on a partial assimilation to the preceding ב; likewise כְּבָד, "to be heavy," is in Assyrian כְּבָתָה. Cf. also Assy. נְדָנָן = Hebr. בְּתָן, "to give;" Assyri. מְלָשָׁנָה = Hebr. דְּבָשָׁה, "honey;" כְּבָרָה, סְכָרָה instead of קְטָלָה, סְכָרָה, etc., etc. Most of the apparently sporadic sound changes in Semitic rest on similar assimilatory processes.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Schlottmann, *Die Inschrift Eschmunazar's*, Halle, 1868, pp. 142–146. Dillmann, *Über Baal mit dem weiblichen Artikel (ה בָּאָל)* in the *Monatsberichte* of the Berlin Academy of June 16, 1881, pp. 7–10.

<sup>3</sup> The prefixed *i* in *nînu ana alîshu i-nîllîshu*, "let us go to his city," ASKT. 119, 25, seems to be a cohortative particle. Compare also *i-nikul*, "let us eat," Haupt, *Nimrod Epic*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 44, l. 68, and Delitzsch, *Assyrische Lesestücke*, Leipzig, 1878, p. 83, l. 3: *anâku u kâshi i-nipush shashma*, "I and thou, let us make fight."

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

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## AN EPISODE OF THE LUTHER CELEBRATION.

AMONGST the almost numberless addresses called forth by the celebration of Luther's four hundredth birthday in Germany, perhaps no one has occasioned more excitement and comment than that of Professor Wilhelm Bender, of Bonn, who, as temporary Dean of the Theological Faculty, was the orator at the Academic Festival. The attention given to this address (of which the title is "Reformation and Kirchenthum") is owing, not so much to any exceptional ability in it, as to the theological position taken by the orator. He made use of the occasion to ventilate his views of the traditional theology, and to read the Protestant Church a sharp lecture for not having been able to keep its hold upon the people. The course of thought in the address is as follows: Luther is considered as "the German Reformer who put the whole mental, social, and political life of the nation on a new ethico-religious basis." Two ideas are found in Luther's reformatory work, which furnish the key to the understanding of it: (1) "the idea of the Christian life with which Luther overcame the monastic view of life; and (2) "the idea of justification by faith in Christ, with which he drew in question the necessity of the Romish ecclesiastical system as a means of salvation." Professor Bender, of set purpose, puts these two ideas in this order, laying special stress on Luther's treatise on the "Freedom of a Christian Man," as unfolding the "ideal of life," which Luther aimed to realize and to enforce. At the same time he says that "It is a question whether the newly-gained knowledge of the Christian ideal of life would have effected so radical a transformation of our spiritual and moral life, if it had not from the beginning been accompanied by that authoritative historical principle which, in the doctrine of justification solely by faith in Christ, has found an expression by no means distinct and exhaustive." In Luther's experience, he says, "the chasm between ideal and reality seemed so deep that he could never hope, in his own strength, to fill it." No priestly indulgence or absolution could appease his troubled conscience. And this personal experience led him to the biblical doctrine of justification through grace in Jesus Christ. "For Luther this faith became the foundation of his whole spiritual existence. In Christ he found again his ideal of life, the highest revelation of Divine love; with Christ he found the Holy Spirit which guided and animated the development of his own religious and ethical character; upon the wonderful life of Christ his exuberant hopes concerning the perfection of human life and of the world were fastened."

So far one might find little to object to; at least nothing that need excite special comment. To be sure, the *order* of these two leading principles is acknowledged by Professor Bender himself to be different from what has been commonly supposed to be the actual one in Luther's own experience and conception; and he has by his critics been sharply reminded that, not only generally, but even in the treatise on the "Freedom of a Christian Man," Luther always put faith first, and an upright life second. But the more serious grounds of difference come out in connec-

tion with the latter part of the address. In general, it may be said, Professor Bender's position is that of a disciple of Ritschl (of Göttingen), namely, that metaphysics should be banished from theology; that the moral perfection of man being the vital thing in Christianity, everything should be viewed from that stand-point. Questions that involve the supernatural, questions about the ultimate causes and relations of things, in short, speculative theology in general, is to be ruled out as having nothing to do with the practical problem of life, and as rather diverting attention from what is essential to what is unimportant. Hence that which is truly valuable and useful in the Reformation has nothing to do with dogmas. "With the question *how* and *by what means* Christ became the Revealer of God and the Redeemer of men, *how* and *by what means* He imparts forgiveness and a new life to those that believe on Him, the scholastic theologian and others have tormented themselves; to the *believing Reformer* it was enough to know and to experience that the life of Christ includes everything in itself that can satisfy religious need and give the moral aspirations of the soul a right direction." Here Professor Bender's representations begin to wear more decidedly the aspect of a distortion of historic fact; especially when he immediately adds that, "when the Papists make appeals to Scripture, he [Luther] puts Christ against the Scriptures," as if the main difference between Luther and the Papists was that the latter made the most of the Bible! In the next paragraph, it is true, speaking of the wide reach of the influence of the Reformation, Professor Bender observes, "And this is all the more wonderful, inasmuch as Luther's relapse into the mediæval dogmatism has already very much helped to increase the difficulty of understanding his doctrine and to paralyze its practical efficiency." The disposition to take Luther's personal experience as a model is then criticised, the conclusion being that, if men nowadays have no such overwhelming sense of sin as he had, the reason is not that moral questions are handled now more superficially than then, but that "we in the mean time have gained clearer knowledge of what a moral life is, and that the moral condition of the present generation, thanks to the ennobling influence of the Reformation, has become incomparably better." To which Luthardt, in his "*Kirchenzeitung*," remarks, "Let us congratulate ourselves that we are sons of the enlightened nineteenth century, which stands morally so much higher; this gives us so much easier a conscience. Later generations will then, perhaps, finally not need Christ's atonement and God's forgiveness at all."

Passing now to Ecclesiasticism in its relation to Christianity the address remarks on the subordinate importance attached to the church by Protestants, as compared with Romanists, and on the fact that many Protestants even "declare that they have no further need of the church in order to the maintenance of their religious and moral character." Against the latter he takes decidedly the ground that "this much despised evangelical churchdom is still the indispensable organ for the appropriate culture of religious and moral life in our Christian people," and will accomplish this object in proportion to its fidelity to "Luther's original Reformation programme." The failure of the Protestant Church to retain its hold upon the masses of the Protestant population is ascribed to the reaction from the orthodoxy of the sixteenth century, the influence of Pietism, and the subserviency of the church to political powers. The apparent improvement of the last half century is de-

scribed as "artificially produced from without rather than a product of the inward vital power of the church." The apparent revival of religious life is regarded rather as an attempt "to make up for the baldness of the Rationalistic period by an æsthetic enthusiasm for the mediæval forms of worship." This disposition, prevalent especially among the circles of the more aristocratic, is closely connected, we are told, with the modern pietistic orthodoxy, "which likewise is fond of adopting those features of the Reformation which it has in common with mediæval Catholicism, but studiously puts into the background its really new and original principle, that is, what really constitutes the Reformation."

It is in the development of these thoughts that Professor Bender indulges in language which has called forth a multitude of replies and protests. Over and over again he charges the Protestant Church with copying the Middle Ages in its doctrines and its forms, and seeks to make the impression that the confessions which grew out of the Reformation were not the true expression of Luther's reformatory thoughts. He calls them "apocryphal confessions, in which the political sagacity of jurists and the sophistics of theologians tortured the evangelical doctrine of salvation into union with the Romish scholasticism." He admits that Luther "in his scholastic period," that is, after 1520, "built up the new soteriology on the dark background of mediæval theology," and therefore is partly to blame for the present condition of things. But "the essence of his Reformation cannot be found in that which it shares with Catholicism, but only in that which appears in it as new, peculiar, original."

The points in which Dr. Bender finds that modern Protestantism needs to be purged of mediæval elements are the following: (1.) In general, dogmatic statements of Christian truth and experience. Everything bordering on metaphysical theories should be abolished. This includes, of course, the doctrine of the Trinity and of the atonement, which latter doctrine is called "that barbarous theory, that God had first to quench his wrath in the sacrificial blood of the Redeemer before he could let grace take the place of justice." (2.) In particular, dogmas concerning miraculous things. Bender does not, in so many words, deny the possibility of miracles. But he affirms that as no one can define or describe a miracle, the fact of one cannot be proved, and that therefore, of course, belief in the fact is of no practical consequence. Even the resurrection of Christ comes under the ban. Of what consequence is it, he asks, to have definite notions as to how Christ was raised, exalted, and transfigured? And still less important is "that mythological theory which tries to explain the deity of the Redeemer by the marriage of a supermundane person with an earthly life." "The church," he says, "ought no longer to hesitate to declare that the salvation of the soul does not hang on those dogmas and miracles; that she does not place the obsolete institutions of the Middle Ages on the same level with the saving faith of the Reformation; that which can have for her only a symbolic significance cannot be taken by her in a physical sense." (3.) Pietism. Against this type of religion which, he says, has become the dominant one in the church, he is almost bitter in his denunciations. Its "sentimental love of Jesus and its painful asceticism, its slavery to the letter and its mania for miracles, its distrust of our life of culture and its exclusive interest in the next world," prove it to "correspond to the monastic rather than to the evangelical ideal of life." "This ascetico-meditative sort of piety is more fitted for monastic idleness than for the busy

complications of modern occupations." And pietism works banefully on the church especially because it distinguishes two classes of Christians, "the believing, or regenerate," and "the worldly Christians;" and by making this distinction it directly fosters self-righteousness in the former, and causes the latter to doubt whether they belong to the church and to Christianity at all. And so we have just such a division as in the Catholic Church; these pietistic Christians stand over against the worldly Christians, just as the monastic clergy among the Catholics do. (4.) The doctrine of conversion. This has been involved in the foregoing. With this doctrine Professor Bender has no patience. He evidently thinks that all who have been brought up in a Christian land should be regarded and treated as real Christians. To teach that each person needs a special conversion is more injurious, he holds, than the extremest Rationalism. To be sure, in this point it is hard to see how he makes out his charge of mediævalism against the objects of his criticism. For the Roman Catholic doctrine of baptismal regeneration is just the one which denies the need of conversion for all those brought up within the church.

As has been remarked, this address has occasioned a lively discussion. That Professor Bender has previously set forth such views in his lectures at the Bonn University is indeed a well-known fact: but the freedom guaranteed to university instructions and the comparative privacy of them, have secured him from attack. But the publication and wide circulation of this address, the uncompromising assault made on current beliefs, the serious charges brought against the more orthodox branch of the evangelical church, and especially against the pastors,—this has naturally stirred up an intense feeling. In the university itself a bitter division has sprung up among the students, and a new society ("Die positiv-theologische Vereinigung") has been organized among them, whose purpose is to counteract the tendency of Bender's instructions. The majority of the theological students belong to the "positive" party, while the professor himself is said to be growing more reckless and radical in his utterances than ever before. A number of pamphlets have been published in reply, among them an address by Professor Christlieb, of Bonn, delivered at the first meeting of the above-mentioned society. This address is, however, only for private circulation. These various replies aim to show that Bender has misstated historic facts as well as displayed his personal dislike of orthodoxy. Thus, they deny that the people in general are so estranged from the church as Bender represents. They deny that the apparent increased power of the church during the present century has come from an artificial aping of mediæval forms and ideas. They point to the reawakening of true Christian faith in men like Neander, Tholuck, Nitzsch, Dorner, Wichern, as the source of the new life in the church. They call attention to the fact that the rationalistic preachers are everywhere just the ones whose churches are the most empty, while the "pietistic" pastors often have crowded houses. They meet the charge that the pietistic Christians with their ascetic-meditative turn of mind are not fitted to modern life, by observing that it is just this much despised class that have carried on all the principal enterprises of home and foreign missions. They show that Luther himself affirmed the distinction between the world and the kingdom of God as emphatically as the modern pietists. They charge Bender with a demagogical appeal to popular prejudices when he designates all the

leading doctrines of the church, inclusive of the articles of the Apostles' Creed, as "medieval." "His Middle Ages," says Luthardt, "extend to the very beginnings of the church. But so to represent the matter would have made little impression. 'Middle Ages,' however, sounds very differently. For that means, of course, the time of darkness and of senseless scholastic subtleties. That produces an effect." They charge him with depreciating the authority of the Scriptures, and putting "scientific theology" in their place. They urge that he distorts Luther's position as to the relation of faith to morality; that he conceals the fact that Luther laid great stress on the atonement, on the death of Christ, whereas Bender represents him as simply finding in Christ his ethical ideal and a revelation of the Divine love. They complain of him for making use of a festive occasion when all should have united in celebrating the blessings which all enjoy as the fruits of the Reformation, in order to ventilate his rationalistic views and to insult the majority of the pastors in Germany.

In particular, it is alleged against him that, while emphasizing morality as the essential thing in Christianity, he is himself guilty of encouraging dishonesty in the treatment of the traditional doctrines and usages. Having sharply accused the church of bringing on itself "the curse of uncertainty, half-truth, and ambiguity" in its doctrines, he himself dares not recommend that they be at once abandoned. Speaking of what he styles "the faith pictures [*Glaubensbilder*] of Christian antiquity," he says, "Let them still be retained. But let them be interpreted as only that which they can be, — as pictures and emblems of unutterable experiences. I know that even the ecclesiastical dogmas cannot be at once and violently torn from the native place out of which they have grown. But let them be explained as that which alone they can be to us, — as pictures and symbols of truths which we feel [*ahnen*] rather than understand." Such a policy, if adopted, would speedily expose itself to the same charge of vagueness and ambiguity which he charges upon his brethren; and one cannot but sympathize with Pastor Krüger's somewhat sarcastic comment: "For the present 'let them be retained,' to prevent too great opposition; for 'the industrious German citizen' likes peace above all things; let them be explained as symbols of unintelligible truths! Be that, ye pupils of Bender, your future practice! Cautiously, yet persistently, without getting entangled in conflicts, but with unmistakable opposition to your 'orthodox, pietistic, clerical' brethren in office, try to steer your course in the church which you are to serve, so that, without an exciting struggle, you may interpret away the creed, dissolve the facts into ideas, put another sense into the traditional language; then you will, to be sure, bring about 'no new Reformation,' but will thoroughly 'carry out the old one.' Yes, a fox is better than a lion; that is so much according to Luther's idea! Wonder whether, perhaps, he had not better have retained the mass as symbol of a truth, 'which we feel rather than understand'; whether it would not have been more advisable to retain for a while the 'faith pictures,' e. g., the worship of the Madonna, and ingeniously interpret them as symbols. Then the whole affair would have gone off with very much less fuss."

Another thing in the address which especially stirs deep feeling is the contemptuous manner in which supernatural facts and religious mysteries are treated: the epithet "mythological" applied to the evangelical account of Jesus' birth, and "barbarous" to the current theory of his

atoning death ; and the notion of the supernatural in general not indistinctly pronounced inconsistent with modern science. He speaks of the "Copernican system" as having made forever impossible the sensuous mediæval notion of miracles, and says that "since the days of Copernicus" even the most believing of believers cannot adopt those materialistic notions of a local and bodily descent into Hades and ascent into Heaven without a certain evasion of the truth. This arraying of Copernicus against the mediæval, and, by implication, the Scriptural conception of the supernatural, has brought upon Professor Bender both severe criticism and satirical banter, one critic giving vent to his feelings by putting into the professor's mouth some verses, of which the following may serve as a proximate rendering : —

The earth revolves around the sun !  
 Why have men quarreled, trying to decide  
 If he who erst in Bethlehem was born,  
 And who on Golgotha was crucified,  
 Is most deserving of our praise or scorn ?  
 What matter if all truths are lost but one, —  
 That Mother Earth revolves around the sun !

The earth revolves around the sun !  
 Whether our God descended to this earth,  
 And here among men lived a human life,  
 Nothing ashamed to have a human birth ;  
 Why o'er these things have mortals waged a strife ?  
 Nay, let all things be doubtful but this one, —  
 That Mother Earth revolves around the sun !

The earth revolves around the sun !  
 Whether, my friend, sin is a grievous thing,  
 And thou canst hope in God's forgiving grace,  
 And whether thine own works can comfort bring  
 In that great day when thou shalt see God's face —  
 No matter ; of no truth be sure but one, —  
 That Mother Earth revolves around the sun !

It will be seen that the antagonism is considerably positive and pronounced. Professor Bender is fearless in his utterances, and probably has a good share of the ambition which makes him not unwilling to pose before the public as the advocate of free thought. One of his critics, Pastor Krüger, of Langenburg, challenges him to formulate his wishes, and to take the regular way to secure the adoption of his views in the Rhenish churches. What may come of this remains to be seen. Meantime Bender, in a fifth edition of his address, has added some rejoinders to his critics, in which, among other things, he says that if he is asked what he retains of the ancient belief, he would reply, "Everything that is necessary for the salvation of the soul : faith in the ideal of life, which presents to every individual the infinite work of attaining moral perfection ; faith in eternal life, of which in our conflict with sin and evil we are the more sure the more sincerely we surrender ourselves to the forgiving and sanctifying love of God ; faith that, while we can follow the radiant traces of this Divine love in the whole world, it has revealed itself as a redeeming vital power in the single person whose word and life-work is the source out of which we to this day derive this love and out of which all generations in all time will derive it." While

claiming to stand nearer to historical Christianity than Lessing, Kant, Goethe, and Schiller, he avows himself as preferring to be called a rationalist with them rather than to be classed among the orthodox of the present day.

In the heat of controversy unguarded things have doubtless been said ; and many are inclined to think that it would have been better to let the affair pass by in silence. But the aggressive attitude assumed by Professor Bender himself makes the controversy inevitable. The further course of it cannot be forecast ; but certain general observations on the situation may be ventured which will, perhaps, not be without interest and application outside of Germany.

1. The question is raised, how far Luther can honestly be made sponsor for all the beliefs which are to be found among those who call themselves Protestants. The Papists, on the one hand, and the free-thinkers, on the other, are eager to affirm that all the most radical views of modern times are the legitimate result of Luther's breaking away from the authority of the church, and opening the door for the freest individual thought. That the Reformation facilitated that freedom of thought and of speech under which the most extreme skepticism finds toleration is clear enough. That certain theological doctrines not held by Luther himself may yet legitimately claim recognition as consistent with the general drift of the Reformation is also not to be denied. But the unqualified claim that the essential thing in the Reformation was the demand for freedom of thought or for the unrestrained exercise of the human reason, so that Herbert Spencer and Colonel Ingersoll are to be called legitimate fruits of the Reformation, is little less than ridiculous. It is cowardly, moreover, to try to shift responsibility for extreme or unpopular views from one's self upon the great Reformer. But it is worse still, a positive dishonesty, when the doctrines of the Reformation are distorted, in order to make them appear to be substantially the same as those which Luther nevertheless would indignantly repudiate. Professor Bender indeed does not hesitate to denounce many of Luther's beliefs as obsolete and superstitious ; and he is right in saying that the essential thing in the Reformation is not what it has in common with mediæval Catholicism, but rather its new and original principles. But it is therefore all the more important to be accurate in stating what those principles are. And it is hard to believe that Bender can think himself to be accurate when he undertakes to define the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ. The doctrine is lauded as a vital thing ; but it is defined as finding in Christ the highest ideal of life. It is bad enough for Professor Bender to call it a *relapse* on Luther's part into mediæval scholasticism when he assented to the Catholic doctrines concerning the Trinity, the atonement, and the supernatural, although no evidence is presented that Luther had ever abandoned those doctrines. But it is, if possible, still worse to eviscerate the doctrine of justification itself. Luther, of course, may have been fallible in his theory of Christ's atoning work ; but when it is said that what he found in place of the Roman hierarchical authority was nothing but a new moral ideal in Christ, even a child can see that in this relation to Christ there is nothing that can account for either "justification" or "faith," as terms wherewith to describe the process by which a sinner obtains peace before God. Luther's conception of the way of salvation is radically transformed. "Justification by faith" means, to Dr. Bender's mind, simply the dis-

covery that not monastic asceticism or priestly intercessions, but only an upright life, can make a man acceptable to God ; and this uprightness of life is gained by finding it perfectly realized in Christ. Luther, he says, found that "the life of Christ contains everything that can satisfy religious needs, and give to the moral aspirations of the soul a right direction." The faith with which we have to do is simply a belief that Christ realized the moral ideal. Christ satisfies our religious needs simply in that He did his own duty, and we are thus encouraged to think that we may do likewise. This is justification. Christ, we are told, is "the highest revelation of divine love ;" but how or in what sense He revealed it, we are not told. The fact that He perfectly fulfilled the divine law would seem to involve no revelation of the divine love, or even any revelation at all. How is it a comfort to a sinner, remorseful over a guilty life and despairing of being able to attain the righteousness which God requires, to be informed that another man has done what he has failed to do, and seems to be unable to do ? How are we assured that God is ready to forgive us by being told that some one else was so holy that he did not need to be forgiven ? Yet not only is this Dr. Bender's theory of justification by faith, but he actually represents it as Luther's also !

2. The incident of which we are speaking illustrates what may be expected to be the outcome of the Ritschl school of theology in respect to the question of the supernatural. Ritschl himself does not deny the fact of the supernatural ; he rather seems to admit it, especially the fact of Christ's resurrection, as having had some use originally, but regards it as of no present importance to insist on a belief in the miraculous, or to have any definite opinion as to what a miracle is. Bender, who has been called Ritschl's *enfant terrible*, goes a step further, and while not explicitly denying the fact of the supernatural, yet takes an attitude of doubt as well as of indifference. What a miracle is, he affirms, we do not know ; it is indefinable ; and it must be useless to prove a fact which cannot be understood. This is a modification of Ritschl's position which could not but have been anticipated. The opinion that the supernatural is of no consequence to be believed now leads inevitably to the opinion that it never could have been of any consequence to any one. If, as is sometimes said, men nowadays accept Christianity not on account of the miracles, but in spite of them, then it is only a short step, and an inevitable step, to the position that miracles must at the outset also have been a hindrance rather than a help. For if the difficulty in believing in miracles consists in the inherent improbability of the violation or suspension of natural laws, then the improbability must at all times have been equally great ; and an alleged miracle must always have been a stumbling-block. He who for this reason now finds it intrinsically difficult or impossible to believe that a miraculous occurrence took place in the past would find it equally difficult to believe in apparent miracles wrought before his eyes ; he would regard them as optical illusions or tricks of jugglery. And if he considers this as the normal state of mind to be in, he must suppose that alleged miracles must always have been as useless and incredible as they would be to him. The only escape from this conclusion is to assume that men have not always been in a normal frame of mind ; that they were formerly not so scientific as now, had not learned so much about the immutability of natural forces, and were credulous of super-

natural interferences with the regular order of things. But this is really no escape after all. It does not make it any more probable that real miracles were once wrought than that they are wrought at present. It only amounts to the allegation that men formerly could be more easily deceived than now; that an event striking or astounding through its strangeness produced the effect of a miracle without really being one. For the essential improbability of a divine interference with natural law must be something invariable,—something not at all affected by men's opinions respecting it. That men formerly may have been more ready than now to believe in such interference, so far from making its occurrence more likely, would rather, if anything, make it less likely; for an apparent, but unreal, miracle would with such men answer the same purpose as a real one, and would involve none of the intrinsic difficulty which is found in an actual violation of natural law. And so, on this theory, we are driven to the conclusion that Christ's mighty works were no real miracles, but only somewhat extraordinary feats which produced the *impression* of real miracles, and answered the purpose of securing assent to his Messianic claims. But this, as implying a sort of deception, cannot be long maintained by any one who professes to accept Christ as the Truth; and the next step must be speedily taken, which lands us in the conclusion that there was no effort to produce belief by extraordinary works at all; that the doctrine rested wholly on its own merits, or that the character of Christ carried conviction by virtue of its own intrinsic excellence. And this is practically what Professor Bender has come to. He does not explicitly say that all the evangelical stories of miracles are legendary or mythical; but this is apparently what he really thinks. The narrative of the miraculous conception of Jesus he distinctly rejects. And even the resurrection of Christ, he says, is something which it is of no account to believe, even if it be a fact; and it is, he further says, assumed to be a fact only on the strength of an *inference* drawn by the apostles from certain appearances of Jesus of which we can get no distinct idea. The one thing which he deems it important to believe concerning Christ is his unique moral perfection.

3. But it is, furthermore, very clear that, with this abandonment of the supernatural as an essential element in Christianity, faith in Christ's moral uniqueness and infallible authority cannot long endure. When all supernatural elements in Christ's person and work have been discarded, the foundation for this belief in his moral uniqueness becomes exceedingly tenuous. That one man out of the many millions of the race should have been perfectly sinless is so startling a fact, if it is a fact, that it requires, to say the least, peculiar proof. It is something more difficult for men in general to believe in than the affirmation of miraculous events. Men have always been prone to believe in miracles, but very slow to believe in the perfect holiness of any fellow-man. The proof of sinlessness, too, is exceedingly difficult to give; sin being so much a matter of the heart, which cannot be looked into by any man. There was nothing in the ancestral or local relations of Jesus to warrant any expectation of such astounding uniqueness. There is an immense presumption against the assumption of it. How can that presumption be overcome? The testimony of Jesus himself alone can hardly suffice; in all other cases such testimony to one's own perfection is summarily rejected. The testimony of his disciples cannot be taken as conclusive; they might easily have been tempted to exaggerate their Master's excellences. If the gospels,

in spite of their strong claims to credibility, are, on account of the miracles reported in them, to be pronounced legendary or mythical, then it is clearly as legitimate to eliminate the statements about Christ's sinlessness as those about his miraculous works. The former, intrinsically as incredible as the latter, could, quite as easily as they, have grown up out of the lively imaginations and ardent affections of his disciples. Or, shall it be said that we infer Christ's uniqueness of character from the uniqueness of effect which has resulted from his life? This is what Professor Bender holds. But this is very inconclusive reasoning. Though Christianity has done much good, it has not produced examples of sinlessness, and has been disgraced by much wickedness. The existence of Christianity may legitimately be held to prove something unique in the founder; the highest ideal of moral excellence may have been set forth by Him. He may have had a peculiar faculty of summoning followers and of inspiring enthusiasm. But all this might be, without his being absolutely perfect himself. A very high degree of excellence may have characterized Him; and He may thereby have commanded even unparalleled respect. But what is the necessity, or where is the warrant for supposing that he had exemption from the universal lot of imperfection? Whence comes our knowledge respecting Christ in general? It cannot be pretended that each individual Christian has an immediate, independent intuition of the sinlessness of Christ as the necessary and sole condition of the moral effect of Christianity on the world. The effect of Christ's life and work must have been, largely at least, conditioned on the opinion which has been held, and the representations which have been made, by the church concerning Him. But these have been to the effect, not merely that He was unique in his moral character, but also that He was unique in his nature, his divine commission, and his atoning work. If, in arbitrary disregard of the testimony of the earliest records and of the Christian church in general, we can eliminate all the supernatural elements in Christ's person, life, and work, there is no logic that can compel us, or even make it reasonable, in the process of elimination, to retain our faith in his sinlessness. Having taken away the seal which marks a special revelation, and accredits Jesus as the Son of God appointed to redeem the world, then at the best we shall have nothing left but a system of morals, and even this without any authoritative standard. Ethical rationalism must be the upshot of this attempt to avoid metaphysics and speculation. At present this aspect of the movement is concealed. The continued recognition of Christ as the bearer of a revelation, the prominence attached to ecclesiastical services, the almost Papal importance assigned to the church as the medium of the impartation of divine blessings,—this preserves to the Ritschl movement as yet the appearance of being positively Christian, more positively Christian than the Protestantenverein, which embraces men of all shades of unbelief. But the two parties are liable to drift together, and become a simple association of deists,—everything distinctively Christian being evaporated away.

The protest against giving prominence to metaphysics in theology is well. But the attempt to banish speculative thought from theology can only result in reducing theology to the most barren platitudes. Even in retaining a belief in God as the Eternal and Omnipotent Creator and accepting the Scriptural definition, "God is love," Ritschl opens the door to a multitude of metaphysical questions which cannot be repressed.

His theological system is strongly flavored with agnosticism; and like agnosticism in philosophy, it can maintain itself against criticisms only by resorting to the very metaphysics which it professes to discard. Much of its apparent strength lies in its catering to the current doubt or denial of the supernatural. The equivocal attitude which it takes relative to this cannot long be preserved. It must come out boldly, as Professor Bender does timidly, in positive rejection of the miraculous, and thence advance by logical necessity to the abandonment of Christianity as a divinely authoritative religion; or else it must return to the orthodox view, and accept Christianity as a supernatural revelation, and Jesus not only as a sinless son of man, but as the anointed Son of God.

*C. M. Mead.*

HALLE, PRUSSIA.

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### ARCHÆOLOGICAL NOTES.

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#### THE WOLFE EXPEDITION TO BABYLONIA.

WE have received, at too late a date to publish in full, a letter from Professor D. G. Lyon, of Harvard University, containing facts of great interest relating to Babylonian exploration. Our readers will regret that we must condense his statement instead of giving it in his own graphic words.

Professor Lyon wishes to outline a new archæological undertaking, even at the risk of seeming premature. If America has been backward in such research, he justly ascribes it to her material preoccupations. The desire to be a sharer with Europe in ancient excavations has not been unfelt, and at Assos, in Asia Minor, has lately expressed itself most sympathetically. What England and France have exhumed in the regions of Mesopotamia has excited especial interest in the United States. The Assyrian galleries of the Louvre at Paris and the British Museum in London have charmed our countrymen of New York and Boston. The travels, discoveries, and decipherments of Botta, Rawlinson, Layard, Loftus, Smith, Rassam, and Sarzeu have been read at home with an enthusiasm none the less intense because directed to men and things abroad. This sentiment has long hoped for an American expedition to Mesopotamia. Language, history, and religion have combined to fan the spark till at last it has burst into a blaze.

The first step toward the expedition was taken in New Haven under the shadow of Yale College, in October, 1883. Then and there a few gentlemen decided the time was ripe, and measures and men were designated for the enterprise. This private action took a more public shape in Boston, May, 1884. At that time the Archæological Institute of America sanctioned the nascent undertaking in the following resolution: "The Archæological Institute has heard with interest of the expedition to the Tigris-Euphrates valley proposed by some of its members, and desires to express its approval of such expedition, and to commend it heartily to the sympathy and aid of persons interested." "Shortly afterward," I quote Professor Lyon's words, "we were thrilled by the intelligence that under the representations made by Dr. J. P. Peters of New York, a liberal and wealthy lady, Miss Catherine Lorillard Wolfe, had promised to pay the

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entire expense of the projected expedition." Who will not feel with him that for this generous act Miss Wolfe deserves the heartiest gratitude of every student of archaeology?

Next came a meeting in Hartford, Connecticut, on June 13, 1884, at which the *personnel* of the proposed party was largely arranged. Our readers will be glad to learn that Dr. William Hayes Ward, of "The Independent," has consented to be of the party. As perhaps the earliest American student of the cuneiform inscriptions, and among the first suggesters of a Euphrates expedition in the press, he seemed predestinated to the post. The other two names are signally competent ones. They are Mr. Joseph Thacher Clarke and Dr. J. R. S. Sterrett, both of whom are brilliantly associated with Assos, and the latter also with Phrygian archaeology as the fellow-traveler of Dr. Ramsay, by the readers of this Review. A fourth member is still to be found.

The "Wolfe Expedition to Babylonia" is so far organized. Its aim is to be preparatory. Old ruins will be visited, and promising excavations located. Historic and scientific, as well as archaeological results will be looked for. The field chosen is wisely the lower part of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. This has two advantages. First, ruin jostles ruin, and secondly, it is comparatively virgin soil. Here, too, was the home of the elder Assyrian civilization. With other high authorities Professor Lyon believes that "some of these mounds contain monuments as important as any which have yet been discovered."

It only remains to say that French and English rights of exploration will be sedulously respected, that the Sultan's permission to travel within his domain has been solicited and will doubtless be gained, and that the party hopes to enter on its inspiring work during the autumn or winter of 1884. The best greetings of our many friends will go out to an undertaking so rich in promise for art, language, and religion. We trust the fruits may rival those of Zaan. The Review congratulates itself on this vast stride toward the goal commended in its earliest issue.

John Phelps Taylor.

## BOOK NOTICES.

**A SANSKRIT READER**, with Vocabulary and Notes. By CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN, Professor of Sanskrit in Harvard College. Parts I. and II. Text and Vocabulary. Boston : Ginn & Heath. 1884.

This work has been much needed and long expected. A hearty welcome will be given it. From Professor Lanman's well-known thoroughness of work we had reason to look from him for the best work only, nor are we disappointed in this attempt to give an introduction into Sanskrit literature ; an attempt which surpasses anything of like sort hitherto made in its adaptability to students' needs ; for, after completing the grammar, the beginner must have something to read, which until now has been a need satisfied but indifferently, although we have had various works purporting to do this : the good (and expensive) school edition of "Nala," by Professor Williams ; the admirable collection of pieces in Böhtlingk's reader (without vocabulary) ; Delbrück's (Vedic) chrestomathy ; Stenzler's skeleton primer, and lately Windisch's hymns,

with which and with other foreign makeshifts we have patiently tried to work ; but what was really needed we have now found for the first time, — a reader composed of judicious extracts taken from all parts of the literature, accompanied by a vocabulary and furnished with notes. The last are yet to come, but the reading material, and a full vocabulary thereto, we have complete in this volume, and our hearty thanks are due Professor Lanman for the admirable care and skill with which the work has been done. The book goes hand in hand with the Sanskrit grammar of Professor Whitney. The graded extracts from the literature are so selected as to lead the student from the simple narrative style of the epic poetry back through the literature to the Vedic period ; then beginning with extracts from the Vedic hymns he descends to the literature based upon them, and ends with the most obscure part of the literature in the Sūtra period. A portion of "Nala" is naturally first selected ; then follows quite a number of stories from the "Hitopadeça" fairy tales, where prose and poetry are united ; part of the "Kathāsaritsāgara" and several interesting extracts from "Manu" close the classical Sanskrit portion. After this a satisfactory collection from the Vedic hymns, ending with passages from the Brahmana philosophical writings, and, finally, the more difficult Sūtra. The hymns have been well selected on account of their poetic worth or ethical interest, and the Brahmana are so chosen as to exhibit the relation of this literature to the hymns. The connection of one part of the literature with another is dwelt upon (and will probably be more emphasized in the notes), while several passages have been inserted for the special purpose of illustrating one branch of writings by the following. The author has been averse to taking extracts already employed in other readers, and has given for the most part material not furnished by other books of the sort. We could almost have wished that he had been less particular in this respect, for as his reader will supersede those now in use, some of the best passages in e. g. Böhtlingk's chrestomathy could well have found a place here.

The vocabulary has evidently been the result of long and careful study ; it is not meant to be a mere list of the words found in the text, with English equivalents added, but aims at much more, and will, in fact, prove to the philological student, as well as to the special Sanskrit learner, one of the most useful portions of the book ; for the words are supplemented by notes calling attention to the radical and derived meaning, and this is illustrated by references to similar developments of signification in words taken from Latin, Greek, English, etc., where such occur, or sometimes simply to the linguistic equivalent in these tongues of the word discussed. It is needless to say that the philological portion is based on the highest authorities, and conducted in a scientific spirit. The wide variety of meanings contained in many Sanskrit words renders the first part of this plan doubly valuable, as nothing more surely impresses this range of meaning in the Sanskrit word on the mind of the learner than an apt comparison from languages with which the student is more familiar. Many of these are, of course, not original, some of those original might be open to discussion, but as a whole this treatment has been worked out by the author with much ingenuity. Opening at random, to illustrate his method, we come across *prsthā* (back), defined thus : "1, back, of an animal ; 2, the upper side, surface ; 3, top of a hill or palace [cf. Ger. first, ridge-pole of a house, A. S. first, *hrōf*, ridge-pole : observe that *vōros* has meanings 1, 2, and 3, that Lat. *tergum* has mean-

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ings 1 and 2, and that Eng. ridge has meanings 1 and 3]." Other parallels are often more full, and given, of course, with a greater number of etymologically parallel words.

The Vocabulary itself is based, as it should be, on the St. Petersburg Dictionary, although the author occasionally deviates from meanings there proposed. In the text he has wisely confined himself to that given by the best editions, and it is to be hoped will not, even in the notes, introduce any but the most important *variae lectiones* to the beginner's notice.

Emphasis should be laid upon the fact alluded to by the author in his preface, that this work is meant not solely for students reading under the eye of an instructor, but as well, and indeed chiefly, for those who desire to learn something of Sanskrit in their own private study. To meet the needs of those teachers or classical scholars who desire some acquaintance with this language is the principal aim of the book, and it is admirably suited for the purpose. Beside being well arranged for the requirements of such persons, the price for which the book is sold (by mail, two dollars!) will enable many to gain advantage from it whom the high prices paid for imported works of this kind have deterred from entering into the study. It is not too much to hope that before long every teacher of Greek and Latin will have gained from it an insight into Sanskrit literature, and an idea of the importance of the language for all philological study. With Professor Whitney's grammar and Professor Lanman's reader no classical scholar, and surely no classical teacher, can longer ignore a language the knowledge of which is essential to the understanding of the classical tongues themselves, aside from the charm its own literature may have.

The book is, finally, a handsome octavo of nearly three hundred pages, printed on heavy, wide-edged paper, from text-plates stereotyped in Berlin, while the Vocabulary is printed by J. S. Cushing of Boston. As the first work of like sort done in America, the execution is worthy of special note and praise.

E. W. Hopkins.

NEW YORK.

**QUOTATIONS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.** By CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY, Professor in Harvard University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo, pp. xliv, 321. 1884.

This is a valuable and timely book on an important subject. After all the older works dealing with the sources, methods, and formulas of quotation in the New Testament, and even after the more recent studies of Turpie, Böhl, and others, a thorough reexamination of the whole field was greatly needed. This investigation Professor Toy has undertaken in the work before us.

The method which he has adopted is to take the quotations one by one in the order of their occurrence in the books of the New Testament, comparing them with the Hebrew and Greek of the Old Testament sources. The procedure is strictly exegetical. There are manifest advantages in this plan; though they are to some degree offset by the fact that it makes the book hard reading, and probably less read than it deserves to be. We may hope that the author will be able to carry out his purpose of resuming the subject at some future time in a more constructive way.

In contrast to the prevailing apologetic tone of works in this field, the author has gone about his task in a critical spirit. In the Preface he has written these significant words : "I believe that the ethical-religious power of the Bible will be increased by perfectly free, fair-minded dealing, and by a precise knowledge of what it does or does not say. As its friends, we ought not to wish anything else than that it should be judged strictly on its merits ; for to wish anything else is a confession of weakness." In the Introduction Professor Toy has considered : The Formal Principles of New Testament Quotation (The Sources of the New Testament Text; The Free Manner of Citing); Hermeneutical Principles; Characters of the Quotations in the Several New Testament Books ; to which is added a list of works on the subject. The treatment of these topics is necessarily brief, but it is well studied and clear. The consideration of the hermeneutical principles, in particular, deserves attention. "We must distinguish," says the author, "between the biblical interpretation of the Evangelists and Apostles, and their authority as historians and teachers of ethics and religion. . . . Interpretation is as really a human and a modern science as astronomy or chemistry ; and to demand of the New Testament writers that they shall practice the historical methods of our day is to wish to tear them from their surroundings, and strip them of their human naturalness. It is an equal injustice to undervalue their religious power because of their ignorance of scientific methods, or to ascribe to them scientific knowledge because of the reverence we feel for them as religious teachers."

"We must judge the New Testament writers by the strictest rules of grammatical and historical exposition. Nor can we pursue any other method with the Scriptural citations of Him whose words are most sacred, Jesus himself, the essence of whose life and utterance is truth. . . . We must compare them with the original passages interpreted according to what we hold to be the best canons of hermeneutical science. The comparison must be made with all caution, humility, and reverence ; but the science of hermeneutics must be the final authority, even if it should seem to come in conflict with Him. To take any other position, out of reverence for his person, would be to deny his spirit and forget his teaching ; to assume his interpretation of the Old Testament to be the final authority is to assume that which can only be proved by investigation." On the other hand, if the strict, often mechanical, application of the best canons of hermeneutic science seems to bring us into conflict with the profoundest spiritual insight, we may reasonably ask ourselves whether something not less essential than syntax is not wanting in our science of interpretation, and whether an imperfect science is the final arbiter. If He splits open a hard saying of an old prophet, and gets out the kernel of truth, shall our science protest that He has not done justice to the shell ? The temptation of scientific exegesis always is that pharisaism which Neander, I think, defines as a preference for the shell without the kernel. Upon the principles and within the limits he has laid down for himself, Professor Toy has done his work with conscientious thoroughness. It will not need to be done over again. That there will be universal agreement with the critical positions of the writer, or with every detail of the exegetical conclusions, no one could expect ; but the method of the book is such as to make it hardly less useful to those who entirely dissent from its postulates, than to those who adopt them.

My own criticism must be limited to a single point, namely, the source  
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of those quotations which are not made, with more or less freedom, from the Septuagint. Professor Toy lays it down as a rule without an exception that these citations are not derived from the Hebrew, though they sometimes agree with it exactly, but always come from the oral Aramaic interpretation of the synagogue.

Back of this lies the assumption that the Hebrew, as a dead language, was not known to any of the New Testament writers except Paul. As this opinion prevails pretty widely, I will here briefly state the reasons which in my view are decisive against it.

In the first place, it is not exactly true that the Hebrew in the time of Jesus was a dead language. A language may long have ceased to be the vernacular of a community, and still be a living language in their use. Such for example is the position of the High German among the *plattdeutsch* speaking populations of some of the Prussian provinces. It is the language of the school, of the government, of the church; it is understood to some extent by almost all; it is spoken more or less constantly by large classes. Yet the Low German mother-tongue is everywhere the speech of common life. Something like this, I conceive, was the relation of Hebrew to Aramaic in Palestine in the time of Christ.

The middle of the second century before Christ witnessed a vigorous reaction against the denationalization which had long been going on. The Maccabees and the Pharisees belong to this reaction. That such a revival of religion and patriotism should make itself felt in language is only what we should expect. One of its consequences was the establishment of numerous common schools for the instruction of the youth of the nation in the Scriptures and the oral law. "The boy of five," we read in the Talmud, "is to be set to the study of the Scriptures; at ten to the oral law; at thirteen he becomes subject to the commandments," etc. That Hebrew was a living language a century before Christ is shown by the fact that the first book of the Maccabees was written in it. That it was not a dead language a century and a half after Christ, we see from the Mishna. Even later the *Midrashim*, writings not of a learned, but of a popular, edifying character, are chiefly in Hebrew. Traditions in the Talmud, whatever they are worth, point in the same direction. In Rosh Hashanah, 26 b, in a discussion about the meaning of a rare word in the Bible, appeal is made to living usage, and that not among the learned, but to the maid-servants in the house of Rabbi. In Sotah, 49 b, R. Jehuda says: "No one in Palestine ought to speak *Sursi* (the vulgar Aramaic of the country), but either Hebrew or Greek; and in Babylonia not Aramaic, but either Hebrew or Persian." That Jesus had some knowledge of Hebrew is evident from Luke iv. 16 ff., where He reads the lesson in the Prophets in the synagogue at Nazareth. We cannot suppose that the authorities of the synagogue would have allowed Jesus, whom they knew very well, to fill the place of a public reader unless they knew that He was competent. Professor Toy himself, upon this passage, says that "there is no great improbability in the supposition that Jesus understood Hebrew, though he was not versed in the rabbinical learning," though he offers the alternative that Luke has blundered, and confounded the reading with the comment. This alternative, however, would be, in the absence of other evidence, a naked begging of the question. But if Jesus, in the circumstances of his early life at Nazareth, had learned Hebrew enough to officiate in the synagogue, it is not very likely that men like the sons of Zebedee, who had been brought up

in a city, who were in comparatively good circumstances, and were well-connected, perhaps with priestly houses, were totally ignorant of it. In fact, if Jesus knew Hebrew, there is no great improbability in supposing that most of his chosen disciples knew as much.

Delitzsch, indeed, maintains ("The Hebrew New Testament," p. 30 f., and earlier in "Saat auf Hoffnung," 1874, which I have not seen) much more than this; more, I think, than the facts warrant. What is properly inferred from all the evidence is very well stated by Oort in his review of Delitzsch ("Theologisch Tijdschrift," 1884, p. 275).

A second difficulty which I find in Professor Toy's theory that the New Testament writers knew the Old Testament only through the oral interpretation in the synagogue is to understand how they became acquainted with the books which, so far as we know, were never read in the synagogue, — the Psalms, Proverbs, Job, etc. In the Temple worship of course they heard the Psalms; but an occasional opportunity to listen to the liturgical use of the Psalms in an unknown tongue does not account for their familiarity with them, which, to judge from the frequency of quotation, was as great as that which they had with any other part of the Old Testament.

The third, and to my mind the most insuperable objection, is found in the well-known character of the Aramaic versions. If the New Testament writers quote from a Targum, the Targum from which they quote must have been a translation as literal, perhaps *more* literal, than the Septuagint. There is no evidence that such a Targum ever existed. The history of these versions, as far as modern scholarship has made it out, is this. After the Old Testament in Hebrew had ceased to be generally understood by the hearers, an oral vernacular interpretation of the synagogue lessons was introduced, which followed the reading verse by verse or by short sections. This oral interpretation tended, as all things Jewish tended in that age, to assume the character of a fixed tradition in the hands of a guild of Methurgermanin, just as the oral law among its professors. Individual departures from the received way of rendering were regarded with disfavor; then were formally condemned. The inflexibility of a Semitic language makes it comparatively easy to repeat an established form of words. So the Targum, even while it remained unwritten, was a pretty definite thing. The general character of the result I have indicated by using the word *interpretation*, rather than *translation*. Especially in the Messianic passages the interpreter brings out the Messianic character as distinctly as he can. For the bold figures which the prophets use, he often substitutes plain prose, for he aims at edification, not at pedantic exactness. The desire to instruct and edify let in other elements of a Haggadic character, and this accretion gradually made the Targum more and more unlike the text. A reaction came, however, and Judaism, under the lead of R. Akiba's school, went back with fresh zeal to the letter. Aquila's Greek version supplanted in Jewish use the Septuagint, which had become meanwhile the Bible of the church. In the same spirit the traditional interpretation of the Pentateuch and the Prophets was subjected in Babylon to something like an official revision, in the course of which the exuberance of the *edifying* matter was severely retrenched. Professor Toy thinks that the "authorized" Pentateuch Targum (Onkelos) may have assumed its present form by 150 A. D., and that on the Prophets (Jonathan), a century later. Many modern scholars would bring them considerably lower

down ; but the earlier the date the greater the difficulty. For the Targum, especially of the Prophets, is far less literal, much more given to frank interpretation, than the New Testament quotations. To illustrate this take a few of the first quotations in Matthew. Thus, Matt. ii. 6 : "And thou Bethlehem, land of Judah, art in no wise least among the princes of Judah ; for out of thee shall come forth a governor, which shall be shepherd of my people Israel," is quoted from Micah v. 1, as Professor Toy thinks, through the medium of an Aramaic version. The Targum runs : "And thou, Bethlehem Ephrata, as thou art small to be counted among the thousands of the house of Judah, out of thee shall come forth before me the Messiah to exercise authority over Israel." Which is partly a more correct rendering of the Hebrew, partly explicit interpretation.

Matt. ii. 18 : A voice was heard in Rama, etc., from Jer. xxxi. 15, agreeing exactly with the Hebrew. The Targum has : "Thus saith Yahwe : a voice is heard in the high places of the earth, the house of Israel which was weeping and wailing after Jeremiah the prophet, when Nebuzaradan, the chief of the murderers, had sent him from Rama ; a lamentation, and they are weeping bitterly, Jerusalem weeps on account of her sons, and refuses to be comforted on account of her sons, because they have gone into captivity." This is interpretation ; on the whole, correct interpretation, and doubtless ancient, but it is certain that it has not influenced Matthew's translation or use of the passage.

The next quotation is Matt. ii. 23, which Professor Toy, in common with most scholars, traces to Is. xi. 1, as a play on the word *n̄ser*. But here again the Targum refuses to help us. It reads : "And the king shall proceed from the sons of Jesse, and the Messiah shall be consecrated of his sons' sons." Where the word *n̄ser* has been replaced by the prose equivalent. So in Matt. iii. 3 (Is. xl. 3-5), which the Targum correctly interprets of the returning exiles ; Matt. iv. 15 f. (Is. viii. 23, ix. 1), understood by the Targum of the Exodus from Egypt.

These examples, taken from the first pages of Matthew, might be indefinitely multiplied. They show how wide the difference between the extant Aramaic versions and the New Testament quotations. They do not differ in particulars, they differ utterly in character. It may be said in reply that no one supposes that the Targums we now hold in our hands are quoted from in the New Testament. But these Targums are the outcome of a development and a tradition, and what was in suspension cannot have been so different in character from what is in precipitation. One who holds that the oral interpretation of the synagogue is the source both of the New Testament quotations and of the written Targum ought to show under what influences, what was, in the time of Christ, a pretty literal translation, developed into the free exegetical paraphrases from which I have quoted. He should show how it came that while in the case of the Greek versions the tendency of the time was to servile literalness, in the Aramaic versions the drift was in exactly the opposite direction to paraphrastic looseness. We should need to have very cogent reason to believe that the explicit Messianic explanations, in which the written Targums abound, crept in after the controversy with Christianity began. The improbability of this is increased by the fact that the scanty fragments of the Palestinian Targum, which escaped the revision of the learned and represents in many ways the older form, is much more Haggadic and more Messianic than Onkelos and Jonathan.

The difficulties which beset Professor Toy's theory are to my apprehension much greater than the difficulty of supposing that the Evangelists sometimes quoted, with such freedom as the natural man who has not fallen into the bondage of literary pedantry allows himself, from the Hebrew of the Old Testament.

No doubt they were dependent on an oral tradition. Hebrew was not their vernacular. They learned it if at all by the natural method; not from dictionaries and grammars, but from the lips of the living teacher. They learned to read it by learning to speak it. But this tradition of the school, by which thousands of modern Jews acquire their knowledge of the Old Testament, a tradition which attaches itself to the original text, is a very different thing from the traditional interpretation of the synagogue for men who were wholly ignorant of the original.

The publishers have done their part, and made a handsome volume. The one exception to this praise is the use of a worn-out font of Hebrew type, which makes broken points very numerous.

*George F. Moore.*

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## LITERARY NOTES AND INTELLIGENCE.

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— The interest in Bryennios' new discovery in England shows, as the "Independent" remarks, that the British mind, if slower to move than the American, is of even greater momentum when aroused. The almost deutero-canonical value attached to the "Teaching" is illustrated by the meeting held by invitation, May 16th, in the famous Jerusalem Chamber of Westminster Abbey (now so closely identified with biblical research through the meetings of the Revisers in it), to listen to a lecture upon the  $\Delta\deltaaxi$ , from Dr. Hatch, the Bampton lecturer, upon "The Early Organization of Christianity."

Dr. Hatch, like Canon Farrar, and apparently most other English scholars who have noticed it, puts the origin of the "Teaching" a good deal earlier than Bryennios does, assigning it to the end of the first century. He regards it as a manual for catechumens. He points to the fact of its origin in a time when the Apostolate, in its wider sense, was still in vigorous working, and together with the office of Prophet, yet held the congregational offices of Bishop and Deacon in the background. Of course, then, the latent distinction of the two grades of the Episcopate could not yet develop itself.

Dr. Hatch points out the spirit of self-sacrifice and self-forgetfulness exhibited in the "Teaching" as the secret of the conversion of the Empire, and the revival of it in our time as the needed secret of the conversion of the world.

Besides the Anglican divines, several non-conformists were present, including Dr. Donald Fraser, Dr. Fairbairn, and Dr. Bevan. All seem to have been of one mind as to the value of the discovery for the past, and for the future.

— Dr. De Pressensé reports, in the "Christian World," that this year's Conference of Free Churches in France took up the important question of the eternity of future punishment. This led naturally to the question

of conditional immortality, and it was decided that this should form the subject of the general conference for the following year.

— The Tercentenary in Edinburgh has given birth to some literature of its own, including "The University of Edinburgh" (Edinburgh : Douglas), a reprint of a concise history of the University by the late Principal Lee; "Viri illustres. Acad. Jacob. Sext." (Edinburgh : Pentland), a list of the distinguished alumni of the University; "Our Tounis College" (Blackwood & Sons), by Mr. J. Harrison, an interesting account of the early days of the university.

— In "Hermathene" Professor Abbott gives a description of a palimpsest uncial, which Mr. Mahaffy borrowed from the Blenheim Library, and which is now in the British Museum, and takes its place as Wg. among the recognized MSS. of the New Testament.

— The fac-similes in the forthcoming catalogue of the Hebrew MSS. in Oxford will be published in a separate form, as specimens of various rabbinical writings, for the use of students.

— The Messrs. Bagster promise a verbatim reprint of the 1530 edition of Tyndale's translation of the Pentateuch. Dr. J. S. Momber edits it from the copy in the Lenox Library in New York. The various readings are noted of the edition of 1534, Matthew's Bible of 1537, the Latin Bible of Stephanus of 1528, and Luther's "Das Alte Testament" of 1523. Subscribers' names will be received till the end of September.

— In the "Deutsche Revue," Dr. Brugsch has finally spoken on M. Naville's discovery of Pithom. He fully accepts it, notwithstanding the modification of his own views which the acknowledgement involves, in a clear and forcible statement (says R. S. Poole), lucidly setting forth all the main data bearing on Pithom. The question of Pithom has thus finally passed from the domain of controversy to that of accepted fact.

— The "Wyclif Society," in a special prospectus, sets forth in full its aims and expectations of the ultimate publication of all the works of this great hero of general and of English Christianity. Wyclif died in 1384. Not till 466 years after was his English Bible printed. Not for 485 years his "Select English Works." Not till last year the rest of his English works. These show him as our first translator of the Bible and the Father of English Prose, but cast little light on his mental development or his immense influence as the teacher of Huss and the originator of the Reformation in Europe. Of the great mass of his Latin works only one of importance, the "Frialogus," has been printed.

Four hundred members, at one guinea a year, could probably in ten years publish everything. Such a subscription entitles to receive all the publications of the society for the year. Three guineas at once is equivalent to an original subscription. Subscriptions received by John W. Standerwick, General Post Office, London, E. C. The first volume for 1884 will either be "De Incarnatione Verbi," or "De Civili Dominio." Wyclif's idea of Dominion, says Green, represented to him what Luther's idea of Justification did to him. "De Veritate Scripturæ Sacrae," "De Mandatis Dei," and "De Statu Innocentiae," are also in hand for editing.

"Reading Notes on Wyclif," by John Edmands, Mercantile Library, Philadelphia, is a list of nearly one hundred and fifty works bearing more or less directly on Wyclif, this "character of almost unmatched intellectual and moral greatness," who a century and a half before Luther vindicated the subjective rights of Faith and the sole normative prerogatives of the Bible.

— S. Calvary & Co., Berlin, are about issuing a new edition of Mansi's "Concilia," which is now out of print. Thus the helps to history have decreased in proportion as the number of explorers in history has increased. The firm remark, "Mansi's work surpasses all preceding collections as respects completeness and critical treatment of the subject," and is "a trusty guide to lead us through the labyrinth of all the various ecclesiastical councils, — the oecumenical and the national, the episcopal and the provincial synods." The value of Mansi is indicated by the fact that Jaffé, in his "Regesta Pontificum Romanorum," and Hefele, in his history of the councils, as well as Ranke in his "Weltgeschichte," cite Mansi throughout. It is intended to give a *fac-simile* reproduction, so that the citations from Mansi, which have been in use for one hundred and thirty years, will need no readjustment of designation.

— Caspar René Gregory, leading editor of the Prolegomena to Tischendorf's Greek Testament, immediately on the appearance of the First Part of that great work, has been appointed by the Faculty of the University of Leipsic a Licentiate in Theology and Privat-docent in that University. His probationary or Inaugural Essay was to be read on the 17th ult., and the public "Disputation" on the same to be held on the 28th. "This appointment," says Professor Thayer, "is certainly a very unusual, if not an unprecedented, honor to be conferred on an American by the authorities of a leading German University." Dr. Gregory was born in Philadelphia in 1846, took his first degree at the University of Pennsylvania at seventeen, took a four years' course at Princeton Seminary, and has been at Leipsic since 1873, where he was made Ph. D. in 1876. His work best known to English biblical students is his translation of Luthardt's work on the origin of the Fourth Gospel, and also of Luthardt's Commentary on John. Dr. Gregory has contributed many articles to religious periodicals and newspapers, particularly the "Independent." His communication to this journal respecting the  $\Delta\delta\alpha\chi\eta\tau\omega\acute{\alpha}\tau\sigma\sigma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omega\nu$  first drew attention to it in America. Of the Theses of his "Disputation," the Second is: "Textus Novi Testamenti conjectura non prius emendandus erit quam codices, versiones, patres exhausti sunt." The Third: "Locus Mt. 16, 2, 3 expungendus est textu sacro." Fourth: "Angeli ecclesiarum Apoc. 2, 3 non sunt episcopi." Fifth: " $\Delta\delta\alpha\chi\eta\tau\omega\acute{\alpha}\tau\delta\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\acute{\pi}\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\tau}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\lambda}\omega\nu$  in  $\mathbb{E}$ gypto scripta est." Sixth: "In religione quæ dicitur naturali, nihil ex natura est nisi facultas concipiendi notionem Dei atque boni."

Since the above matter respecting Dr. Gregory went to press, we have received a full and interesting account of the actual holding of the Disputation on the Theses. The German journal in which it is contained speaks of it as of unusual importance from the present rarity of these Latin contests, once so famous and so common. We will give the substance of the account in our August number.

— Dr. Dorner is preparing for publication a work on "Christian Ethics." His lectures on this subject have been one of the attractions of the University of Berlin.

— A letter from Dr. Riggs to Secretary Clark, dated Constantinople, the 16th ult., alludes to the discovery of Archbishop Bryennios. Dr. Riggs remarks that both the language and the allusions of the  $\Delta\delta\alpha\chi\eta$  seem to him thoroughly consonant with the belief that it was written early in the second century. The use of the terms "prophet," "false prophet," "teacher," "try," etc. seems to accord entirely with their use

[July, 1884.]

in the New Testament. Dr. Riggs thinks Professor William Adams unfortunate in his designation of the "Teaching" as *apocryphal*, and his comparison of it to the "Gospel of the Infancy" and the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," inasmuch as the  $\Delta\delta\alpha\chi\eta$  does not, like these, claim or purport to be what it is not. Dr. Riggs remarks that there is an apocryphal book entitled "Teaching of the Apostles," but that it is an entirely different book from the "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," edited by Archbishop Bryennios.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

## FROM HARPER AND BROTHERS, NEW YORK.

The Great Argument; or, Jesus Christ in the Old Testament. By William H. Thomson, M. A., M. D. Pp. xliv., 471. 1884.

## FROM METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, PHILLIPS AND HUNT, AGENTS, NEW YORK.

A Higher Catechism of Theology. By William Burt Pope, D. D., Theological Tutor, Didsbury College, Manchester. Pp. vi., 389. 1884. \$1.50.

## FROM ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH AND COMPANY, NEW YORK.

Urbané and his Friends. By Mrs. E. Prentiss, author of "Stepping Heavenward," "The Story Lizzie told," "The Flower of the Family," etc., etc. Pp. 287. \$1.50.

The Biblical Museum: A Collection of Notes Explanatory, Homiletic, and Illustrative, on the Holy Scriptures, especially designed for the use of Ministers, Bible-Students, and Sunday-School Teachers. By James Comper Gray, author of "Topics for Teachers," "The Class and the Desk," etc., etc. Old Testament, Vol. VIII. Containing the Book of Isaiah. Pp. 384. \$1.25. Vol. IX. Containing the Book of Jeremiah, Lamentations, and Ezekiel. Pp. 384. \$1.25.

## FROM FUNK AND WAGNALLS, NEW YORK.

Brahmoism; or, History of Reformed Hinduism. From its origin in 1830, under Rajah Mohun Roy, to the present time. With a particular account of Babu Keshub Chunder Sen's connection with the movement. By Ram Chandra Bose, M. A., of Lucknow, India. Pp. 222. 1884. \$1.25.

## FROM HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, BOSTON.

Government Revenue: Especially the American System. An Argument for Industrial Freedom against the Fallacies of Free Trade. By Ellis H. Roberts. 12mo, pp. 389. 1884. \$1.50.

A Home in Italy. By Mrs. E. D. R. Bianciardi. 16mo, pp. 300. 1884. \$1.25.

Summer: From the Journal of Henry D. Thoreau. Edited by H. G. O. Blake. Pp. v., 382. 1884. \$1.50.

A Country Doctor. By Sarah Orne Jewett. 16 mo, pp. 351. 1884. \$1.25.

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
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
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